As Quartet Representative, Blair coordinated an intensive effort during the 2011 negotiations to rebuild Gaza’s economy and infrastructure through mechanisms now embedded in the US President’s plan. The 2025 framework adopts the same infrastructure priorities and governance model developed over those years. 

The Infrastructure Blueprint 

The continuities are specific. The April 2011 report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee listed the following: containerised water desalination units for Gaza, sewage treatment plants at Sheikh Ajleen and Khan Yunis, upgraded electricity supply, and facilitated construction materials for approved projects. These projects had secured funding and implementation partners. 

Trump’s plan commits to “rehabilitation of infrastructure (water, electricity, sewage), rehabilitation of hospitals and bakeries, and entry of necessary equipment to remove rubble and open roads.” The priorities match the 2011 programme. 

The Gaza Marine gas field appears in both frameworks. The 2011 package included “approval in principle of the supply of Palestinian offshore gas to Gaza power plants” with preliminary discussions to conclude within three months. Trump’s plan promises Gaza will be “redeveloped” and “energised” through expertise from “thriving modern miracle cities in the Middle East.” 

The Governance Model 

Point 9 of Trump’s plan establishes Gaza under “temporary transitional governance of a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee” with “oversight and supervision by a new international transitional body.” 

The 2011 work focused on Palestinian Authority institution-building and technocratic capacity. Reports from that period documented judicial reforms, PA security force training, and economic policy development. The 2025 plan imposes this model rather than building towards it through negotiation. 

The “Board of Peace” chaired by President Trump, with Blair among its members, formalises the coordination role performed between 2007 and 2015. The Office of the Quartet Representative worked with Israeli, Palestinian and international partners on movement and access, private sector development and infrastructure projects. 

From Negotiation to Enforcement 

The earlier approach relied on incremental improvements. The 2011 report included approval of 20 construction projects, release of 0.6 megahertz of electromagnetic spectrum for Palestinian mobile operators, extended operating hours at Allenby Bridge crossing and issuance of 5,250 work permits for Palestinians in Israel. 

The economic results were measurable. In 2010, real GDP growth in the Palestinian territories reached 9% and unemployment fell from 24.5% to 23.4%. Poverty rates had declined from 31.2% in 2007 to 21.9% by 2009. Despite this, Gaza experienced successive conflicts in 2014, 2021 and the 2023-2025 war. 

Trump’s plan retains the economic development model and adds enforcement. Point 13 mandates that “all military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, including tunnels and weapon production facilities, will be destroyed and not rebuilt.” Point 15 establishes an International Stabilisation Force to “immediately deploy in Gaza” and train Palestinian police forces. 

Where the 2011 approach required negotiating with Israel for each checkpoint opening and export permission, the current plan declares: “If Hamas delays or rejects this proposal, the above … will proceed in the terror-free areas handed over from the IDF to the ISF.” 

The Record 

The 2011 work operated on a premise; improved material conditions and institutional capacity would enable political resolution. Reports from that period documented GDP growth, judicial efficiency gains and infrastructure improvements. 

The World Bank noted in 2010 that if the PA maintained its institution-building performance, it was “well-positioned for the establishment of a state in the near future.” In 2025, statehood remains conditional. Point 19 states: “when the PA reform programme is faithfully carried out, the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination.” 

The 2025 plan applies the same economic development sequence along with military guarantees that Hamas cannot disrupt the process. The infrastructure needs identified in 2011 remain the infrastructure priorities in 2025. The governance model advocated then has become the governance model to be implemented now. The theory – that economic development and institutional capacity can create conditions for political resolution – has survived multiple wars and returned with harder guarantees. The next phase will test if those guarantees can succeed where diplomacy and development funding have not. 

 

AUTHOR

Vision of Humanity Logo – Black-Grey (VOH Logo)

Vision of Humanity

Editorial Staff

Vision of Humanity

Vision of Humanity is brought to you by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), by staff in our global offices in Sydney, New York, Brussels, The Hague, Nairobi and Taguig. Alongside maps and global indices, we present fresh perspectives on current affairs reflecting our editorial philosophy.