


# MEXICO PEACE INDEX 2021

**IDENTIFYING AND  
MEASURING THE FACTORS  
THAT DRIVE PEACE**



## **Quantifying Peace and its Benefits**

The Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank dedicated to shifting the world's focus to peace as a positive, achievable, and tangible measure of human well-being and progress.

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 2021 report is the eighth edition of the Mexico Peace Index (MPI), produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). It provides a comprehensive measure of peacefulness in Mexico, including trends, analysis and estimates of the economic impact of violence on the country. The MPI is based on the Global Peace Index, the world's leading measure of global peacefulness, produced by IEP every year since 2007.

Mexico's peacefulness improved by 3.5 percent in 2020. After four years of successive deteriorations, this marks a change in trend following the sharp increases in violence recorded between 2015 and 2018. This change can be traced to well before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Homicide and firearms crime rates peaked in July 2018 and have since been gradually declining. Other crime rates began to fall in mid-2019, which also preceded the pandemic.

While improvements were occurring prior to the onset of COVID-19, further reductions in specific types of violence in 2020 followed the implementation of public health measures and stay-at-home orders. Crimes typically associated with people's everyday movements — such as robberies, assaults, kidnappings and extortion — all recorded notable improvements in 2020.

To highlight the changing trend in peacefulness in Mexico, the MPI finds that falls in peacefulness have historically occurred in most of the states. Between 2015 and 2019, 25 of the 32 states recorded deteriorations in peacefulness. However, in 2020, 22 states improved, while only ten deteriorated. Violence in Mexico has become increasingly concentrated, particularly along key drug trafficking routes. In these areas, rival groups are engaged in violent contests over territory that continue to drive the high homicide rates. In 2020, just six states accounted for more than half of all homicides: Guanajuato, the state of México, Baja California, Chihuahua, Jalisco, and Michoacán.

Over the past year, four of the five indicators in the MPI have shown improvements. The largest of these improvements was in Mexico's violent crime rate, which fell by 13.3 percent. This trend was largely due to a fall in opportunistic crimes, with the rates of robberies and assaults falling by 22.3 and 13.2 percent, respectively. Although the violent crime rate had begun to decline slightly from late 2019, it fell significantly after March 2020, with people spending more time at home due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Since 2015, the national homicide rate has increased by 84.1 percent. However, in the past year there was a reduction of 1.3 percent. Despite this marginal improvement, Mexico's homicide rate remains at historically high levels, at 27.8 deaths per 100,000 people, or over 35,000 victims. Prior to 2018, Mexico did not have a year on record with more than 30,000 homicides.

The only indicator to deteriorate in 2020 was *detention without a sentence*. This was the first time since 2015 that this indicator deteriorated. The number of detainees without a sentence increased substantially after March 2020, which appears to be related to the partial shutdown of criminal courts during the pandemic. Prior to COVID-19, legal reforms had sought to reduce the use of pre-trial detention.

In 2020, Yucatán was the most peaceful state in Mexico for the fourth consecutive year, followed by Tlaxcala, Campeche, Chiapas and Nayarit. Baja California remained Mexico's least peaceful state in 2020, followed by Colima, Zacatecas, Chihuahua and Guanajuato. All of the five least peaceful states had homicide rates of over 64 deaths per 100,000 people.

The largest improvements over the last year occurred in Quintana Roo, Mexico City, Guerrero, Tabasco and Campeche. The largest deteriorations in 2020 occurred in Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí, Sonora, Guanajuato and Michoacán. Three of these states — Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí and Guanajuato — are located in the greater Bajío region of Northern Central Mexico and share borders with one another. In recent years, this region has become the location of a violent struggle between several national drug cartels for dominance in the surging fentanyl market.

Despite an overall improvement in peace in 2020, Mexico remains the country with the ninth highest homicide rate in the world. It is also home to the five cities with the highest homicide rates in the world: Tijuana, Ciudad Juárez, Uruapan, Irapuato and Ciudad Obregón.<sup>1</sup> The most violent city, Tijuana, recorded a homicide rate of 134 deaths per 100,000 people in 2019, more than 20 times higher than the global average.

High levels of violence in Mexico have also affected security forces, political figures and journalists. In 2020, 524 police officers were killed, marking a 17.5 percent increase from the previous year. Political assassinations are also on the rise, with at least 139 politicians, government officials and candidates killed between September 2020 and March 2021. Journalists also face danger when they cover issues related to organized crime. Mexico remains one of the most dangerous places in the world to be a journalist, with at least eight journalists and media professionals killed in connection with their work in 2020.<sup>2,3</sup>

There are distinct trends for male and female victims of homicide in Mexico. Ninety percent of all homicide victims are male, with the majority of these linked to organized crime. Highlighting the gravity of the situation, homicide was the leading cause of death for males aged 10 to 54.<sup>4</sup>

By contrast, female deaths are more likely to be associated with intimate partner violence. Femicides have risen at a similar rate to male homicides,

increasing by 116 percent since 2015. Unlike the predominance of firearms in male homicide, the majority of femicides are committed by some other means.

The organized crime rate has increased by 40.5 percent since 2015. This follows the fragmentation of major criminal organizations and the proliferation of smaller organized crime groups that have heightened competition over territory, access to drug trafficking routes and control of illicit rackets. Gun violence has risen in line with organized crime activity, and violent confrontations between rival criminal groups have driven Mexico's homicide rate. In 2020, it was estimated that as many as two-thirds of homicides in Mexico were related to organized crime.<sup>5</sup>

The economic impact of violence in Mexico is estimated to be 4.71 trillion pesos (US\$221 billion) in 2020, equivalent to 22.5 percent of Mexico's GDP. At this level it is more than seven times higher than government expenditure on the public health system and more than six times higher than government expenditure on the education system in 2020. On a per capita basis, the economic impact of violence was 36,893 pesos (US\$1,730), approximately two times the average monthly salary in Mexico. If the level of violence in all states were reduced to the level in the five most peaceful states, this would result in a peace dividend of 3.3 trillion pesos (US\$154 billion) per year — equivalent to 16 percent of Mexico's GDP.

The economic impact of violence improved for the second year in a row in 2020, decreasing by 1.8 percent or 88 billion pesos from the previous year. The improvement in 2020 was led by decreases in opportunistic crimes such as kidnapping, robbery, extortion and violent assaults. This was followed by improvements in the economic impact of homicide, which fell 72.3 billion pesos in 2020. However, military expenditure and spending on private protection costs increased from the previous year.

To effectively address violence, Mexico must increase its spending on the criminal justice system. In 2020, Mexico reported the lowest domestic security and justice spending as a percentage of GDP of all of the 37 countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), at 0.73 percent of GDP. This is less than half the OECD average of 1.68 percent. It is also the lowest percentage of all Latin America and the Caribbean countries, with the average rate in the region being similar to the OECD average.

In the last six years, spending on domestic security decreased by 31.4 while spending on the justice system decreased by 2.9 percent. Consequently, Mexico has found it difficult to build sufficient capacity in its judicial system to meet the country's needs. For instance, Mexico averages 2.2 judges per 100,000 people,<sup>6</sup> eight times fewer than the global average. This deficit limits the capacity of the judicial system to process cases, leading to high impunity rates.

Globally, Mexico ranks 71<sup>st</sup> out of 163 countries in the Positive Peace Index and ranks sixth in Central America and the Caribbean. Positive Peace is a measure of the

*attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies*, and Mexico's Positive Peace results are considerably stronger than its ranking on the Global Peace Index, where it ranks 137<sup>th</sup>, highlighting its potential for improvement.

*Well-Functioning Government* and the *Low Levels of Corruption* were the only Pillars of Positive Peace that deteriorated in Mexico over the last decade. IEP research shows how weaknesses in both of these Pillars create a systemic effect that subsequently leads to increases in violence. In Mexico between 2008 and 2019, deteriorations in perceptions of corruption coincided with decreases in government effectiveness. Following these changes, violent demonstrations, perceptions of criminality and homicide rates all increased. This result shows the strong link between Positive Peace and violence. It also highlights that tackling violence without addressing underlying drivers may not be sufficient to solving issues in Mexico in the long term.

“

Gun violence has risen in line with organized crime activity, and violent confrontations between rival criminal groups have driven Mexico's homicide rate.

Tackling corruption is key to addressing violence in Mexico. *Low Levels of Corruption* is Mexico's weakest Pillar and with scores among the lowest for the region. Over the last decade, the population's assessment of the government, confidence in the political process, and trust in the rule of law have all deteriorated, especially in regards to corruption. Mexico ranks 117<sup>th</sup> out of 163 countries in terms of control of corruption, as assessed by the World Economic Forum, and has fallen 46 places in the last decade. Perceived corruption of judges has increased by 4.5 percentage points since 2015, the largest deterioration among public security institutions.

This report also includes examples of the practical application of Positive Peace in Mexico at the national, state and local level. IEP has led numerous Positive Peace workshops and conferences to help civil society organizations, communities and individuals develop practical and concrete actions to strengthen peace by enhancing the *attitudes, institutions and structures* associated with Positive Peace. In the last three years, IEP has provided training to more than 2,500 local public servants in Mexico as well as more than 3,000 members of the armed forces.

Simply addressing the factors that drive violence will not be enough to sustain peace. Improving peacefulness in Mexico requires broader strategies that include addressing corruption and building effective institutions that are trusted by the public. In order to address elevated levels of violence, a holistic, integrated public security and peacebuilding framework is needed. The 2021 MPI report provides evidence for policy makers, business leaders and civil society organizations to help develop new and broader peacebuilding solutions for Mexico.

# KEY FINDINGS

## SECTION 1: RESULTS & TRENDS

### 2020 Results

- In 2020, Mexico's peacefulness improved by 3.5 percent, after four years of successive deteriorations. This was driven by improvements in four of the five indicators, led by a 13.3 percent decline in the violent crime rate.
- The improvements recorded in 2020 are significant as they show a change from the sharp increases in violence recorded between 2015 and 2018. In the past two years, violence in Mexico has become increasingly concentrated, particularly along key drug trafficking routes.
- Twenty-two of Mexico's 32 states improved in peacefulness in 2020, while ten states deteriorated. This marks the first year since 2015 that the majority of states experienced an overall improvement in peacefulness.
- In 2020, Mexico's homicide rate was 27.8 per 100,000 people, a 1.3 percent decrease compared to 2019. Mexico has the ninth highest homicide rate globally.
- Despite this slight improvement, Mexico's homicide rate remains near historically high levels, with over 35,000 homicides recorded in 2020. Prior to 2018, Mexico did not have a year on record with more than 30,000 homicides.
- Mexico is home to the five cities with the highest homicide rates in the world: Tijuana, Ciudad Juárez, Uruapan, Irapuato, and Ciudad Obregón. Tijuana has the highest homicide rate, at 134 per 100,000 people.<sup>7</sup>
- Quintana Roo recorded the largest improvement in overall score, driven by a 35 percent decline in its firearms crime rate.
- Zacatecas recorded the largest deterioration in overall score, driven by a 65.5 percent increase in its homicide rate.
- The improvement in the national violent crime rate was driven mainly by a 22.3 percent decline in the robbery rate and a 13.3 percent decline in the assault rate.
- The violent crime rate fell significantly after March 2020, with people spending more time at home due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
- Yucatán remains the most peaceful state, followed by Tlaxcala, Chiapas, Campeche and Nayarit.
- For the third consecutive year, Baja California is the least peaceful state in Mexico, followed by Colima, Zacatecas, Chihuahua and Guanajuato.

- Violence against security services has been increasing, with 524 police officers killed in 2020, a 17.5 percent rise from the previous year.
- Political assassinations are also on the rise, with at least 139 politicians, government officials and candidates killed between September 2020 and March 2021.<sup>8</sup>

### Six-year trends

- Mexico's peacefulness has declined by 18.8 percent over the last six years. The deterioration was mainly driven by an 84 percent increase in the national homicide rate, rising from 15.1 deaths per 100,000 people in 2015 to 27.8 in 2020.
- Seven states have recorded improvements in their homicide rates since 2015, while 25 deteriorated.
- Gun violence is also on the rise, with the national firearms crime rate almost doubling, from 14.6 crimes per 100,000 people in 2015 to 27.7 in 2020.
- The violent crime rate increased by 7.1 percent from 2015 to 2020, driven by large increases in family violence and sexual assault rates, which have risen by 63.6 and 59.9 percent, respectively.
- The organized crime rate has increased by 40.5 percent since 2015. The largest deterioration occurred for the rate of retail drug crimes, which increased by 125 percent.
- By contrast, the *detention without a sentence* indicator has improved every year, except in 2020. Since 2015, the total number of detainees without a sentence has declined by 4.5 percent.

## SECTION 2: ECONOMIC VALUE OF PEACE

- The economic impact of violence in Mexico was 4.71 trillion pesos (US\$221 billion) in 2020, equivalent to 22.5 percent of the country's GDP.
- The economic impact of violence improved for the second year in a row in 2020, decreasing by 1.8 percent or 88 billion pesos from the previous year.
- The economic impact of violence was more than seven times higher than public investments made in health care and more than six times higher than those made in education in 2020.
- Mexico's spending on domestic security and the justice system in 2020 was equal to 0.73 percent of GDP, the least of any Latin American country or any member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

- Spending on domestic security decreased by 31.4 percent from 2015 to 2020, while spending on the justice system decreased by 2.9 percent.
- Homicide comprised 47 percent of the economic impact of violence in 2020, equivalent to 2.2 trillion pesos (US\$105 billion).
- The economic impact of violence was 36,893 pesos (US\$1,730) per person, approximately two times the average monthly salary in Mexico.
- The per capita economic impact of violence varies significantly from state to state, ranging from 11,146 pesos in Yucatán to 77,957 pesos in Colima.
- The economic impact of private protection costs increased by 86.2 percent in 2020, the largest percentage increase of any indicator. Businesses purchasing protective measures drove the increase, particularly in Mexico City.
- Since 2015, nine states have recorded improvements in their economic impact of violence, with each state improving by an average of 17 percent. In contrast, 23 states have recorded deteriorations in their economic impact, with each state deteriorating on average by 66.9 percent.
- If the level of violence in all states were reduced to the level in the five most peaceful states, this would result in a peace dividend of 3.3 trillion pesos (US\$154 billion) per year.

### SECTION 3: POSITIVE PEACE

- Globally, Mexico ranks 71<sup>st</sup> out of 163 countries in the 2020 Positive Peace Index and ranks sixth in Central America and the Caribbean. This is much higher than its ranking on the Global Peace Index, highlighting its potential for improvement.

- Mexico's score in the global Positive Peace Index improved by 2.9 percent over the past decade, which is lower than the average global improvement of 3.3 percent.
- The Pillars showing the greatest improvements in the past ten years were *Sound Business Environment*, at 15.5 percent, and *Free Flow of Information*, at 13.5 percent.
- The largest deteriorations were recorded for the *Well-Functioning Government* and *Low Levels of Corruption* Pillars. Deteriorations in these two pillars are statistically linked to increases in violence and homicides.
- *Low Levels of Corruption* is the weakest Pillar in Mexico.
- In 2020, insecurity ranked as the largest concern for Mexican citizens, followed by unemployment and health.
- The sub-national Mexico Positive Peace Index (MPPI) showed substantial variation across Mexico's states. Nuevo León, Colima and Baja California Sur have the strongest levels of Positive Peace, while Guerrero, Chiapas and Puebla have the weakest.
- Some states have high levels of Positive Peace while also recording high levels of violence. This is in part associated with a strong presence of organized crime, which can distort the relationship between levels of violence and Positive Peace.
- Organized crime tends to flourish where the *Well-Functioning Government* and *Low Levels of Corruption* Pillars are weak.




**VISION OF HUMANITY**  
[visionofhumanity.org](http://visionofhumanity.org)

Explore the data on the interactive Mexico Peace Index map: see how peace changes over time, compare levels of peace between states and discover how the states fare according to each indicator of peace.


# 2021 MEXICO PEACE INDEX

A SNAPSHOT OF THE STATE OF PEACE IN MEXICO

MPI SCORE



RANK	STATE	SCORE	RANK	STATE	SCORE
1	Yucatán	1.318	17	Nuevo León	2.496
2	Tlaxcala	1.587	18	Mexico City	2.517
3	Chiapas	1.613	19	Baja California Sur	2.607
4	Campeche	1.691	20	Jalisco	2.691
5	Nayarit	1.872	21	México	2.943
6	Hidalgo	1.911	22	San Luis Potosí	2.956
7	Coahuila	2.003	23	Michoacán	3.142
8	Puebla	2.005	24	Morelos	3.143
9	Durango	2.088	25	Guerrero	3.15
10	Veracruz	2.15	26	Quintana Roo	3.304
11	Aguascalientes	2.197	27	Sonora	3.312
12	Tamaulipas	2.216	28	Guanajuato	3.856
13	Oaxaca	2.266	29	Chihuahua	3.867
14	Querétaro	2.39	30	Zacatecas	4.17
15	Tabasco	2.448	31	Colima	4.203
16	Sinaloa	2.493	32	Baja California	4.411




# 1

# RESULTS

## 2020 RESULTS

- In 2020, Mexico's peacefulness improved by 3.5 percent, after four years of successive deteriorations. This was driven by improvements in four of five indicators, led by a 9.2 percent decline in the *violent crime* score.
- The improvements recorded in 2020 are significant as they show a slight improvement following the sharp increases in violence recorded between 2015 and 2018. In the past two years, violence in Mexico has become increasingly concentrated in specific states.
- Twenty-two of Mexico's 32 states improved in peacefulness in 2020, while 10 states deteriorated. This marks the first year since 2015 that the majority of states experienced an overall improvement in peacefulness.
- In 2020, Mexico's homicide rate was 27.8 per 100,000 people, a 1.3 percent decrease compared to 2019. Mexico has the ninth highest homicide rate globally.
- Despite this slight improvement, Mexico's homicide rate remains near historically high levels, with over 35,000 homicides recorded in 2020. Prior to 2018, Mexico did not have a year on record with more than 30,000 homicides.
- Mexico is home to the five cities with the highest homicide rates in the world: Tijuana, Ciudad Juárez, Uruapan, Irapuato and Ciudad Obregón. Tijuana has the highest homicide rate, at 134 per 100,000 people.
- The improvement in the violent crime score was driven mainly by a 22.3 percent decline in the robbery rate and a 13.2 percent decline in the assault rate.
- The rate of improvement in the violent crime rate increased significantly after March 2020, with people spending more time at home due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
- Violence against security services has been increasing with 524 police officers killed in 2020, a 17.5 percent rise from the previous year.
- Political assassinations are also on the rise with at least 139 politicians, government officials and candidates killed between September 2020 and March 2021.
- In 2020, more than 8,200 people were reported missing or disappeared. The homicide rate could be significantly higher if it included all those missing due to homicide.
- Quintana Roo recorded the largest improvement in overall score, driven by a 35 percent decline in its firearms crime rate.
- Zacatecas recorded the largest deterioration in overall score, driven by a 65.5 percent increase in its homicide rate.
- Yucatán remains the most peaceful state, followed by Tlaxcala, Chiapas, Campeche and Nayarit.
- For the third consecutive year, Baja California is the least peaceful state in Mexico, followed by Colima, Zacatecas, Chihuahua and Guanajuato.



## SIX-YEAR TRENDS

- Mexico's peacefulness has declined by 18.8 percent over the last six years. The deterioration was mainly driven by an 84 percent increase in the national homicide rate, rising from 15.1 deaths per 100,000 people in 2015 to 27.8 in 2020.
- However, homicides and firearms crime peaked in the month of July 2018 and have since been gradually declining. Following the steep increases in homicide and firearms crimes rates in the years prior, the levelling of these rates since mid-2018 is significant as it points to a change in trend.
- Seven states have recorded improvements in their homicide rates since 2015, while 25 deteriorated.
- The violent crime rate increased by 7.1 percent from 2015 to 2020, driven by large increases in family violence and sexual assault rates, which have risen by 63.6 and 59.9 percent, respectively.
- Gun violence is also on the rise, with the national firearms crime rate almost doubling, from 14.6 firearms crimes per 100,000 people in 2015 to 27.7 in 2020.
- The organized crime rate has increased by 40.5 percent since 2015. The largest deterioration occurred for the rate of retail drug crimes, which increased by 125 percent.
- Twenty states recorded deteriorations in their organized crime rates since 2015, compared to only 12 that improved.
- By contrast, the detention without a sentence indicator has improved every year, except in 2020. Since 2015, the total number of detainees without a sentence has declined by 4.5 percent.
- Zacatecas recorded the largest overall deterioration in peacefulness between 2015 and 2020, followed by Colima, Guanajuato, Chihuahua and Baja California.
- Tamaulipas has experienced the largest overall improvement over the last six years, followed by Sinaloa, Guerrero, Coahuila and Chiapas.

TABLE 1.1

**Mexico Peace Index results, 2021**

A lower score indicates a higher level of peacefulness.

MPI RANK	STATE	OVERALL SCORE	HOMICIDE	VIOLENT CRIME	FIREARMS CRIME	ORGANIZED CRIME	DETENTION WITHOUT A SENTENCE	OVERALL CHANGE, 2019-2020	
1	Yucatán	1.318	1.167	1.133	1.042	1.454	2.697	0.066	↔
2	Tlaxcala	1.587	1.583	1.305	1.289	1.581	3.098	0.032	↔
3	Chiapas	1.613	1.544	1.444	1.372	1.629	2.874	-0.064	↔
4	Campeche	1.691	1.533	1.223	1.345	1.723	4.297	-0.267	↑1
5	Nayarit	1.872	1.891	1.266	1.499	1.614	5	-0.081	↓1
6	Hidalgo	1.911	1.72	2.732	1.756	1.672	1.488	-0.125	↔
7	Coahuila	2.003	1.495	2.274	1.312	3.204	1.766	-0.041	↔
8	Puebla	2.005	1.984	2.654	1.936	1.561	1.716	-0.248	↑1
9	Durango	2.088	1.649	2.463	1.455	2.904	2.196	-0.082	↓1
10	Veracruz	2.15	2.135	2.178	2.199	2.316	1.569	-0.249	↑2
11	Aguascalientes	2.197	1.368	3.167	1.49	3.425	1.307	-0.075	↓1
12	Tamaulipas	2.216	2.237	2.783	1.747	2.396	1.35	-0.199	↑1
13	Oaxaca	2.266	2.487	2.55	2.573	1.628	1.606	-0.2	↑1
14	Querétaro	2.39	1.584	3.013	1.608	4.084	1.29	0.043	↓3
15	Tabasco	2.448	2.501	3.36	2.335	1.942	1.464	-0.481	↑6
16	Sinaloa	2.493	2.601	2.595	2.401	2.747	1.387	-0.157	↑1
17	Nuevo León	2.496	2.023	2.727	2.421	3.393	1.503	-0.094	↓1
18	Mexico City	2.517	1.933	4.107	2.285	2.378	1.479	-0.505	↑6
19	Baja California Sur	2.607	1.554	3.411	1.274	5	1.496	-0.101	↓1
20	Jalisco	2.691	3.008	2.916	2.433	2.589	1.822	-0.136	↓1
21	México	2.943	2.06	4.783	2.38	3.536	1.271	0.034	↓1
22	San Luis Potosí	2.956	2.662	2.963	2.724	4.167	1.437	0.366	↓7
23	Michoacán	3.142	4.195	2.225	4.41	1.856	1.798	0.128	↔
24	Morelos	3.143	3.942	3.429	3.094	2.42	1.414	-0.224	↑1
25	Guerrero	3.15	3.485	2.308	3.337	3.962	1.499	-0.5	↑2
26	Quintana Roo	3.304	3.419	3.944	2.755	3.689	1.551	-0.709	↑4
27	Sonora	3.312	4.3	2.28	3.412	3.234	2.268	0.298	↓5
28	Guanajuato	3.856	5	3.313	5	2.657	1.28	0.167	↔
29	Chihuahua	3.867	5	2.641	4.894	3.29	1.785	0.024	↔
30	Zacatecas	4.17	5	2.754	4.647	5	1.404	0.749	↓4
31	Colima	4.203	5	3.344	5	4.224	1.418	-0.027	↔
32	Baja California	4.411	5	3.296	5	5	2.11	-0.055	↔
<b>NATIONAL</b>		<b>2.694</b>	<b>2.743</b>	<b>2.991</b>	<b>2.65</b>	<b>2.812</b>	<b>1.529</b>	<b>-0.098</b>	


Source: IEP



## METHODOLOGY AT A GLANCE

The Mexico Peace Index (MPI) is based on the work of the Global Peace Index, the leading global measure of peacefulness, produced by IEP annually since 2007. The MPI follows a similar methodology to the United Kingdom Peace Index and the United States Peace Index, also produced by IEP, and measures negative peace, which is defined as “the absence of violence or fear of violence”. This is the eighth iteration of the MPI. The MPI primarily uses data published by the Executive Secretary of the National System for Public Security / *Secretariado Ejecutivo de Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública* (SESNSP). However, wherever possible, the official data is adjusted for underreporting and contextualized using other datasets. A detailed review of the methodology can be found in Section 5.

The MPI is composed of the following five indicators, scored between 1 and 5, where 1 represents the most peaceful score and 5 the least peaceful.



GLOBAL PEACE INDEX 2020

### HOMICIDE

The number of victims of intentional homicide per 100,000 people.

Source: SESNSP

### VIOLENT CRIME

The number of violent crimes per 100,000 people, adjusted for underreporting. Violent crimes include robbery, assault, sexual violence and violence within the family.

Source: SESNSP

### ORGANIZED CRIME

Organized crime is made up of the following sub-indicators: extortions; major offenses; retail drug crime offenses; and kidnapping or human trafficking investigations.

Extortion, kidnapping and human trafficking rates are adjusted for underreporting.

Major organized crime offenses include:

- the federal crimes of production, transport, trafficking, trade, supply, or possession of drugs or other crimes under the *Crimes Against Public Health law / Los Delitos contra La Salud Pública*
- crimes classed under the *Law Against Organized Crime / La Ley Contra El Crimen Organizada*, which includes all of the above crimes when three or more people conspire to commit them.

Retail drug crimes is used as a proxy indicator of the size of the market fueled by illegal drug production and distribution.

The crimes included in the *organized crime* indicator are

weighted against each other to derive the indicator score. Indicator sub-weights adjust the scores based on the distribution of crimes, the relative social impact of the offense, and the degree to which the crime represents the presence of criminal organizations.

Source: SESNSP

### FIREARMS CRIME

The number of victims of an intentional or negligent homicide or assault committed with a firearm per 100,000 people.

Source: SESNSP

### DETENTION WITHOUT A SENTENCE

The ratio of people in prison without a sentence to the number of violent crimes (including homicide).

Source: National Security Commission / *Comisión Nacional de Seguridad* (CNS)

### UNDERREPORTING AND ADJUSTMENT

Two of the indicators — *violent crime* and *organized crime* — are adjusted for underreporting. In 2020, 92.4 percent of crimes in Mexico did not make it into the official statistics because they were either not reported to the authorities or because no investigation was opened.<sup>3</sup> IEP uses the National Survey of Victimization and Perceptions of Public Security / *Encuesta Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad Pública* (ENVIPE) of the National Institute of Statistics and Geography / *Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía* (INEGI) to calculate underreporting rates for each state and crime and adjusts the official statistics for robbery, assault, sexual violence, extortion and kidnapping or human trafficking to better reflect actual rates of violence.



## NATIONAL RESULTS


Peace in Mexico improved by 3.5 percent in 2020, marking a change from four years of successive deteriorations. Improvements were recorded across all MPI indicators in 2020, except for *detention without a sentence*. The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted many illegal activities and stay-at-home orders may have helped with the reductions across most indicators of violence.

However, the improvements experienced in 2020 also arose in the context of longer term changes in patterns of violence. After recording large deteriorations in peacefulness between 2015 and 2018, the rate of deterioration began to slow considerably in 2019. The monthly rates of homicide and firearms crime, for instance, peaked in July 2018 and have gradually declined since. Similarly, the rates of organized crime and violent crime peaked in mid-2019. The improvements recorded in 2020 are significant as they suggest a new trend after the sharp increases recorded since 2015.

A number of factors may have contributed to this change, including realignments in the country's organized criminal landscape. Following a period of cartel fragmentation and expansion by several large organizations, most notably the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), hostilities between rival groups have declined in the majority of states.<sup>4</sup> In some instances this may indicate that one organization has consolidated territorial control. The states which recorded the largest reductions in homicide since mid-2018, including Quintana Roo, Sinaloa and Guerrero, have registered sharp declines in the number of armed clashes between rival criminal groups over the last two years.<sup>5</sup>

FIGURE 1.1  
**Number of states recording improvements and deteriorations in homicide rates, 2016–2020**

In 2020, the majority of Mexican states recorded improvements in their homicide rates.



Source: SESNSP; IEP calculations


Despite a slight improvement in the homicide rate, of 1.3 percent, Mexico remains one of the most violent countries in the world, with a national homicide rate of 27.8 per 100,000 people in 2020. Prior to 2019, the majority of states were recording deteriorations in their homicide rates each year, as shown in Figure 1.1. However, violence in Mexico has become increasingly concentrated in specific states. In 2020, just six states accounted for more than half of all homicides: Guanajuato, the state of México, Baja California, Chihuahua, Jalisco and Michoacán.

Twenty-two of Mexico's 32 states recorded improvements in overall peacefulness in 2020, compared to nine states which improved the previous year. The improvement in scores for the majority of states was due to a reduction in *violent crime*. The national *violent crime* score improved by 9.2 percent in 2020, as shown in Figure 1.2. This improvement was driven by reductions in the rates of opportunistic crimes such as robbery and assault, which fell by 22.3 and 13.2 percent, respectively. This may be because fewer people were on the streets due to COVID-19.

After *violent crime*, the *firearms crime* indicator recorded the largest improvement, improving by 4.2 percent in 2020. This was

FIGURE 1.2  
**Changes in peacefulness by indicator, 2019–2020**

Peacefulness in Mexico improved by 3.5 percent from 2019 to 2020. A lower score indicates a higher level of peacefulness.



Source: IEP

mainly driven by a reduction in the rate of assault with a firearm which declined by 17 percent, while the rate of homicide with a firearm decreased marginally, by one percent. In 2020, gun violence accounted for 69 percent of homicides.

The *organized crime* indicator also improved for the first time in four years, recording a 2.9 percent improvement. This was due to declines in crimes such as kidnapping and human trafficking and extortion, which fell by 30.9 and 7.5 percent, respectively.

Despite the overall improvement in the organized crime rate, the rates of major offenses and retail drug crimes continued to rise in 2020, suggesting organized crime groups have adapted their activities amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

For first time since 2015, the *detention without a sentence* indicator deteriorated, increasing by 12 percent in 2020 compared to the prior year. This was due to a sharp increase in the number of detainees. The trend started in March and appears to be related to the partial shutdown of criminal courts during the COVID-19 pandemic and the extension of mandatory pre-trial detention. Monthly data indicates that the number of detainees without a sentence peaked in September 2020, when the total number stood at more than 77,000, with small reductions recorded in the subsequent months.

### COVID-19 IN MEXICO

The first cases of COVID-19 in Mexico were detected on 28 February 2020. Five weeks later, on 30 March, the federal government announced measures to suspend non-essential activities and restrict movement in order to contain the pandemic. Beginning in May restrictions were eased and a “traffic light” system was implemented for the gradual reopening of states.<sup>6</sup> By the end of 2020, Mexico had recorded over 1.4 million confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 125,000 deaths.<sup>7</sup>

Although the COVID-19 pandemic did not lead to significant improvements in levels of peacefulness in Mexico, the impact of public health measures and stay-at-home orders can be seen for specific types of violence. Crimes typically associated with people’s everyday movements, such as robberies, assaults, kidnappings and extortion, all experienced notable reductions in 2020. In contrast, those not associated with such movements, such as interpersonal violence, local and international drug trafficking and cartel violence, either increased or remained virtually unchanged.

Figure 1.3 displays the changes in sub-indicator rates in the year prior to the pandemic (2018-2019), compared to changes recorded in the past year.


Interpersonal violence rose in 2020 with the rates of family violence and sexual assault increasing by four percent and 0.9 percent, respectively. The rate of increase in these indicators in 2020 was greatly reduced from prior years. Given the heightened awareness of family violence and sexual assault, it is difficult to determine whether improved reporting and police recording of crimes have influenced the trend.

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has slowed the pace of drug trafficking and disrupted some cartel activities. However, initial evidence suggests that cartels have largely adapted to the COVID-19 operating environment by diversifying their methods of drug sales and expanding distribution points.<sup>8</sup> Organized crime groups have employed both older methods, such as underground tunnels, and newer ones, such as the use of drones, to smuggle drugs across the US-Mexico border.<sup>9</sup> Law enforcement agencies have also detected a rise in the use of cryptocurrency for drug transactions and money laundering in 2020.<sup>10</sup> Prior to the pandemic, drug cartels primarily imported chemical precursors from Asia through Mexico’s Pacific coast seaports. However, in 2020, several large drug seizures were also reported at Mexico’s airports.<sup>11</sup> This potential shift followed the decision by President

FIGURE 1.3

### Annual change in MPI sub-indicators

In 2020, the majority of sub-indicators experienced either reversals or a deceleration of trends seen in 2019.



Source: IEP

Andrés Manuel López Obrador to put the country's military in charge of customs operations at seaports.<sup>12</sup>

Current conditions have reportedly favored the territorial ambitions of larger groups and intensified inter-cartel fighting in some states.<sup>13</sup> For instance, in 2020, the CJNG made rapid advancements in the states of Guanajuato, Veracruz and Zacatecas, and even encroached on the capital, Mexico City.<sup>14</sup>

Homicide and organized crime remained elevated throughout 2020, even as opportunistic crimes, such as extortion and robbery, declined.

Prior to 2020, opportunistic crimes had recorded significant increases, driven by the continued fragmentation of larger organized crime groups. Fragmentation has led to the diversification of criminal activity as smaller groups turned to activities that are less likely to be detected by authorities and provide a fast and easy way to raise revenue.<sup>15</sup>

However, public health measures introduced to combat the COVID-19 pandemic have significantly reduced mobility and therefore reduced opportunities for criminal groups to target victims in public. According to INEGI's annual victimization survey, in 2019 crimes perpetrated in public places accounted for

nearly two-thirds of the total. The MPI results suggest that this number will have reduced in 2020.


As the number of COVID-19 cases steadily increased around the country, Mexicans began to spend more time in their homes. According to anonymized mobility data released by Facebook, the stay-home rate, or percentage of people staying at home or in their immediate surroundings on a daily basis, increased. It peaked in April following the introduction of national restrictions and then gradually declined in the subsequent months. However, this figure still remained well above pre-pandemic levels to the year's end.<sup>16</sup>

There was a clear relationship between reduced mobility and improvements in peacefulness in 2020, as shown in Figure 1.4. The five most improved states — Quintana Roo, Mexico City, Guerrero, Tabasco and Campeche — averaged a rate of 29.4 percent of people staying at home or in their immediate surroundings between March and December. In contrast, this figure was only 21.3 percent in the five states that experienced the largest deteriorations in peacefulness — Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí, Sonora, Guanajuato and Michoacán.<sup>17</sup> Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, Mexico's national stay-home rate was approximately 15 percent.

FIGURE 1.4

### Changes in peacefulness vs. average stay-home rates, 2020

There is a clear relationship between the change in overall peacefulness and the average stay-home rate for states between March and December 2020.



Source: Facebook Data for Good; IEP calculations  
 Note: Data based on use of Facebook on mobile phones

Following reductions in mobility and restrictions on public gatherings, the number of civil unrest events recorded a sharp decline in April as the number of people staying home increased. However, civil unrest events increased again and peaked at 662 in June, with the number of monthly events remaining above 450 to the end of the year.

Figure 1.5 shows the trend in civil unrest events between January 2018 and December 2020. There were more than 6,000 civil unrest events recorded in 2020, marking a 14 percent increase from the previous year. Eighty-eight percent of events were protests, while riots accounted for 12 percent of events.

The majority of demonstrations took place in the capital, Mexico City, with 809 protests and 69 riots recorded in 2020. Civil unrest events in Mexico City peaked in February 2020 before falling sharply in late March as restrictions were implemented.


Nationally, approximately 20 percent of civil unrest events were related to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Almost half of these demonstrations involved labor groups<sup>18</sup> with demonstrators protesting against government mandated restrictions, demanding financial support or denouncing shortages of medical supplies.

Several high-profile femicides<sup>19</sup> in early 2020 sparked major demonstrations against gender-based violence across Mexico. This follows a growing trend of activism against gender-based violence in many democratic countries. In Mexico, there were at least 359 demonstrations of this kind in 2020, compared to 204 in 2019. Most of these demonstrations occurred in March 2020, as tens of thousands of women across the country took part in a national strike.<sup>20</sup>

FIGURE 1.5

### Civil unrest, 2018–2020

Despite reductions in mobility and restrictions on public gatherings, public demonstrations continued to rise in 2020.



Source: ACLED

**MEXICO PEACE INDEX**

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2020  
STATE  
RESULTS

# IMPROVEMENTS IN PEACEFULNESS

Twenty-two states improved in peacefulness in 2020, while ten deteriorated. This marks a change from previous years, with 2020 being the first year since 2015 in which the majority of states improved.

As shown in Table 1.2, the five states with the largest improvements all experienced significant gains in peacefulness. Quintana Roo recorded the largest improvement and no longer ranks among Mexico's five least peaceful states.

Four of the five most improved states — Quintana Roo, Mexico City, Guerrero and Tabasco — recorded improvements in their

homicide rates. While the fifth state, Campeche, recorded a 1.9 percent increase in its homicide rate, this was a much smaller deterioration than in previous years.

In line with the national trend, all five states recorded a deterioration in the *detention without a sentence* indicator. Mexico City recorded one of the largest increases with over 3,000 additional detainees without a sentence in 2020 compared to 2019.

TABLE 1.2

## Five most improved states, 2019–2020

Quintana Roo recorded the largest improvement in its overall score following improvements across four of the five indicators.

STATE	CHANGE IN SCORE	2019 RANK	2020 RANK	CHANGE IN RANK
Quintana Roo	-0.709	30	26	↑ 4
Mexico City	-0.505	24	18	↑ 6
Guerrero	-0.5	27	25	↑ 2
Tabasco	-0.481	21	15	↑ 6
Campeche	-0.267	5	4	↑ 1


Source: IEP

3.304

↗ 4

CHANGE IN SCORE 19/20:

-0.709



Quintana Roo recorded the largest improvement in peacefulness of any Mexican state in 2020, following three years of consecutive deteriorations. It improved in four of the five MPI indicators, registering the country's largest improvement in *firearms crime*. This was driven by a 69 percent decline in the assault with a firearm rate and a 15.4 percent decline in the homicide with a firearm rate.

The state experienced a 19.2 percent improvement in its violent crime rate. Robberies declined by 29.6 percent. The homicide rate fell by 18.5 percent, after rising by 35.9 percent in 2019. Family violence also declined by 14.6, the second largest improvement in this category in the country. However, in keeping with the national trend, the *detention without a sentence* indicator deteriorated, with an additional 440 detainees without a sentence recorded in 2020.

Both legitimate and illicit economic activity in Quintana Roo was impacted by the restrictions on movement related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The state, whose economy relies on tourism, saw visits nearly halve, leading revenues from the sector to fall from 15.4 billion pesos in 2019 to 6.4 billion pesos in 2020.<sup>21</sup> As movement to and from the state declined, the economy contracted and local mobility decreased, the profit-generating practices of criminal groups were also reduced. Extortions, kidnappings and human trafficking, retail drug crimes and major offenses all dropped in 2020, leading Quintana Roo to record a 22.8 percent overall improvement in its *organized crime* rate.

The improvement in the *organized crime* rate was primarily driven by a 40.5 percent reduction in major offenses, a sub-indicator that includes federal drug trafficking crimes. Quintana Roo is an important coastal transit point for drugs heading north to the United States, and such trade was among the crimes most directly affected by the pandemic.

Despite significant improvements in 2020, Quintana Roo still ranks among the ten least peaceful states in Mexico. It has become a contested zone among rival cartels, with the CJNG

challenging the Sinaloa Cartel for control of cities along the coast. These cities are attractive due their geographical proximity to the ocean, offering opportunities for moving drugs northward.<sup>22</sup> Resort destinations such as Cancún have also become hotspots for retail drug sales, money laundering, extortion and human trafficking.<sup>23</sup> For the second year in a row, Quintana Roo recorded the highest kidnapping and human trafficking rate in Mexico.

“

Quintana Roo recorded the largest improvement in peacefulness of any Mexican state in 2020, following three years of consecutive deteriorations. It improved in four of the five MPI indicators, registering the country's largest improvement in firearms crime.

MPI SCORE IN 2020

CHANGE IN RANK 2019-2020

2.517

↑ 6


CHANGE IN SCORE 19/20:

-0.505

OVERALL SCORE, 2015-2020



CHANGE IN INDICATOR RATES, 2020



Mexico City had the second largest improvement in 2020, moving up six places in the rankings. Mexico City improved in four of the five MPI indicators, led by an improvement in the *organized crime* indicator. This was driven by significant reductions in the rates of extortion and kidnapping and human trafficking, which declined by 59.2 and 54.7 percent, respectively. In addition, the firearms crime rate fell by 29.8 percent and the homicide rate fell by 16.9 percent.

The rates for all sub-indicators of *violent crime*, *organized crime* and *firearms crime* improved in Mexico City in 2020, with the exception of family violence, which rose by 7.9 percent. Following the introduction of COVID-19 lockdown measures in March, calls to the Mexico City women's

emergency hotline increased sharply. By the end of 2020, the hotline had received more than three times as many family violence calls than in 2019.

Overall, the violent crime rate in Mexico City fell by 24.8 percent in 2020, the fourth largest improvement in the country. This drop was driven by a reduction in opportunistic crimes, likely due to people remaining in their homes during lockdown. According to Facebook mobility data, Mexico City had the second highest stay-home rate in the country in 2020. Robbery and assault on the street or public transport are by far the most common type of crime experienced by Mexico City residents, and in 2020 robberies in the capital fell by 35.2 percent and assaults fell by 27.1 percent.

MPI SCORE IN 2020


CHANGE IN RANK 2019-2020

3.150

↑ 2

CHANGE IN SCORE 19/20:

-0.500



Guerrero’s overall score improved by 13.7 percent in 2020, primarily driven by a 23.7 percent reduction in the homicide rate, the second largest decline of all states. This improvement is noteworthy given that Guerrero has registered one of the highest recorded homicide rates in Mexico since 2015. Acapulco, the state’s largest city and a major seaport, had the sixth highest homicide rate of any Mexican city and the seventh highest in the world in the most recent rankings of the world’s most violent cities.<sup>27</sup>

Guerrero also recorded improvements in the *firearms crime*, *organized crime* and *violent crime* indicators. Across subcategories for these indicators, changes in Guerrero’s crime rates largely tracked with national trends. For instance, while assaults and robberies fell substantially, by 30.7 and 23.5 percent, respectively, the state recorded increases in the rates of family violence and sexual assault, increasing by 12.4 percent and 3.1 percent respectively.

The *organized crime* rate in Guerrero fell by 9.8 percent in 2020, after peaking in 2019. This was largely driven by a 12.1 percent reduction in extortion and a 27.3 percent reduction in kidnapping and human trafficking. However, retail drug crimes rose by 18.9 percent in 2020, in line with the national trend.

This decline in organized crime is significant given that Guerrero has seen a proliferation of distinct criminal groups amid cartel fragmentation. There are at least 40 armed groups contending for territory in Guerrero, more than in any other single region.<sup>28</sup> At least 20 of these are criminal organizations, whose principal activities include the production and trafficking of heroin.<sup>29</sup> The heartland for poppy growing in Mexico, Guerrero is the top supplier of heroin in the United States,<sup>30</sup> though in the past few years demand for heroin has fallen with the upsurge in the use of synthetic opioids such as fentanyl.<sup>31</sup>

MPI SCORE IN 2020

CHANGE IN RANK 2019-2020


2.448

6


CHANGE IN SCORE 19/20:

-0.481

OVERALL SCORE, 2015-2020



CHANGE IN INDICATOR RATES, 2020



The state of Tabasco experienced improvements across four of the five MPI indicators in 2020, leading to a 16.4 percent improvement in its overall score. The largest improvement was in the organized crime rate, which fell by 49.4 percent.

Organized crime sub-indicators experienced substantial improvements across the board, with a 55.6 percent decline in extortion, a 30 percent decline in retail drug crime and a 20.5 percent decline in kidnapping and human trafficking. In addition, Tabasco recorded the country's lowest rate of major offenses, which includes federal drug trafficking crimes and organized criminal offenses committed by three or more people, following a 31.4 percent decline in the category in 2020.

The *homicide* and *firearms crime* indicators also improved in 2020, with rates falling by 12.6 and 16.6 percent, respectively. These improvements mark a reversal of the 2015-2019 trends, in which homicides, and specifically homicides with a firearm,

rose precipitously. In 2020, the percentage of homicides committed with a firearm fell for the first time in six years, dropping by 5.1 percent from its peak of 76.4 percent in 2019.

The violent crime rate in Tabasco also improved by 29.1 percent in 2020, the third largest improvement in the country. The improvement in violent crime was primarily driven by a reduction in opportunistic crimes as more people remained in their homes amid COVID-19 restrictions. According to Facebook mobility data, Tabasco had the highest stay-home rate in the country in 2020.<sup>32</sup>


Robbery and assault on the street or public transport are the most common type of crime experienced by people in Tabasco,<sup>33</sup> and in 2020 robberies and assaults in the state fell by 38.4 and 17.5 percent, respectively.

1.691

↑ 1

CHANGE IN SCORE 19/20:

-0.267



Consistently ranked as one of the most peaceful states in Mexico, Campeche registered the fifth largest improvement in peace in 2020. Campeche's 50.5 percent reduction in its organized crime rate was the largest improvement in this category of any state, resulting in it recording the second lowest overall organized crime rate in the country in 2020.

Campeche's significant improvement in its organized crime rate was driven by reductions in the rate of kidnapping and human trafficking and the rate of major offenses, which fell by 75.4 and 73.8 percent, respectively. The state's improvement in major offenses was the largest improvement of any state in 2020. In addition, the reduction in kidnappings and human trafficking led to Campeche registering the lowest rate in this sub-category for all of Mexico. The state also recorded declines in the rates of extortion and retail drug crime.

The violent crime rate improved by 12.7 percent in 2020. Family violence and sexual assaults declined by 28.6 and 21.5 percent, respectively. This was the second largest improvement nationally. Yucatán was the only state with as higher rate of improvement. However, while the assault rate fell in 2020, by 30.9 percent, robberies increased by 16.6 percent. Contrary to the national trend, robberies of homes and business rose in Campeche in 2020.<sup>34</sup>

Despite these improvements, both the *firearms crime* and *detention without a sentence* indicators deteriorated in 2020. The homicide rate also deteriorated marginally, by 1.9 percent, though the state still recorded the fourth lowest homicide rate in the country.

# DETERIORATIONS IN PEACEFULNESS

Table 1.3 details the five states with largest deteriorations in peacefulness in 2020. All five states experienced increases in the *homicide* indicator, and four of the five states experienced increases in *organized crime* and *firearms crime*.

Across all five states, homicide rates rose by an average of 33.6 percent, organized crime rates by an average of 31.3 percent and firearms crime by an average of 24.7 percent.

Three of the states with the largest deteriorations — Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí and Guanajuato — are located in the greater Bajío region of Northern Central Mexico and share borders with one another. In recent years, this region has become the location of a violent struggle between several national drug cartels for dominance of the surging fentanyl market.<sup>35</sup>

TABLE 1.3

## Five states with the largest deteriorations, 2019–2020

Zacatecas had the largest deterioration in overall score, recording substantial increases in the *homicide* and *firearms crime* indicators.

STATE	CHANGE IN SCORE	2019 RANK	2020 RANK	CHANGE IN RANK
Zacatecas	0.749	26	30	↓ 4
San Luis Potosí	0.366	15	22	↓ 7
Sonora	0.298	22	27	↓ 5
Guanajuato	0.167	28	28	↔
Michoacán	0.128	23	23	↔



Source: IEP

4.170

4

CHANGE IN SCORE 19/20:

0.749



In 2020, Zacatecas experienced the largest deterioration in peacefulness of any state in Mexico. The state’s overall score has deteriorated by 91 percent since 2015, marking the largest overall deterioration of any state in the last six years. Zacatecas fell from the top half of the rankings (13<sup>th</sup>) in 2015 to be ranked among the bottom five states (30<sup>th</sup>) in 2020.

Zacatecas recorded the highest overall organized crime rate in Mexico in 2020, following a 4.8 percent increase compared to the previous year. While kidnapping and human trafficking, retail drug crimes and major offenses all improved, the overall deterioration was driven by a 6.8 percent increase in the extortion rate, which is by far the more prevalent form of *organized crime* in Zacatecas. The state has the highest extortion rate in Mexico, at 316 cases per 100,000 people, nearly twice as high as the second highest rate.

Zacatecas has become a hotspot for organized criminal activity in recent years, with five cartels vying for territory in the state in 2020. While the Gulf Cartel, the Northeastern Cartel and the Talibanes have operated in the state for some time, the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG have entered more recently.<sup>36</sup> The CJNG, which has rapidly expanded across the country in the last few years, announced its entrance into more than a dozen new

municipalities in the state with a series of “narcomantas”, public messages from drug gangs, posted during the early COVID-19 quarantine period.<sup>37</sup>

The contest for control of Zacatecas and other parts of central Mexico seems to be tied to the expanding fentanyl trade.<sup>38</sup> Seizures of fentanyl increased by at least 486 percent across the country in 2020,<sup>39</sup> and Zacatecas has become an important distribution hub for the drug. Major highways that cross the state connect it with the United States to the north and Mexico’s busiest port in Colima to the east.<sup>40</sup>

The upsurge in organized crime in Zacatecas has been accompanied by an upsurge in violence, with the state’s secretary of public security estimating that 90 percent of all homicides in the state are connected to organized crime.<sup>41</sup> While Zacatecas recorded deteriorations in all five MPI indicators in 2020, its decline in peacefulness was primarily driven by increases in the rates of homicide and firearms crimes. Homicides rose by 65.5 percent, the largest increase in the country, while homicides with a firearm rose by 78.3 percent, the second largest increase in the country.

MPI SCORE IN 2020

CHANGE IN RANK 2019-2020


2.956

7


CHANGE IN SCORE 19/20:

0.366

OVERALL SCORE, 2015-2020



CHANGE IN INDICATOR RATES, 2020



San Luis Potosí’s overall score deteriorated by 14.1 percent in 2020. It fell seven places to 22<sup>nd</sup> position, the single largest movement of any state in the rankings. San Luis Potosí experienced substantial deteriorations in four of the five MPI indicators. The only indicator to improve was *violent crime*, with its rate improving by 11.2 percent.

The *organized crime* indicator deteriorated due to significant increases in major offences, kidnappings and human trafficking, extortion and retail drug crimes.

The dynamics underlying the deterioration in peacefulness in San Luis Potosí are similar to those in neighboring Zacatecas, where cartels clashed over the control of territory and strategic drug trafficking routes.<sup>42</sup>



Corresponding with the increase in organized crime San Luis Potosí experienced a substantial increase in the rates of homicides and firearms crimes, which rose by 44.4 and 39 percent, respectively. Compared to the prior year, the proportion of homicides that were committed with a firearm rose by 9.8 percent, to 74.7 percent.

3.312

5

CHANGE IN SCORE 19/20:

0.298



Sonora experienced the third largest deterioration in its overall score in 2020, which was mainly driven by a 60.8 percent deterioration in its organized crime rate. This was the largest deterioration in the country.

The rise in the organized crime rate was driven by increases in the rates of extortion and retail drug crimes. Sonora recorded a 229 percent increase in extortion between 2019 and 2020. According to ENVIPE 2020 data, 89.4 percent of extortions were carried out through fraudulent phone calls nationally. In Sonora, the rate was even higher at 95 percent. Such calls commonly consist of “virtual kidnappings”, in which the caller — often calling from a Mexican prison — falsely claims to have taken a family member of the victim hostage in order to extort money.<sup>43</sup> By September 2020, Sonora had recorded nearly twice

as many telephone-based extortions as in 2019, with an average of 17 attempts being reported each day.<sup>44</sup>

Bucking the national trend, Sonora’s *violent crime* score deteriorated in 2020. The state recorded a 46.4 percent increase in its violent crime rate, the largest deterioration of any Mexican state, with rises across all sub-indicators. In 2020, Sonora experienced a 50 percent increase in the rate of family violence, the second largest increase in the country.

The homicide and firearms crime rates also registered deteriorations, increasing by 14.3 percent and 12.4 percent respectively. Unlike almost all other Mexican states, the *detention without a sentence* indicator improved in Sonora in 2020.

MPI SCORE IN 2020

CHANGE IN RANK 2019-2020


3.856

0


CHANGE IN SCORE 19/20:

0.167

OVERALL SCORE, 2015-2020



CHANGE IN INDICATOR RATES, 2020



Guanajuato deteriorated in peacefulness by 4.5 percent in 2020, maintaining its position at 28<sup>th</sup> in the rankings. Guanajuato has experienced consistent deteriorations in peacefulness each year since 2015, when it ranked 14<sup>th</sup>. Over the past six years, both the homicide and organized crime rates in Guanajuato have increased fourfold.

In 2020, these trends continued, with the homicide rate rising by 25.6 percent. Guanajuato recorded the highest number of homicides in 2020, at over 4,500, accounting for one in eight homicides in Mexico. The majority of these homicides can be attributed to gun violence. In Guanajuato, 82.3 percent of homicides were committed with a firearm in 2020, the highest proportion of any state. The overall firearms crime rate increased by 14.3 percent from the prior year, leading the state to record the highest rate in the country.

Guanajuato also experienced more police homicides than any other state. Out of a reported 524 police officers killed in Mexico in 2020, 84 were killed in Guanajuato, which was 11 more than in 2019.<sup>45</sup> As with several states in Northern Central

Mexico, the rise in homicides in Guanajuato was tied to turf wars between rival criminal organizations. Guanajuato's *organized crime* rate rose by 54.5 percent in 2020, the country's second largest increase. This rise was driven by a 73.5 percent increase in major offenses and a 56.8 percent increase in retail drug crime.

In 2020, the state was primarily contested by the CJNG and the local Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel (CSRL). The CSRL emerged in Guanajuato in the last few years and gradually established a major position in the lucrative fuel theft racket in the state.<sup>46</sup> The city of Salamanca in Guanajuato is the site of one of the largest oil refineries in Mexico. Salamanca is located less than 25 kilometers from the larger city of Irapuato, which had the fourth highest homicide rate in Mexico and also the same ranking in the most recent listing of the world's most violent cities.<sup>47</sup> The violent confrontation between the CJNG and the CSRL has contributed to Guanajuato recording the most homicides of any state in each of the past three years.

3.142

0


CHANGE IN SCORE 19/20:

0.128

OVERALL SCORE, 2015-2020



CHANGE IN INDICATOR RATES, 2020



Michoacán’s overall score deteriorated by 4.3 percent in 2020 and it remained in 23<sup>rd</sup> place in the rankings. While the state recorded marginal improvements in the *organized crime*, *firearms crime* and *violent crime* indicators, these were offset by significant deteriorations in the *homicide* and *detention without a sentence* indicators.

The homicide rate in Michoacán rose by 18.3 percent in 2020, following steady increases over the past six years. Michoacán recorded 2,456 homicides in 2020, the sixth largest number of homicides in the country. The city of Uruapan in the region of Tierra Caliente had the third highest homicide rate in Mexico and the world in the most recent rankings of the world’s most violent cities.<sup>48</sup>

The Tierra Caliente region, comprising parts of Michoacán, Guerrero and the state of México, is also noted for having one of Mexico’s most complex criminal landscapes. The CJNG is the most powerful group in the area. There are at least 20 criminal groups that reportedly operate there, with some enjoying strong local support. Competition centers on control of

synthetic drug production and trafficking routes near the Pacific as well as the growing extortion of the avocado industry.<sup>49</sup>

Michoacán produces the vast majority of Mexico’s avocados and their trade has increasingly attracted criminal groups. While the extortion of avocado growers is not new, it has intensified in the past few years. With the decline in demand for non-synthetic opioids like heroin, which has long been produced in the region, criminal organizations have sought to offset falling revenues by escalating their predation on the trade of avocados, which have themselves quadrupled in value over the past decade. As of 2019, four cartels in Michoacán are engaged in extorting avocado producers.<sup>50</sup>

Although Michoacán’s overall organized crime rate did slightly improve in 2020, by 2.1 percent, the state experienced a 15-fold increase in extortions, by far the largest increase in the category of any state. However, it is unclear what proportion of these extortions were directly connected to the avocado industry.

**MEXICO PEACE INDEX**

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SIX-YEAR  
TRENDS



## SIX-YEAR TRENDS

Peacefulness in Mexico has deteriorated by 18.8 percent in the past six years. This deterioration primarily occurred between 2015 and 2018. In the years since, most indicators of violence have either improved slightly or remained virtually unchanged, representing a shift from earlier trends.


Figure 1.6 shows the changes in overall peacefulness since 2015. Prior to 2020, the rate of deterioration in peace had begun to slow from 10.8 percent in 2017 to three percent in 2019. The change in trend started in July 2018 when the homicide and firearms crime rates peaked, with other crime rates beginning to fall later. This is significant as it is a change in trend after the steep deteriorations in peacefulness in the previous years.

Despite the slight improvement in crime rates since 2018, the

overall deterioration in peacefulness over the last six years was significant and mainly driven by increases in *firearms crime* and *homicide*, as shown in Figure 1.7. Homicides peaked in July 2018 after doubling over the previous three and a half years. Since that peak, homicide rates have gradually declined. Comparable trends can also be seen in the firearms crime rate, which also peaked in July 2018, and for the rates of organized crime and violent crime, which peaked in mid-2019.

FIGURE 1.6  
**Change in overall peacefulness, 2015–2020**

Peacefulness improved slightly in 2020, after four years of consecutive deteriorations.



Source: IEP




Despite the slight improvement in crime rates since 2018, the overall deterioration in peacefulness over the last six years was significant and mainly driven by increases in the *firearms crime* and *homicide* indicators.

FIGURE 1.7

## Indexed trend in peacefulness by indicator, 2015–2020

The *firearms crime* and *homicide* indicators recorded the largest deteriorations over the six-year period.



Source: IEP

The national firearms crime rate recorded the largest deterioration over the six-year period, deteriorating by 89.4 percent. In 2015, 57.4 percent of homicides were committed with a firearm. In 2020, this figure had risen to 69.4 percent. The state of Tabasco recorded the largest increase in the proportion of homicides committed with a firearm, increasing from 17.9 percent in 2015 to 71.4 percent in 2020.

Over the last six years, overall homicides have also risen dramatically. Since 2015, the homicide rate has increased by 84 percent, with over 35,000 people killed in the last year. However, there was a slight reduction in 2020. The homicide rate is currently around 28 deaths per 100,000 people and ranked ninth globally.

*Firearms crime, homicide and organized crime* all experienced improvements in 2020, but these gains were minor in comparison with the substantial deteriorations recorded between 2015 and 2019. The deteriorations in these three indicators have likely been driven by the fragmentation of large criminal organizations in Mexico. Fragmentation may have led to the diversification of criminal activity, extreme violence and a steady rise in Mexico’s homicide rate as smaller groups compete for territory and control of drug trafficking routes. The proliferation of criminal organizations has also led to a sharp increase in retail drug crimes and extortion as well as violence against civilians.<sup>51</sup>

In 2020, *violent crime* also improved for the first time in six years, though this improvement did not fully offset the deteriorations experienced between 2015 and 2019. Overall, the violent crime rate has deteriorated by 7.1 since 2015. This deterioration has been driven by large increases in recorded rates of family violence and sexual assault, which rose by 63.6 and 59.9 percent, respectively. In contrast, assault rates improved by 14.2 percent and robbery rates improved by 4.6 percent.

After registering significant improvements between 2015 and 2019, the *detention without a sentence* score deteriorated substantially in 2020, resulting in a net improvement of just 6.1 percent in the past six years. However, it appears that the deterioration experienced in

this indicator in 2020 was an anomaly attributable to disruptions in the legal system caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Table 1.4 shows the changes in peacefulness by state since 2015. Twenty-three states have deteriorated in peacefulness, while nine have improved. The largest improvements were recorded in Tamaulipas. Peacefulness in Tamaulipas improved by 22.5 percent, driven primarily by a reduction in the state’s organized crime rate.

In contrast, Zacatecas recorded the largest deterioration in peacefulness between 2015 and 2020, deteriorating by 91 percent. Colima, Guanajuato, Chihuahua and Baja California recorded the next largest deteriorations, with declines in peacefulness ranging from 38.3 to 75.9 percent. All five states recorded substantial increases in their *homicide, firearms crime and organized crime* scores.

“

*Firearms crime, homicide and organized crime* all experienced improvements in 2020, but these gains were minor in comparison with the substantial deteriorations recorded between 2015 and 2019.

”

TABLE 1.4

**Change in peacefulness by state, 2015–2020**

Between 2015 and 2020, Tamaulipas recorded the largest improvement in peacefulness while Zacatecas recorded the largest deterioration.

2020 RANK	STATE	OVERALL SCORE (2015)	OVERALL SCORE (2020)	CHANGE IN SCORE, 2015–2020	CHANGE IN RANK
1	Yucatán	1.443	1.318	-0.125	↑ 1
2	Tlaxcala	1.400	1.587	0.187	↓ 1
3	Chiapas	1.785	1.613	-0.172	↑ 5
4	Campeche	1.694	1.691	-0.003	↑ 3
5	Nayarit	1.820	1.872	0.052	↓ 5
6	Hidalgo	1.475	1.911	0.436	↓ 3
7	Coahuila	2.366	2.003	-0.363	↑ 15
8	Puebla	1.878	2.005	0.127	↑ 4
9	Durango	2.215	2.088	-0.127	↑ 6
10	Veracruz	1.539	2.15	0.611	↓ 6
11	Aguascalientes	1.815	2.197	0.382	↓ 2
12	Tamaulipas	2.860	2.216	-0.644	↑ 17
13	Oaxaca	1.629	2.266	0.637	↓ 8
14	Querétaro	1.633	2.39	0.757	↓ 8
15	Tabasco	2.261	2.448	0.187	↑ 2
16	Sinaloa	3.109	2.493	-0.616	↑ 4
17	Nuevo León	2.281	2.496	0.215	↓ 1
18	Mexico City	2.343	2.517	0.174	↑ 2
19	Baja California Sur	2.764	2.607	-0.157	↑ 8
20	Jalisco	2.319	2.691	0.372	↓ 1
21	México	2.683	2.943	0.260	↑ 4
22	San Luis Potosí	1.871	2.956	1.085	↓ 11
23	Michoacán	2.249	3.142	0.893	↓ 7
24	Morelos	2.714	3.143	0.429	↑ 2
25	Guerrero	3.551	3.15	-0.401	↑ 7
26	Quintana Roo	2.354	3.304	0.950	↓ 5
27	Sonora	2.766	3.312	0.546	↑ 1
28	Guanajuato	2.192	3.856	1.664	↓ 14
29	Chihuahua	2.643	3.867	1.224	↑ 5
30	Zacatecas	2.183	4.17	1.987	↓ 17
31	Colima	2.529	4.203	1.674	↓ 8
32	Baja California	3.189	4.411	1.222	↓ 1
<b>NATIONAL</b>		<b>2.268</b>	<b>2.694</b>	<b>0.43</b>	

Source: IEP



# HOMICIDE

Since 2015, the national homicide rate has increased by 84.1 percent. However, in the past year there was a marginal reduction of 1.3 percent. Figure 1.8 depicts the national trend using monthly data. The monthly homicide rate peaked in July 2018 at 2.5 deaths per 100,000 people. The peak was prior to the start of COVID-19 and the relative levelling off of the homicide rate after mid-2018 represents a change from the earlier pattern of steady monthly increases.

Between 2015 and 2018, sharp increases in the homicide rate were recorded in the majority of states in Mexico. However, in the last two years, more states have begun to register improvements than deteriorations. The states that recorded the largest deteriorations were home to ongoing conflicts between organized crime groups. The majority of homicides in Mexico since 2015 have been related in some way to cartel activity, with some estimates suggesting that approximately two thirds of homicides are connected to organized crime.<sup>52</sup>

### CONTEXTUALIZING HOMICIDE IN MEXICO

Despite a slight reduction in 2020, Mexico's homicide rate remains at historically high levels, at 27.8 deaths per 100,000 people, resulting in over 35,000 victims. In 2020, Mexico's homicide rate was more than four times the global average.<sup>53</sup> Mexico has the ninth highest homicide rate in the world, as shown in Table 1.5. The highest rate was recorded in El Salvador at 52 homicides per 100,000 people.<sup>54</sup>

Mexico is also home to six of the ten most violent cities in the world, as shown in Table 1.6. The most violent city, Tijuana, is located in the state of Baja California and recorded a homicide rate of 134 deaths per 100,000 people in 2019,<sup>55</sup> more than 20 times the global average.

TABLE 1.5

### Ten countries with the highest homicide rates

Mexico has the ninth highest homicide rate in the world.


GLOBAL RANK	COUNTRY	HOMICIDE RATE PER 100,000 PEOPLE
1	El Salvador	52.0
2	Jamaica	43.9
3	Lesotho	43.6
4	Honduras	38.9
5	Venezuela	36.7
6	South Africa	36.4
7	Nigeria	34.5
8	Trinidad and Tobago	30.6
9	Mexico	27.8
10	Brazil	27.4

Source: SESNSP; UNODC; IEP calculations  
Note: Based on latest available UNODC data. Figure for Mexico is based on SESNSP data.

FIGURE 1.8

### Homicide rate, 2015–2020

Between January 2015 and December 2020, the monthly homicide rate increased by 86 percent, reaching a high in July 2018.



Source: SESNSP

### KEY FINDINGS

#### HOMICIDE



In 2020, Mexico's homicide rate was 27.8 per 100,000 people, a 1.3 percent decrease compared to 2019.

Despite this slight improvement, Mexico's homicide rate remains near historically high levels, with over 35,000 homicides recorded in 2020. Mexico has the ninth highest homicide rate globally.

TABLE 1.6

## Ten most violent cities in the world, 2019

The five cities with the highest homicide rates in the world are in Mexico.

RANK	CITY	STATE/PROVINCE	COUNTRY	HOMICIDES (2019)	HOMICIDE RATE PER 100,000 PEOPLE
1	Tijuana	Baja California	Mexico	2,367	134.2
2	Juárez	Chihuahua	Mexico	1,522	104.5
3	Uruapan	Michoacán	Mexico	301	85.5
4	Irapuato	Guanajuato	Mexico	723	80.7
5	Obregón	Sonora	Mexico	281	80.7
6	Caracas	Capital District	Venezuela	2,134	74.7
7	Acapulco	Guerrero	Mexico	600	71.6
8	Cape Town	Western Cape	South Africa	3,065	68.3
9	St. Louis	Missouri	United States	194	64.5
10	Vitória da Conquista	Bahia	Brazil	205	60.0

Source: Citizen Council for Public Security and Criminal Justice / Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad Pública y la Justicia Penal (CCSPJP)

In the past six years, seven states recorded improvements in their homicide rate, while 25 deteriorated. However, in the past year, more states have recorded improvements than deteriorations. Mexico's high levels of violence continue to be driven by a handful of regions with 50 percent of all homicides occurring in six states: Guanajuato, the state of México, Baja California, Chihuahua, Jalisco and Michoacán.

High levels of violence in Mexico have also been characterized by increasing violence targeting security forces and political figures. Table 1.7 shows the number of police deaths and political assassinations across Mexico. In 2020, Guanajuato recorded the highest number of police homicides, with 84 officers killed.<sup>56</sup> Violence against political figures has escalated in the lead up to Mexico's mid-term elections in June 2021. Initial reports indicate that 139 politicians, government officials and candidates have been killed between September 2020 and March 2021.<sup>57</sup> The state of Veracruz has registered the highest number of political assassinations with 17 politicians and candidates killed.

### HOMICIDE RATES AND NUMBERS OF MISSING PERSONS

The homicide rate in Mexico is most likely underestimated. There are significant numbers of missing persons in Mexico, a proportion of which may have been victims of homicide. Government estimates of the number of disappeared people in Mexico have fluctuated widely over time, especially of those who are missing due to possible homicide.<sup>58</sup> In 2017, the Mexican government established a National Search Commission (Comisión Nacional de Búsqueda) in an effort to accurately assess the number of missing and disappeared people in the country. The Commission estimates there are over 80,000 missing persons in Mexico, with the vast majority having disappeared since 2006, the beginning of the war on drugs.<sup>59</sup>

Figure 1.9 displays the annual number of people recorded as missing or disappeared since 2000. The number of people reported missing peaked in 2019 at over 9,000, before falling to around 8,300<sup>60</sup> in 2020. The relatively low numbers of persons reported missing prior to 2010 likely reflects difficulties in data collection.

There are many factors that may result in a person going missing,

TABLE 1.7

## Police homicides and political assassinations in Mexico

More than 500 police officers were killed in 2020.

STATE	POLICE HOMICIDES (2020)	POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS (2021)*
Guanajuato	84	9
México	39	8
Veracruz	39	17
Guerrero	37	13
Chihuahua	35	4
Michoacán	26	7
Zacatecas	26	8
Mexico City	22	2
Jalisco	22	7
Sonora	21	3
Baja California	20	7
San Luis Potosí	19	4
Puebla	15	5
Oaxaca	15	8
Tamaulipas	14	3
Morelos	13	10
Colima	11	1
Tabasco	10	2
Nuevo León	9	1
Sinaloa	8	7
Quintana Roo	7	5
Durango	7	0
Querétaro	5	0
Hidalgo	5	1
Chiapas	5	5
Coahuila	4	1
Baja California Sur	2	0
Nayarit	1	1
<b>NATIONAL</b>	<b>524</b>	<b>139</b>


Source: Causa en Común; Etellekt Consulting

Note: \* Data year refers to 7 September 2020–20 March 2021

FIGURE 1.9

## Number of reported missing and disappeared people, 2000–2020

In 2020, more than 8,200 people were reported missing or disappeared.



Source: National Search Commission / Comisión Nacional de Búsqueda (CNB)  
 Note: Data correct as of 20 March 2021

and not all missing persons will be victims of homicide. However, Mexico's homicide rate could be considerably higher if it included all those missing due to homicide.

### CHANGES IN HOMICIDE BY STATE, 2015–2020

Over the last six years, state-level homicide rates have risen dramatically. Table 1.8 details the number of states with a homicide rate in the low, moderate, high or extreme category by year. In 2015, a quarter of Mexico's states had relatively low homicide rates. By 2020, just two remained low, while seven had reached a level considered to be extreme. The categories are based on the distribution of homicide rates in 2015, when they were much lower. In this analysis, a low homicide rate is considered less than 7.6 per 100,000 people. A moderate rate is between 7.6 and 13.4, while a rate between 13.5 and 48.8 is classed as high. An extreme homicide rate is greater than 48.9 homicides per 100,000 people. Homicide rates at this level are more than three times higher than the state average in 2015. For comparison, most European countries have a homicide rate below 1.5 while the homicide rate in the United States is approximately five deaths per 100,000 people.

As shown in Table 1.8, the number of states with a low homicide rate fell from eight to two between 2015 and 2020, while the

TABLE 1.8

### Homicide levels by year

The number of states with extreme homicide rates has increased from one in 2015 to seven in 2020.

	LOW	MODERATE	HIGH	EXTREME
2015	8	8	15	1
2016	6	10	14	2
2017	3	8	15	6
2018	2	7	18	5
2019	2	8	16	6
2020	2	8	15	7

Source: SESNSP; IEP calculations

number of states with an extreme homicide rate rose from one to seven. Aguascalientes and Yucatán were the only two states to record a low homicide rate in 2020. Yucatán had the lowest homicide rate in Mexico at 2.7 deaths per 100,000 people. Although Aguascalientes recorded a low homicide rate, its rate has increased by 90.3 percent since 2015 to 5.9.

Both Guerrero and Morelos have reduced their level of homicide from extreme to high, with the improvements occurring in the last year.

The homicide rate in Guerrero was 29.8 percent lower in 2020 than in 2015, with the homicide rate peaking in 2017, at 70.4 deaths per 100,000 before falling to 39.6 in 2020. In recent years, the state has recorded a steady improvement in peacefulness, driven by reductions in the rates of major organized crime offenses, homicide with a firearm and kidnapping and human trafficking. The state government has implemented a number of security measures, including the deployment of additional security forces, particularly to the most violent municipalities of Acapulco and Iguala. The state governor also cites daily meetings by the newly established Bureau for Peacebuilding for contributing to the reduced levels of violence in the state.<sup>61</sup>

In contrast, Zacatecas, Sonora and Michoacán have all recorded substantial deteriorations in their homicide rates over the past six years, which have risen by 261, 147 and 145 percent, respectively. In 2020, they recorded extreme homicide rates for the first time.

The homicide rate in Zacatecas rose from 17.8 deaths per 100,000 people in 2015 to 64.5 in 2020. In the last year alone, the homicide rate more than doubled. The sharp increase in homicides has been driven by the expansion of several cartels into the state. As of 2020, five criminal organizations, including the CJNG, were competing for control of the fentanyl trade and key trafficking routes which connect the Pacific with the US-Mexico border.<sup>62</sup> In early 2020, it was estimated that as many as 90 percent of homicides in the state were related to organized crime.<sup>63</sup>

Colima recorded Mexico's highest homicide rate for the fifth year in a row, with 81.3 deaths per 100,000 people. Since 2015, the homicide rate in Colima has more than tripled. This follows similar increases in firearms crime, organized crime and violent crime. In the past six years, the extreme homicide rate in Colima


has been predominantly driven by an ongoing turf war between two of Mexico's most powerful drug cartels, the CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel. Both groups have sought control of the port city of Manzanillo, which is a key entry point for drug trafficking.<sup>65</sup> This rise in violence has been accompanied by a number of high-profile homicides of political and social leaders in the state.<sup>66</sup>

### HOMICIDE RATES DISAGGREGATED BY SEX

Figure 1.10 shows that men are much more likely to be victims of homicide in Mexico, making up nearly nine out of ten victims. Based on the latest available data, homicide was the leading cause of deaths for males aged ten to 54.<sup>67</sup> The vast majority of male homicide victims are adults. However, the number of victims under 18 years old has steadily risen in recent years, accounting for around four percent of all male homicides where age was recorded in 2020.

FIGURE 1.10  
**Homicide by sex, 2020**

Male homicides accounted for 87 percent of total homicides in 2020.



Source: SESNSP; IEP calculations  
Note: Excludes homicides in which the sex of the victim is unknown; female homicides includes femicides.

Figure 1.11 shows that since 2015 male homicides have increased by a larger percentage than female homicides. However, femicides, defined in Mexican law as the murder of a woman for gender-based reasons, have increased at a similar rate as male homicides.<sup>68</sup> Box 1.1 outlines the legal definition of femicide in Mexico.

While male homicides can be linked to organized crime trends, female deaths are more likely to be associated with intimate partner violence.<sup>69,70</sup> Survey data indicates that 44 percent of women in Mexico have experienced intimate partner violence during their lifetime.<sup>71</sup> Unlike the predominance of firearms in male homicide, the majority of femicide deaths are recorded as being committed by some other means. At 13 percent, the proportion of femicide victims under the age of 18 is much higher than for their male counterparts.


The last few years has witnessed growing social awareness of gender-based violence in Mexico. In early 2020, several high-profile cases of femicide, including the killing of a minor, sparked widespread protests across the country. According to ACLED data, there were approximately 359 demonstrations against gender-based violence in 2020, marking a 76 percent increase from the previous year.

### BOX 1.1 **Femicide in Mexico**

Mexico first included femicide as a distinct category in its official crime statistics in 2012.<sup>72</sup> Femicide is defined as the criminal deprivation of the life of a female victim for reasons based on gender.<sup>73</sup> The murder of a woman or girl is considered gender-based, and included in femicide statistics, when one of seven criteria is met, including evidence of sexual violence prior to the victim's death, a sentimental, affective or trusting relationship with the perpetrator or the victim's body being displayed in public.<sup>74</sup>

FIGURE 1.11  
**Indexed trend in male homicide, female homicide and femicide rates, 2015–2020**

The femicide rate has risen by 116 percent between 2015 and 2020.



Source: SESNSP and CONAPO data; IEP calculations  
Note: This figure shows the three-month moving average of the indexed trend. The female homicide rate includes femicides.



## FIREARMS CRIME

**In the past six years, rising gun violence has been a principal driver in Mexico's epidemic of homicides and its deteriorating levels of peacefulness. Since 2015, the rate of homicide with a firearm has increased by 122 percent, while the rate of assault with a firearm has risen by 41.6 percent. Nationally, the proportion of homicides committed with a gun rose from 57.4 percent in 2015 to 69.4 percent in 2020. This equates to over 24,600 homicides committed with a gun in 2020.**

The rise in gun violence has been fueled by an expansion of organized criminal activity. In 2020, four of the five states with the worst organized crime rates in the country also figured among the five states with the highest firearms crime rates. The increasing proliferation of distinct organized crime groups has resulted in violent competition over territory and access to drug trafficking routes and other rackets. This can be seen in states with important border crossings such as Baja California, states with major seaports such as Colima, states with lucrative fuel theft opportunities such as Guanajuato and states along strategic trafficking corridors such as Zacatecas.

The rise in gun violence has also been driven by the illegal import of firearms from the United States.<sup>75</sup> A decade ago, as many as 427,000 guns were estimated to be trafficked across the border annually.<sup>76</sup> By 2017, the estimated number of civilian-held guns in Mexico totaled almost 17 million, the seventh most of any country, with the vast majority held illegally.<sup>77</sup> Recent analysis by the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives indicated that at least seven in 10 firearms in Mexico come from the United States.<sup>78</sup> More than three-quarters of US-traced firearms have been found to come from Southwest border states, with over 40 percent coming from Texas alone.<sup>79</sup>

Gun violence also has distinct trends for male and female victims, with men much more likely to be the victims of gun violence. The proportion of male homicides committed with a gun rose from 60.9 percent in 2015 to 72.5 percent in 2020. The data indicates that women are killed by guns less often. However, the percentage of female homicides committed with a firearm has risen steadily from 37.8 percent in 2015 to 58.5 percent in 2020.

Seven states reported improvements in the firearms crime rate between 2015 and 2020, while 25 states deteriorated. Yucatán had by far the lowest firearms crime rate in 2020, recording 0.7 firearms crimes per 100,000 people. For six years, Yucatán has been the only Mexican state whose homicide with a firearm rate has been lower than the global median.<sup>80</sup>

In the past six years, Baja California Sur has recorded the largest improvement in both overall firearms crimes and homicides with a firearm, with its rates improving by over 75 percent in both cases.

The state of Tabasco recorded the largest deterioration in firearms crime from 2015 to 2020. In that time, it has gone from having Mexico's lowest firearms crime rate, with 1.9 cases per 100,000 people, to the 16<sup>th</sup> lowest rate, with 22.4 cases per 100,000 people.

Conflict between the CJNG, Los Zetas, the Gulf Cartel and the Sinaloa Cartel for control of the state has contributed to the rise in gun violence.<sup>81,82</sup>


Nationally, the firearms crime rate improved in 2020 for the first time in six years. This improvement was driven by a 17 percent decline in assaults with a firearm, which had risen by 70.6 percent between 2015 and 2019. In contrast, homicides with a firearm fell by only one percent in 2020. The national rate of homicide with a firearm has remained consistent for the last three years at just over 19 deaths per 100,000 people. The rate of homicides with a firearm has more than doubled since 2015.

Quintana Roo registered the largest deterioration in homicides with a firearm in the past six years. The rate increased substantially, from two homicides per 100,000 people in 2015 to 24.3 in 2020. In the same period, Oaxaca registered the largest deterioration in assaults with a firearm, with its rate increasing nine-fold.

Figure 1.12 highlights the trend in the firearms crime rate from 2015 to 2020 using monthly data. The firearms crime indicator includes assaults and homicides committed with a firearm.

FIGURE 1.12  
**Trends in gun violence, 2015–2020**

The rate of firearms crime has increased by 89.4 percent since 2015.



Source: SESNSP



# ORGANIZED CRIME

Since 2015, the national organized crime rate has increased by 40.5 percent. This follows the fragmentation of major criminal organizations, as the proliferation of smaller organized crime groups has heightened competition over territory and access to drug trafficking routes.

Fragmentation has also led to the diversification of criminal activity. Smaller groups in particular have increasingly turned to more localized activities, such as extortion and retail drug crime, that are less likely to be detected by authorities and which provide a fast and easy way to raise revenue.<sup>83</sup> Smaller criminal groups pose a new set of challenges because they lack clear hierarchical structures and are harder for law enforcement to track.<sup>84</sup> Being smaller in size, they are less likely to be able to exert influence on senior political figures or benefit from corruption.

Some of Mexico's largest organized crime groups – including the Sinaloa Cartel, CJNG and Los Zetas – have fragmented or faced internal fighting following the arrests of their leaders in recent years.<sup>85</sup> Violent confrontations between criminal organizations have typically occurred when a single organization does not have total control over a criminal market.<sup>86</sup> In the last six years, violent confrontations between rival criminal groups and internal fighting have driven Mexico's elevated homicide rate. In 2020, it was


estimated that as many as two-thirds of homicides in Mexico were related to organized crime.<sup>87</sup>

This subsection presents the trends and results for the four sub-indicators that comprise the overall measure of organized crime. The four sub-indicators are *extortion*, *kidnapping and human trafficking*, *retail drug crimes* and *major organized crime offenses*. Major organized crime offenses include federal drug trafficking crimes and criminal offenses committed by three or more people. Figure 1.13 shows the monthly indexed trends in each of these sub-indicators, which compares their rates to levels in January 2015.

Retail drug crime has driven the rise in the national organized crime rate for the past six years. The rate of retail drug crimes had the largest increase of the organized crime sub-indicators in that period, more than doubling, from 26.7 crimes per 100,000 people in 2015 to 60 in 2020.

FIGURE 1.13  
**Indexed change in organized crime offenses, 2015–2020**

The organized crime rate has been driven by significant increases in retail drug crimes, which have risen by 157 percent since January 2015.




Source: SESNSP; IEP calculations

FIGURE 1.14

## State changes in organized crime rate, 2015–2020

The state of Querétaro recorded the largest deterioration in its organized crime rate since 2015, with an average annual increase of 60.8 percent.



Source: SESNSP; IEP calculations

The deterioration in retail drug crimes has been widespread, with only seven states recording an improvement in the past six years, compared to 25 states that deteriorated. Coahuila had the highest rate of retail drug crime offenses in 2020, at 312 per 100,000 people. The state has recorded a 302 percent increase in retail drug crimes over the last six years. Situated along the US-Mexico border, Coahuila is seen as a strategic state for drug trafficking organizations.<sup>88</sup>

While Mexico has long been known as a point of transit and producer of illegal drugs, in the past two decades it has increasingly become a consumer as well. According to national survey data, between 2008 and 2016, the proportion of Mexicans aged 12 to 65 that have consumed illicit drugs nearly doubled, from 5.2 to 9.9 percent, with rates rising fastest among adolescents.<sup>89</sup>

Baja California and Guanajuato recorded the second and third highest rates of retail drug crimes in 2020, at 273 and 240 offenses per 100,000 people, respectively. In Baja California, competition to sell drugs in a given local area, known as a plaza in Mexico, has intensified in the city of Tijuana.<sup>90</sup> Local and state officials estimate that the majority of homicides in Tijuana are linked to local drug sales.<sup>91</sup> In Baja California, organized crime-related violence has largely been concentrated in Tijuana, and caused the state's homicide rate to increase by 199 percent since 2015.

The increase in retail drug crimes in Guanajuato has been driven by an intensifying turf war between the CJNG and the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel (CSRL). An additional four organized crime groups, including the Sinaloa Cartel, maintain a presence in the state.<sup>92</sup> Organized crime groups have been competing for territorial control in the state to carry out fuel theft, extortions, kidnappings and drug trafficking.<sup>93</sup>

Overall, the national extortion rate increased by 23.5 percent, from 51.3 offenses per 100,000 people in 2015 to 63.4 in 2020. The extortion rate has increased steadily since 2015, peaking at 68.5 in 2019, before declining in 2020. According to INEGI's annual victimization survey, the majority of extortion cases, or 67 percent, occurred in the victim's home, followed by the victim's place of work at 14.7 percent.<sup>94</sup> Rates of extortion are also almost twice as high in cities than rural areas.<sup>95</sup>

In 2020, Zacatecas recorded the highest extortion rate in Mexico. The state recorded a three-fold increase in its extortion rate between 2015 and 2020, likely driven by a sharp increase in the occurrence of "virtual kidnapping" calls in recent years.<sup>96</sup> Virtual kidnapping is a type of extortion whereby perpetrators demand a ransom payment via telephone without having actually taken a hostage.<sup>97</sup> National survey data suggests that there were approximately 950 incidents of telephone extortion per 100,000 people in Mexico in 2019, while in Zacatecas there were over 1,500 such incidents per 100,000 people.<sup>98</sup>

In contrast, the rate of major offenses has improved since 2015. The overall improvement in major offenses is primarily the result of a 34.2 percent decline in the category between 2015 and 2017. Since then, the rate has gradually risen, from 5.3 per 100,000 people in 2017 to 6.4 in 2020. Mexico's major offenses disproportionately occur in the northern border states where drugs are trafficked to the United States. The five states with the highest average major offenses rates over the past six years have all been northern states, with Baja California and Sonora registering the worst average rates since 2015.

In addition, the kidnapping and human trafficking rate nearly halved in the last six years, falling from 10.1 cases per 100,000 people in 2015 to 5.3 in 2020. The spike in the kidnapping and human trafficking rate in August 2015, shown in Figure 1.13, was due to a high level of police reporting that month, based on successful police rescues of trafficked migrants in Coahuila.<sup>99</sup> Since then, the rate has fluctuated, but has generally followed a downward trend. Much of this decline was recorded in 2020, when the rate fell by 31.1 percent.

In the last six years, the deterioration in organized crime rates has been widespread. Twenty states recorded deteriorations in their organized crime rates since 2015, compared to only 12 that improved. Figure 1.14 illustrates the average annual changes in organized crime rates across Mexico's 32 states.

The largest deteriorations in the organized crime rate were recorded in Querétaro, Guanajuato, Baja California, Zacatecas and Veracruz. Notably, the CJNG, one of the most powerful organized crime groups in Mexico, has been active in all five states.

Querétaro and Guanajuato recorded the largest deteriorations in the last six years, with the rate of organized crime offenses increasing by 667 and 314 percent, respectively. In Querétaro, the rise in organized crime was driven primarily by a substantial increase in the rate of extortion, as well as retail drug crimes and major offenses. In 2015, Querétaro had the fourth lowest organized crime rate in Mexico, but has since fallen to 20<sup>th</sup> in the organized crime rankings. As of 2020, at least three large organized crime groups maintained a presence in the state: the CJNG, the Sinaloa Cartel and the Beltrán Leyva Cartel.<sup>100</sup>

Conversely, the states of Tamaulipas, Sinaloa, Puebla, Nayarit and Tabasco reported the largest improvements in their organized crime rates.

Tamaulipas, which shares a border with the United States, recorded a 58.9 percent improvement in its organized crime rate between 2015 and 2020. Notably, Sinaloa, home to one of the largest organized crime groups in Mexico, recorded a 55.3 percent reduction in its organized crime rate in the same period. Sinaloa recorded improvements across all four sub-indicators, with retail drug crimes and extortion recording the largest reductions, falling by 72.6 and 55.1 percent, respectively. This is partially due to successful cooperation between state and municipal police forces in the region.<sup>101</sup>

The Sinaloa Cartel also faced internal tensions with violence erupting in mid-2020 between two factions: one led by the children of former leader Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, and the other led by the suspected leader of the Sinaloa Cartel, Ismael Zambada García.<sup>102</sup>

### **COVID-19 AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN MEXICO**

The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 caused numerous logistical and financial challenges for organized crime

groups in Mexico. For instance, port of entry closures along the Mexico-US border and restrictions in both countries have disrupted drug trafficking operations, money laundering and other illicit activities.<sup>103</sup> However, for the most part, organized crime groups have adapted to this new operating environment.<sup>104</sup>

China, which is the source of the vast majority of fentanyl and its precursor chemicals, announced a crackdown on the production of the drug and its variants in 2019,<sup>105</sup> and during the pandemic there was a temporary suspension of all shipments from the country. In response to these obstacles, organized crime groups established new supply chains with countries such as Vietnam and India in order to keep supplies of fentanyl and its precursor chemicals flowing into Mexico.<sup>106</sup>

In 2020, retail drug crimes reached a six-year high as criminal organizations adapted to the new operating environment by diversifying their methods of drug sales and expanding their distribution points.<sup>107</sup> As cartels faced increased difficulty in trafficking drugs into the United States, initial evidence suggests that criminal organizations expanded sales among local Mexican consumers.<sup>108</sup>

Furthermore, organized crime groups have viewed the pandemic as an opportunity to exert greater power within their areas of influence.<sup>109</sup> For instance, several criminal groups distributed aid packages, branded with cartel insignia, in an attempt to gain favor with local communities and attract recruits.<sup>110</sup>

“

In 2020, retail drug crimes reached a six-year high as criminal organizations adapted to the new operating environment by diversifying their methods of drug sales and expanding their distribution points.

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## VIOLENT CRIME

Despite recording a notable improvement in 2020, Mexico's violent crime rate recorded a net deterioration of 7.1 percent over the past six years. The violent crime indicator consists of four components: *assault*, *family violence*, *robbery* and *sexual assault*. Between 2015 and 2020, assault and robbery rates modestly improved, while sexual assault and family violence rates deteriorated substantially. Over the six-year period, 13 states recorded improvements in their overall violent crime rates, while 19 states deteriorated.

Yucatán recorded the largest improvement in violent crime over the past six years, while Oaxaca recorded the largest deterioration. Yucatán, which is Mexico's most peaceful state, experienced the largest improvements across all sub-indicators of violent crime between 2015 and 2020, resulting in an 84.5 percent improvement in its overall violent crime rate.

In contrast, Oaxaca recorded a near seven-fold increase in violent crime between 2015 and 2020. It had the largest deteriorations in Mexico for all violent crime sub-indicators, except sexual assault where it recorded the second largest deterioration in the country. Consequently, Oaxaca has fallen from second place among states with the lowest violent crime rates in 2015 to 12th place in 2020.

As with much of the crime across the country, the rise in violent crime in Oaxaca has been fueled by the growing number of

organized criminal groups in the state,<sup>111</sup> whose activities feed a more generalized climate of violence. In Oaxaca, there is a strong correlation ( $r=0.91$ ) between the rise in violent crime and organized crime rates over the past six years.


Nationally, the violent crime rate increased steadily between 2015 and 2019, but this rise was disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, as shown in Figure 1.15. As violent crime represents the indicator of peacefulness that most directly affects ordinary Mexicans, it was the category most clearly impacted by reductions in mobility brought on by the pandemic. Following the announcement of stay-at-home orders, the violent crime rate recorded a sharp decline, from 210 cases per 100,000 people in March 2020 to 157 per 100,000 people in April 2020.

However, the pandemic affected different types of violent crime in

FIGURE 1.15

### Violent crime rate, 2015–2020

The violent crime rate recorded a sharp decline in 2020, of 13.3 percent, driven by reductions in the rates of assault and robbery.



Source: SESNSP; IEP calculations

different ways. Crimes typically committed in public places — assaults and robberies — registered significant improvements in 2020, while those typically committed in private settings — sexual assaults and family violence — continued to deteriorate, albeit at a much slower rate than in previous years.


Figure 1.16 illustrates the indexed trend in violent crime sub-indicators between January 2015 and December 2020.

The national family violence rate has deteriorated each year

between 2015 and 2020, increasing by 63.6 percent in total. Just five states have recorded improvements in their family violence rate between 2015 and 2020, compared to 27 which recorded deteriorations. In 2020, Colima, one of the epicenters of organized crime in Mexico, recorded the highest rate of family violence in the country for the second year in a row. With over 1,573 cases per 100,000 people, Colima's rate was nearly three times the national average.

FIGURE 1.16  
**Indexed change in violent crime rates, 2015–2020**


While the rates of sexual assault and family violence have consistently deteriorated since 2015, the rates of robbery and assault have experienced overall improvements.



Source: SESNSP; IEP calculations

FIGURE 1.17  
**Monthly family violence rates and emergency calls in Mexico City, 2019–2020**

In April 2020, the number of family violence calls to Mexico City's women's emergency hotline spiked, while the number of family violence cases reported declined sharply.



Source: Línea Mujeres; SESNSP; IEP calculations

The national sexual assault rate has risen in tandem with the rate of family violence, deteriorating 59.9 percent since 2015. However, in 2020, the rate of increase slowed, rising by less than one percent. Aguascalientes has recorded the highest rate of sexual assault in the country each year since 2017. With 652 cases per 100,000 people, Aguascalientes's rate in 2020 was nearly four times the national average.

It is unclear to what degree the COVID-19 pandemic affected crime reporting in 2020, particularly for crimes typically committed in private settings. For example, in Mexico City, while reported cases of family violence fell in April, the first full month of lockdown measures, there was a spike in the number of family violence calls to the capital's emergency hotline for women, as shown in Figure 1.17.

In contrast to the consistent deteriorations in sexual assault and family violence rates over the past six years, robbery and assault rates have experienced net improvements since 2015, though these improvements have not been consistent year to year.

Among *violent crime* sub-indicators, the assault rate experienced the largest improvement between 2015 and 2020, declining by 14.2 percent. Assaults decreased in 20 states, while they increased in 12. The state of México has recorded the highest assault rate in the country since 2015, despite recording a 16.5 percent improvement in that time. In 2020, the state recorded 1,123 assaults per 100,000 people. The high assault rate in the state of México is driven by the prevalence of robberies and attempted robberies on public transport. Assaults on public transport in the state of México, the most populous state in the country, accounted for more than half of public transport assaults,<sup>112</sup> while the state's overall assaults accounted for 30 percent of national assaults in 2020.

The national robbery rate has improved by 4.6 percent over the past six years. After peaking in 2017, at 1,395 robberies per 100,000 people, the robbery rate recorded improvements in 2019 and 2020. The state of México and adjacent Mexico City, where one fifth of the country's population resides, have recorded the two highest robbery rates since 2017. In 2020, there were 2,705 robberies per 100,000 people in the state of México and 2,026 per 100,000 people in Mexico City, in both cases well over twice the national average. As with assaults, the high robbery rates in the Greater Mexico City area are driven by the prevalence of the crime on public transport. According to national survey data, robberies and assaults on the street or public transport in Mexico City and the state of México are by far the single most common category of crime experienced by the residents of any state.<sup>113</sup>

The growing prevalence of violent crime in Mexico has been accompanied by deteriorating perceptions of security, as shown in Figure 1.18. According to the Gallup World Poll, women in Mexico are more likely to say that they do not feel safe walking alone at night. Males are the victims of non-sexual assault in approximately 60.2 percent of the cases,<sup>114</sup> while 92 percent of sexual assault victims surveyed were female.<sup>115</sup> While the perceptions of security for both men and women have deteriorated since 2007, the divergence in recent years has become increasingly stark. In 2007, 46 percent of women reported feeling unsafe walking alone compared to 37 percent of men. By 2019, this gap had widened significantly, with 67 percent of females feeling unsafe compared to 48 percent of males. This growing discrepancy between male and female perceptions of safety follows deteriorations in the rates of femicide, family violence and sexual assault since 2015.

FIGURE 1.18

### Percentage of respondents feeling unsafe walking alone, 2007–2019

Perceptions of insecurity for males and females largely fluctuated in tandem until 2016, when an increasing proportion of female respondents reported feeling unsafe walking alone at night.



Source: Gallup World Poll



## DETENTION WITHOUT A SENTENCE

For the first time since 2015, the *detention without a sentence* indicator deteriorated. This was due to a sharp increase in the number of detainees, with the trend beginning in March 2020. The trend appears to be related to the partial shutdown of criminal courts during the COVID-19 pandemic. The *detention without a sentence* indicator measures the number of people in prison without a sentence relative to the number of violence crimes and homicides.

In 2020, roughly 76,700 people were incarcerated without a sentence in Mexico, a 4.5 percent decline since 2015. In the last six years, 21 states reported reductions in the number of detainees without a sentence, while 11 states recorded an increase.

Sinaloa recorded the largest reduction in the number of detainees without a sentence, from 2,309 in 2015 to 1,113 in 2020. This marked a 51.8 percent decline and follows similar reductions in organized crime, firearms crime and homicide in the same period. Conversely, Mexico City registered an additional 3,742 detainees who had not been sentenced in 2020 compared to 2015.


In Mexico, a number of recent legal reforms have sought to reduce the use of pre-trial detention. The introduction of presumption of innocence as a legal standard in Mexico, as part of the new criminal justice system, is intended to protect the rights of the accused and prevent the majority of presumed criminals from being detained without a conviction.

Article 19 of the Mexican constitution prescribes preventative prison for nine “grave” crimes, which include organized crime related offenses, rape and homicide.<sup>116</sup> In February 2019, the

FIGURE 1.19

### Total number of detainees without a sentence, 2006–2020

The number of detainees without a sentence reached their lowest levels between 2016 and 2019, before rising sharply again in 2020.



Source: CNS data provided by Jurimetria

national legislature voted to include an additional eight crimes, including corruption and abuse of a minor.<sup>117</sup> The Article states that a judge may order “preventative prison” for up to two years prior to sentencing when other precautionary measures are not enough to:

- guarantee the presence of the accused at the legal proceedings
- prevent obstruction of justice
- protect victims, witnesses or the community.<sup>118</sup>

As such, the *detention without a sentence* indicator captures both the need for pre-trial detention and the degree to which state governments are relying on this tool.

As more and more states across the country implemented reforms to the justice system, there was a steady decline in the overall number of detainees without a sentence until 2020. Figure 1.19 displays the trend in the number of detainees without a sentence since 2006.

However, in 2020, the number of detainees without a sentence increased sharply, by 26.9 percent. In July 2020, the Mexican Senate approved the expansion of mandatory pre-trial detention for more offenses, including electoral offenses, illegal possession of weapons and enforced disappearances.<sup>119</sup>

Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the extension of mandatory pre-trial detention and the temporary suspension of criminal courts has contributed to overcrowding in Mexico’s prisons. Monthly data indicates that the number of detainees without a sentence peaked in September 2020, when the total number of stood at more than 77,000, with marginal reductions recorded in the subsequent months. By the end of 2020, 42 percent of prisoners in state prisons were held without a sentence.<sup>120</sup>

# 2

## THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF PEACE IN MEXICO

### KEY FINDINGS

- The economic impact of violence in Mexico was 4.71 trillion pesos (US\$221 billion) in 2020, equivalent to 22.5 percent of the country's GDP.
- The economic impact of violence improved for the second year in a row in 2020, decreasing by 1.8 percent or 88 billion pesos from the previous year.
- The economic impact of violence was more than seven times higher than public investments made in health care and more than six times higher than those made in education in 2020.
- Mexico's spending on domestic security and the justice system in 2020 was equal to 0.73 percent of GDP, the least of any Latin American country or member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
- Spending on domestic security decreased by 31.4 percent from 2015 to 2020, while spending on the justice system decreased by 2.9 percent.
- In 2020, homicide comprised 47 percent of the economic impact of violence, this was equivalent to 2.23 trillion pesos (US\$104.8 billion).
- A one percent decline in the economic impact of violence is approximately equal to the federal government's investment in science, technology and innovation in 2020.
- The economic impact of violence was 36,893 pesos per person, approximately two times the average monthly salary in Mexico.
- The per capita economic impact varies significantly from state to state, ranging from 11,146 pesos in Yucatán to 77,957 pesos in Colima.
- The economic impact of private protection costs increased by 86.2 percent in 2020, the largest percentage increase of any indicator. Businesses purchasing protective measures drove the increase, particularly in Mexico City.
- Mexico City accounts for 55.8 percent of the total private expenditure on protection in 2020.
- In 2020, the economic impact for each of the eight indicators contained in the interpersonal violence category declined year on year.
- Since 2015, nine states have recorded improvements in their economic impact of violence, with each state improving by an average of 17 percent. In contrast, 23 states have recorded deteriorations in their economic impact, deteriorating on average by 66.9 percent.
- A reduction in violence across all states equal to the level of the five most peaceful states in Mexico would result in an average peace dividend of 3.3 trillion pesos (US\$154 billion) per year.



# THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE IN 2020

In 2020, the economic impact of violence in Mexico was estimated to be 4.7 trillion pesos in constant 2020 terms (US\$221 billion). This is equivalent to 22.5 percent of Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP) or 36,893 pesos per person.<sup>1</sup> The economic impact of violence improved for the second year in a row in 2020, falling by 1.8 percent or 88 billion pesos from the previous year. Although the impact of violence declined in 2020, it remains significant and is equivalent to more than four times the government's economic development expenditure.<sup>2</sup>

The economic impact of violence is defined as the expenditure and economic effect related to "containing, preventing and dealing with the consequences of violence." The total economic impact of violence includes the direct cost of violence, the indirect cost and the multiplier effect. Direct costs are expenditures incurred by the victim, the perpetrator and the government. Indirect costs accrue after the fact and include the present value of long-term costs arising from incidents of crime, such as lost future income and physical and psychological trauma. Table 2.1 presents a full breakdown of the costs included in the 2020 economic impact estimate.

The multiplier effect represents the economic benefits that would have been generated if all relevant expenditure had been directed into more productive alternatives. A summary of the methodology is provided at the end of this section, and a comprehensive explanation of how the economic impact of violence is calculated is provided in Section 5.

In both 2019 and 2020, Mexico recorded an improvement in the economic impact of violence from the previous year, reversing a four-year trend of continuous increases. In 2020, decreases in opportunistic crimes such as kidnapping, robbery, extortion and violent assaults underpinned the 1.8 percent improvement in the economic impact. However, military expenditure and spending on private protection costs increased from the previous year.

Figure 2.1 displays the economic impact of violence by state as a percentage of its GDP in 2020. Zacatecas, Guanajuato, Guerrero and Michoacán all have a cost of violence that exceeds 40 percent of GDP. These four states suffer from higher levels of interpersonal violence and are all ranked in the bottom half of the MPI 2021.

Violence and the fear of violence create significant economic disruptions. Violent incidents incur costs in the form of property damage, physical injury or psychological trauma. Fear of violence also alters economic behavior, primarily by changing investment and consumption patterns, which diverts public and private resources away from productive activities and towards protective measures. Violence and the fear of violence generate significant losses in the form of productivity shortfalls, foregone earnings and distorted expenditure. Therefore, measuring the scale and cost of violence has important implications for assessing its effects on economic activity. Figure 2.2 illustrates the share of the total economic impact of violence in 2020 by the categories used in the model.

TABLE 2.1

## The economic impact of violence in 2020, constant 2020 pesos, billions

The total economic losses amounted to 4.7 trillion pesos in 2020.

INDICATOR	DIRECT	INDIRECT	MULTIPLIER EFFECT	THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE
Homicide	193.91	1,846.10	193.91	2,233.93
Violent Crime	364.91	836.02	364.91	1,565.83
Organized Crime	-	15.25	-	15.25
Fear	-	45.73	-	45.73
Private security & weapons	132.82	-	132.82	265.63
Military Spending	140.43	-	140.43	280.86
Domestic Security Spending	42.22	-	42.22	84.44
Justice System Spending and Incarceration	109.72	3.57	109.72	223.01
<b>Total</b>	<b>984.01</b>	<b>2,746.67</b>	<b>984.01</b>	<b>4,714.69</b>

Source: IEP


Note: Totals may not be exact due to rounding

The data shows that the consequential costs from violence in Mexico are significantly larger than government expenditure on violence containment. In 2020, 18 percent of Mexico's economic impact was government expenditure and private protection expenditures, whereas the remaining 82 percent is from homicides, violent crime, organized crime and fear of victimization. This differs significantly from the global economic impact of violence, where 81 percent of the impact is comprised of government and private expenditures on containing and preventing violence.<sup>3</sup> This suggests that there is a need for more violence containment spending in Mexico.

FIGURE 2.1

### The economic cost of violence by state, percentage of state's GDP, 2020

The economic cost of violence ranges from 2.2 percent of GDP in Campeche to 44.1 percent of GDP in Zacatecas.




Source: IEP

FIGURE 2.2

### Breakdown of the economic impact of violence, 2020

Homicide and violent crime represent 81 percent of the economic impact of violence.



Source: IEP

In 2020, homicide was the largest category in the model at 47 percent and amounted to 2.2 trillion pesos (US\$104.8 billion). This is equivalent to 10.7 percent of Mexico's GDP. By contrast, in the global economic impact model homicide is 7.4 percent of the total,

equal to 0.8 percent of global GDP.<sup>4</sup> If Mexico were to achieve a ten percent decline in the homicide rate, Mexico's economic impact would decrease by 223 billion pesos. This is more than four times government spending on science, technology and innovation in 2020.<sup>5</sup>

Violent crime, which comprises robbery, assault and sexual violence, was the second most expensive form of violence, representing 33 percent of the total economic impact at 1.6 trillion pesos. The economic impact of violent crime also measures Mexican households' and businesses' financial and health-related losses from violent crime.

Government spending on activities aimed at reducing violence — domestic security, the military and the justice system — amounted to 588.3 billion pesos, accounting for 12.5 percent of the total economic impact. Also included in the government spending is the economic impact of incarceration through the loss of wages of those imprisoned. The prisoners' lost wages are assumed to equal the Mexican minimum wage of 32,530 pesos per year in 2020. In 2020, the cost of incarceration was estimated at 3.6 billion pesos.

The economic impact model includes the costs households and businesses incur in protecting themselves from crime and violence. Protection costs amounted to 265.6 billion pesos in 2020 — six percent of the total. This indicator includes insurance, private security spending, the cost of firearms for protection, changing place of residence or business due to violence, and the installation of alarms, locks, doors, windows, bars and fences.

The remaining one percent of economic losses are related to the costs of organized crime and the fear of violence. The economic impact of organized criminal activity is calculated for two types of crimes — extortion and kidnapping — and amounted to 15.3 billion pesos in 2020. However, this is a conservative estimate as the model does not include all of the losses imposed by organized

criminal groups, particularly commodity theft or drug trade-related economic activity such as production, transport and distribution. Furthermore, the presence of organized criminal groups can increase costs incurred to businesses due to the risks of kidnapping and extortion.<sup>6</sup> Data on the economic impact of these types of crimes are extremely difficult to capture.

The fear of violence distorts consumer and business behavior, which in turn causes economic losses. These losses were calculated at 45.7 billion pesos in 2020.<sup>7</sup>



## TRENDS IN THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

Since 2015, the economic impact of violence has increased by 36.5 percent, reflecting the deterioration in peacefulness that has occurred in Mexico over the same period. Having peaked in 2018 at 4.8 trillion pesos (US\$226 billion), the economic impact of violence has since declined by 102 billion pesos.

The largest improvement came in 2020, with the economic impact falling by 88 billion pesos from the previous year. Declines in violent crime drove the improvements over the last two years.

For the first time since the inception of the index, the homicide rate in Mexico fell, decreasing from 28.1 homicides per 100,000 people in 2019 to 27.8 homicides per 100,000 people in 2020. This improvement is positively reflected in the economic impact of

TABLE 2.2

### Trend in the economic impact of violence, constant 2020 pesos, billions, 2015–2020

In 2020, personal and business expenses on protection recorded the largest percentage increase from 2019.

INDICATOR	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	PESO CHANGE (2019–2020)	PERCENTAGE CHANGE (2019–2020)
Homicide	1,199.30	1,491.50	1,973.80	2,283.60	2,306.30	2,233.90	-72.3	-3.1%
Violent Crime	1,474.40	1,454.20	1,540.10	1,741.70	1,713.50	1,565.80	-147.6	-8.6%
Organized Crime	16.5	14	14.9	15.5	18.3	15.3	-3	-16.6%
Fear	46.9	46	43.5	45.8	46.9	45.7	-1.2	-2.5%
Protection Costs	119.3	174	169.2	149.7	142.7	265.6	123	86.2%
Military Spending	245.4	233.7	228.6	231.3	261	280.9	19.9	7.6%
Domestic Security Spending	123.1	112.3	102.6	102.7	88.4	84.4	-3.9	-4.5%
Justice System Spending and Incarceration	228.9	255.9	233.5	246.3	225.7	223	-2.7	-1.2%
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,453.80</b>	<b>3,781.60</b>	<b>4,306.30</b>	<b>4,816.70</b>	<b>4,802.70</b>	<b>4,714.70</b>	<b>-87.8</b>	<b>-1.8%</b>


Source: IEP

Note: Totals may not be exact due to rounding

FIGURE 2.3

### Trend in the economic impact of violence and year-on-year percentage change, 2015–2020

The largest annual increase occurred in 2017, equal to 524.6 billion pesos. This represents a 13.9 percent increase from 2016.



Source: IEP

homicide which fell 72.3 billion pesos, or 3.1 percent from the previous year. Figure 2.3 displays the trend in Mexico's economic impact of violence.

Interpersonal violence costs decreased while military expenditure and private expenditure on protection increased from 2019. Table 2.2 presents the trend in indicators from 2015 to 2020. Between 2015 and 2018, the economic impact of violence rose consecutively, rising by 39.5 percent in total. These three years of continuous

increase coincided with Mexico's increasing homicide rate and the overall deterioration in peacefulness. Consequently, the economic impact of violence is 1.3 trillion pesos (US\$61 billion) higher in 2020, relative to 2015.

Figure 2.4 shows the trend in the economic impact of violence in Mexico across three categories: personal and business protection costs, interpersonal violence; and government expenditure. Since 2015, both the economic impact from interpersonal violence as well as the personal and business expenditures on protection and safety have increased. The economic impact of protection costs has more than doubled from 2015, the largest increase of the three categories. In 2020, protection costs were up 86.2 percent from the previous year, equal to 123 billion pesos. The economic impact of interpersonal violence has increased 41 percent from 2015.

Protection costs are an aggregate of the National Survey of Business Victimization (ENVE)<sup>8</sup> and the National Survey of Victimization and Perception of Public Security (ENVIPE)<sup>9</sup> surveyed responses on expenditures made by business and citizens to protect themselves. In 2020, business protection costs increased 86.3 percent, while personal protection expenses decreased by 0.7 percent.

The rapid increase in protection expenses was driven by business expenditures rather than personal private expenditures. These expenses include higher insurance premiums, the installation of additional locks, alarms, video surveillance cameras and tracking devices. There was also an increased demand for the hiring of surveillance personal and private security.

Table 2.3 shows the change in the economic impact of violence by indicator from the inception of the index to 2020.

TABLE 2.3

### Change in the economic impact of violence by indicator, constant 2020 pesos, billions, 2015–2020

The economic impact of homicide increased by one trillion pesos between 2015 and 2020.

INDICATOR	2015	2020	PESO CHANGE (2015–2020)	PERCENTAGE CHANGE (2015–2020)
Homicide	1,199.3	2,233.9	1,034.6	86.3%
Violent Crime (Assault, Robbery and Sexual violence)	1,474.4	1,565.8	91.5	6.2%
Military Spending	245.4	280.9	35.5	14.4%
Protection Costs	119.3	265.6	146.3	122.7%
Justice System Spending and Incarceration	228.9	223.0	-5.9	-2.6%
Domestic Security Spending	123.1	84.4	-38.6	-31.4%
Fear	46.9	45.7	-1.2	-2.5%
Organized Crime	16.5	15.3	-1.2	-7.5%
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,453.8</b>	<b>4,714.7</b>	<b>1,260.9</b>	<b>36.5%</b>


Source: IEP

Note: Totals may not be exact due to rounding

FIGURE 2.4

### Indexed trend in the economic impact of violence, 2015–2020

Personal and business expenses on protection have recorded the largest percentage increase since 2015.



Source: IEP




## THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE BY STATE

Only eight of the 32 states in Mexico recorded a higher economic impact of violence in 2020 compared to the previous year. Querétaro experienced the largest percentage increase, increasing by 52.6 percent, followed by Zacatecas at 30.5 percent. The higher economic impacts in these two states were driven by the increased costs from interpersonal violence in 2020.

From 2019, Guerrero had the largest decrease, recording a 25.1 percent decline in its economic impact of violence. This was driven by a significant fall in the costs of homicide and violent crime. Figure 2.5 displays the five states with the largest improvements and deteriorations in their economic impact from 2019.

FIGURE 2.5  
**Changes in the economic impact of violence by state, 2019–2020**

Querétaro recorded the largest increase of any state in its economic impact, increasing by 52.6 percent year-on-year.



Source: IEP

The economic impact of violence differs significantly between states. Of the 32 Mexican states, Zacatecas recorded the highest burden from the economic cost of violence, equivalent to 44.1 percent of its GDP. Table 2.4 lists the five most and least affected states as a percentage of GDP. The states with the higher costs as a percentage of GDP all have higher homicide rates and firearms crime compared to the five states with the lowest economic cost from violence.

The states with the higher levels of organized crime, homicide and violent assault suffer from a higher economic impact. The nationwide economic impact of violence amounted to 36,893 pesos per person in 2020. This is worth approximately two months income for an average Mexican worker.<sup>10</sup> Table 2.5 presents the MPI rank, the per capita and the total economic impact of violence by state.

TABLE 2.4

### The five most and least affected states, 2020, percentage of state's GDP

The five states with the highest economic cost of violence are all less peaceful than the states with the lowest cost.

STATE	ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE	STATE	ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE
Zacatecas	44.1%	Campeche	2.2%
Guanajuato	41.9%	Yucatán	4.8%
Guerrero	41.6%	Coahuila	6.2%
Michoacán	40.0%	Mexico City	7.3%
Morelos	38.7%	Nuevo León	7.4%

Source: IEP

The two least peaceful states in Mexico, Colima and Baja California, recorded the highest per capita impact in 2020, with both states exceeding 70,000 pesos per person. Yucatán, the most peaceful state in 2020 recorded the lowest economic impact per person at 11,146 pesos.

Figure 2.6 displays the map of the per capita economic impact of homicide by state for 2020. Yucatán's per capita impact of homicide is equal to 1,672 pesos per person, the lowest in Mexico. In comparison, the highest occurs in Colima with an impact of 51,157 pesos. The extreme disparity of homicides between the states is highlighted by the 49,485 pesos per person difference.

Baja California Sur, which ranked as the 17<sup>th</sup> most peaceful state out of the 32, had the highest per capita expenditure on domestic security, the justice system and the military. Mexico City had the highest per capita expenditure on private security equal to 16,442 pesos per person. This is over six times higher than the next highest state, Nuevo León.

TABLE 2.5

### The per capita economic impact of violence, 2020, constant 2020 pesos

The per capita economic impact of violence varies significantly from state to state in Mexico, from Yucatán at 11,146 pesos per person to Colima at 77,957 pesos per person.


STATE	MPI RANK	PER CAPITA ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE	ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE (BILLIONS)
Yucatán	1	11,146	25.2
Chiapas	3	13,742	78.7
Coahuila	7	18,344	59.0
Tlaxcala	2	20,310	28.0
Durango	9	20,650	38.6
Campeche	4	21,543	21.6
Nayarit	5	22,219	28.6
Veracruz	10	23,060	196.9
Hidalgo	6	25,302	78.1
Nuevo León	17	27,681	155.3
Tamaulipas	12	29,404	107.3
Puebla	8	31,227	206.2
Oaxaca	13	31,565	130.8
San Luis Potosí	22	32,053	91.9
Sinaloa	16	32,089	101.3
Tabasco	15	33,133	85.2
México	21	33,836	589.7
Baja California Sur	19	35,761	28.8
Aguascalientes	11	36,158	51.9
Guerrero	25	37,922	138.7
Jalisco	20	38,466	323.5
Querétaro	14	43,574	99.3
Mexico City	18	44,355	400.0
Quintana Roo	26	46,871	80.8
Sonora	27	48,117	147.9
Michoacán	23	50,321	242.8
Morelos	24	52,101	106.5
Zacatecas	30	57,953	96.6
Chihuahua	29	61,538	233.9
Guanajuato	28	67,536	420.6
Baja California	32	71,413	259.6
Colima	31	77,957	61.2

Source: IEP

FIGURE 2.6

### Map of the per capita economic impact of homicide, 2020, constant 2020 pesos

The difference in the per capita economic impact of homicide is largest between Colima and Yucatán, equal to 49,485 pesos.



Source: IEP

The Crime Victimization Survey/*Encuesta Nacional Sobre Inseguridad* (ENSI) found that households in areas suffering from higher levels of organized crime-related violence spend on average US\$1,085 (20,880 pesos) more on security than areas not affected by similar violence.<sup>11</sup> Table 2.6 displays the percentage change in the per capita economic impact of violence.

**TABLE 2.6**  
**The percentage change in the per capita economic impact of violence, 2015–2020 & 2019–2020, constant 2020 pesos**

The per capita economic impact in Guanajuato is 139 percent higher in 2020 than in 2015. This was the largest percentage increase of any Mexican state.

State	2015–2020	2019–2020
Guanajuato	139%	16%
Colima	137%	-12%
Oaxaca	130%	-17%
Zacatecas	114%	30%
Michoacán	69%	6%
Querétaro	68%	50%
Chihuahua	67%	-2%
Baja California	57%	-5%
San Luis Potosí	55%	14%
Jalisco	54%	-2%
Sonora	52%	6%
Aguascalientes	49%	7%
Quintana Roo	47%	-16%
Puebla	46%	-2%
Mexico City	45%	12%
Hidalgo	38%	-12%
Veracruz	35%	-15%
Nayarit	30%	-2%
Tabasco	25%	-17%
Nuevo León	19%	-2%
Morelos	18%	-11%
Campeche	14%	-5%
Tlaxcala	8%	-13%
México	-7%	-7%
Sinaloa	-16%	-8%
Tamaulipas	-19%	-15%
Coahuila	-20%	-19%
Baja California Sur	-21%	-15%
Chiapas	-22%	-16%
Durango	-22%	-10%
Guerrero	-31%	-25%
Yucatán	-37%	-8%

Source: IEP




## IMPROVEMENTS AND DETERIORATIONS IN THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

Over the last six years, the economic impact of violence has improved in nine states but deteriorated in 23 states. This has led to the economic impact of violence being 36.5 percent higher in Mexico today compared to 2015. The deterioration in the economic impact in Mexico has been considerably larger in states that were already less peaceful to begin with, which has led to an increase in the 'economic impact gap' between the more peaceful and less peaceful states, as shown in Figure 2.7.

**FIGURE 2.7**  
**Trend in economic impact, five most and five least peaceful states, average change, 2015–2020**

Since 2015, the five least peaceful states have more than doubled their economic impact increasing on average by 115 percent. The most peaceful states have deteriorated by 6.1 percent.



Source: IEP

The economic impact of violence of Mexico's five most peaceful states have averaged a 6.1 percent increase since 2015. This contrasts to a more than doubling of the economic impact of violence in Mexico's least peaceful states.

### IMPROVEMENTS

Since 2015, only nine states have recorded improvements, with each state improving on average by 17 percent. The five states that recorded the largest percentage improvements were Yucatán, Guerrero, Durango, Chiapas and Tamaulipas. On average, the economic impact of violence fell by 22.5 percent across these five states. Table 2.7 displays the economic impact in 2015 and 2020 for these five states. Not only has Yucatán been the most peaceful

TABLE 2.7

### The economic impact in the five most improved states, 2015–2020, constant 2020 pesos, billions

On average, the impact of violence fell by 22.5 percent across the five states with the largest improvements.

Indicator	2015	2020	CHANGE 2015–2020	PERCENTAGE CHANGE (2015–2020)
Yucatán	37.9	25.2	-12.7	-33.5%
Guerrero	196.4	138.7	-57.7	-29.4%
Durango	47.3	38.6	-8.7	-18.3%
Chiapas	93.6	78.7	-14.8	-15.9%
Tamaulipas	127.0	107.3	-19.6	-15.5%

Source: IEP

state in Mexico for the last five years, but it also recorded the largest percentage improvement from 2015, decreasing by 33.5 percent or 12.7 billion pesos.

In the nine states that have recorded improvements from 2015, the total impact of violent crime and homicides fell by 12.8 percent in total. The impact of military expenditure had the largest increase, increasing by 11.1 percent from 2015.

#### DETERIORATIONS

Since 2015, 23 states have recorded deteriorations, with each state deteriorating by an average of 66.9 percent. These increases were primarily driven by homicides, violent crime and private expenditure on protection costs. For example, the economic impact of homicide increased by 153 percent and protection costs increased 179 percent across these 23 states. Over the same period in these 23 states, the total government expenditures on domestic security and the judicial system declined by 30.5 and 1.6 percent, respectively. This demonstrates that the costs associated with violence have increased, yet the government's expenditures to counter violence have decreased over the same period.

TABLE 2.8

### The economic impact in the states with the largest percentage deterioration, 2015–2020, constant 2020 pesos, billions

On average, the impact of violence increased by 131 percent across the five states with the largest deteriorations.

Indicator	2015	2020	CHANGE 2015–2020	PERCENTAGE CHANGE (2015–2020)
Colima	23.7	61.2	37.5	157.8%
Guanajuato	167.4	420.6	253.2	151.3%
Oaxaca	55.2	130.8	75.5	136.7%
Zacatecas	43.3	96.6	53.2	122.8%
Querétaro	53.8	99.3	45.5	84.7%

Source: IEP

The five states that recorded the largest percentage deteriorations were Colima, Guanajuato, Oaxaca, Zacatecas and Querétaro. On average, their economic impact of violence increased by 130.7 percent. Table 2.8 displays the economic impact in 2015 and 2020 for these five states. Colima recorded the largest deterioration and ranks as the second least peaceful state on the MPI 2021. Its economic impact of violence increased by 157.8 percent or 37.5 billion pesos.

#### THE PEACE DIVIDEND

To illustrate the variation in the economic impact of violence across Mexican states, three scenarios can be modeled:


1. Current Projected Scenario: All states continue at their current levels of peace.
2. High Peace Scenario: All states improve their levels of peace to the level of the five most peaceful states.
3. Low Peace Scenario: All states deteriorate in peace to the level of the five least peaceful states.

The first scenario assumes that peacefulness in Mexico continues at its current trend. The second scenario is the high peace

FIGURE 2.8

### Difference in the economic impact of interpersonal violence, high peace scenario vs. the current projected scenario, 2015–2024

Mexico would gain 13.4 trillion pesos in additional economic activity over four years if peace improved to a level equivalent to the five most peaceful states.



Source: IEP

scenario, which demonstrates the benefits of reducing the economic impact of violence to the level of the five most peaceful states.<sup>12</sup> The five most peaceful states in 2020 were Yucatán, Tlaxcala, Chiapas, Campeche and Nayarit. Figure 2.8 shows the projections for scenarios one and two.

In contrast, the third scenario demonstrates the additional losses that Mexico would incur if the economic impact of violence across all Mexican states increase to the level of the five least peaceful states. The five least peaceful states were Guanajuato, Chihuahua, Zacatecas, Colima and Baja California. A comparison of scenarios one and three is shown in Figure 2.9.

A reduction in violence across all states equal to the level of the five most peaceful states in Mexico would result in an average peace dividend of 3.3 trillion pesos per year, or 13.4 trillion pesos (US\$628 billion) over a four-year period. The annual peace dividend is equivalent to 14.6 percent of Mexico's GDP in 2020.

The difference in the economic impact between the first and third scenarios is more pronounced. This scenario displays the difference between states deteriorating to a level of the five least peaceful states which in then compared to the current projected

scenario. In this scenario, the consequence of a fall in Mexico's peace to a level equal to the five least peaceful states would amount to 5.6 trillion pesos in additional losses per year, or 22.6 trillion pesos (US\$1.1 trillion) over a four-year period. These additional annual losses in this scenario are equivalent to 26.7 percent of Mexico's 2020 GDP. Figure 2.9 illustrates the disparity between the low peace scenario and the current projected scenario, forecasting for four years.


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Since 2015, nine states have recorded improvements in their economic impact of violence, with each state improving by an average of 17 percent. In contrast, 23 states have recorded deteriorations in their economic impact, with each state deteriorating on average by 66.9 percent.

FIGURE 2.9

### Difference in the economic impact of violence, low peace vs. the current projected scenario, 2015–2024

The difference in the economic impact of violence from the level of the five least peaceful states to that of the current projected level, amounts to 22.6 trillion pesos over four years.



Source: IEP



## GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT

Mexico's government spending on domestic security and the judicial system as a percentage of GDP is less than half of the OECD average. Considering Mexico's high levels of violence, considerable gains can be made by increasing funding to match the OECD average.

Government expenditure on containing and dealing with violence accounted for 12.5 percent of Mexico's economic impact in 2020, or 588.3 billion pesos. Violence containment spending is comprised of the government expenditures on domestic security, the military and the justice system. In 2020, the impact on these three indicators increased by 2.3 percent from the previous year.

Since 2007, federal violence containment expenditure has increased by 71.5 percent. While the government's expenditure on the military, judicial system, and public order and safety have increased, the funding increases have differed. Of the three, military expenditure has had the largest increase, increasing by 98 percent since 2007. This was followed by the expenditure on the judicial system, which increased by 64 percent and then the expenditure on public order and safety which has increased 29 percent.

However, in recent years, the government has implemented austerity measures. Consequently, in three of the last four years, the government has cut domestic security and the justice system funding. Whereas the expenditure on the military has decreased only once in the last four years. Although the economic impact of

these three measures of violence containment increased by 2.3 percent in 2020, the increase came from the spending on the military rather than public safety or the judicial system. The government's expenditure on domestic security services has fallen by 31.4 percent since 2015.


Spending on domestic security through police, protection services, custody and incarceration costs, surveillance and security of persons and respective administration costs peaked in 2012, but has since declined by 32 percent.<sup>14</sup> Spending on the justice system in 2020 was 109 billion pesos, down by 1.5 percent from the previous year.

While spending on public order and safety has decreased over the last years, spending on the military has outpaced other forms of government expenditure. Military expenditure is currently 140 billion pesos, the highest level on record. The higher levels of expenditure coincide with the increased use of the military to fight organized crime. Despite this, Mexico's expenditure on the military is equivalent to 0.5 percent of its GDP, well under the global average. Figure 2.10 shows the trend in the government's expenditure on violence containment from 2007 to 2020.

FIGURE 2.10

### Trend in government spending on violence containment, 2007–2020

Mexico's military expenditure was at its highest level in 2020, while domestic security expenditure was at a twelve-year low.



Source: Mexican Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP); IEP

Similarly, Mexican public spending on justice and domestic security are well below regional and international levels. Mexico spent 0.73 percent of its GDP on the justice system and domestic security in 2020, less than half of the OECD average. A similar trend emerges when Mexican spending on justice and domestic security is compared with other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.<sup>15</sup>

Figures 2.11 and 2.12 show the justice system and domestic security spending for countries in the OECD, and for Latin America and the Caribbean, displaying Mexico's relative position in both groups.


Given the magnitude of the direct losses from homicide and violent crime in Mexico, an increase in violence containment

spending is well justified. Mexico has found it difficult to build sufficient capacity in its judicial system to meet the demand. Consequently, Mexico's justice system displays the need to increase the number of judges. By increasing the number of judges, the capacity of Mexico's legal system may improve lead to reductions in overcrowding in prisons and those incarcerated without sentence.<sup>16</sup> Mexico has an average of 2.2 judges and magistrates per 100,000 people.<sup>17</sup> This half the average number of judges compared to the rest of the Americas and eight times less than the global average.<sup>18</sup> This deficit limits the judicial system's capacity to process cases and creates backlogs of unsolved cases and persons incarcerated without a sentence.<sup>19</sup>

The pattern of federal expenditure on domestic security and justice by state does not match the levels of violence as captured

FIGURE 2.11  
**Domestic security and justice system spending in OECD countries, percentage of GDP**


Mexico spends 0.73 percent of its GDP on public order and safety. This is less than half of the OECD average.



Source: OECD; Mexican Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP), IEP  
Notes: Where data isn't available for the latest year, the latest available data is used

FIGURE 2.12  
**Domestic security and justice system spending in Latin America and Caribbean countries, percentage of GDP**

Mexico's expenditure on domestic security and justice as a proportion of GDP is less than half the average for Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries.



Source: Jaitman, Laura, 'Frontiers in the Economics of Crime', Inter-American Development Bank, Dec 2018; IEP  
Note: Mexico figure calculated by IEP for 2020; other countries reflect 2014 levels from Jaitman (2018)

KEY FINDINGS ↗

GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE

**31.4%** ↓

Spending on domestic security decreased by 31.4 percent from 2015 to 2020, while spending on the justice system decreased by 2.9 percent.




Mexico spent 0.7 percent of its GDP on the justice system and domestic security in 2020, less than half of the OECD average.

FIGURE 2.13

### State MPI scores and per capita expenditure on domestic security and justice, 2020

States that experience the lowest levels of peace do not necessarily receive higher per capita funds for domestic security and justice.



Source: INEGI; IEP

by state MPI scores. States such as Baja California, Guerrero, Chihuahua and Guanajuato experience high levels of violence yet have a below-average per capita spending on domestic security and justice. Figure 2.13 shows the level of peacefulness and per capita domestic security expenditure by state. Colima has increased its expenditure more than any other state, increasing it by 352 pesos for each person in the state since 2015. Sonora recorded the largest decrease. The expenditure on domestic security and justice is 452.8 pesos less for each person in the state from 2015.

In evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of government spending on the justice and public security sectors, spending beyond an optimal level has the potential to constrain a nation's economic development. However, underinvestment can create conditions for higher levels of impunity, which in turn reduces deterrents to crime and violence. According to the SESNSP there

is approximately a 42 percent deficit of state police.<sup>20</sup> With 1.03 police officers per every 1,000 people, Mexico is well below the international minimum standard of 1.8 police officers per 1,000 people.<sup>21</sup>

These trade-offs are not easy to navigate and present an important policy challenge. Limited public resources mean that an increase in spending on containing violence has to be funded by either increased taxes or reallocating funds from other sectors. In Mexico, the lack of capacity in the judicial and security sectors leads to a security gap where the consequential costs of violence far exceed the containment costs. Therefore, achieving the optimal levels of spending on public security expenditure is important for making the most productive use of capital.

## METHODOLOGY

The economic impact of violence is defined as the expenditure and economic activity related to "containing, preventing and dealing with the consequences of violence." The **economic impact of violence** refers to the total cost (direct and indirect) of violence plus an economic peace multiplier. The **economic cost of violence** refers to the direct and indirect costs of violence.

IEP's estimate of the economic impact of violence includes three components:

1. **Direct costs** are the costs of crime or violence to the victim, the perpetrator, and the government, including those associated with policing, medical expenses, funerals or incarceration.
2. **Indirect costs** accrue after the fact. These include physical and psychological trauma and the present value of future costs associated with the violent incident, such as the consequential lost future income. There is also a measure of the impact of fear on the economy, as people who fear that they may become a victim of violent crime alter their behavior.
3. The **multiplier effect** is a commonly used economic concept that describes the extent to which additional expenditure has flow-on impacts in the wider economy. Injections of new income into the economy will lead to more spending, which will in turn create employment, further income and encourage additional spending, thereby increasing GDP. This mutually reinforcing economic cycle explains the "multiplier effect," and why a dollar of expenditure can create more than a dollar of economic activity. The multiplier effect calculates the additional economic activity that would have accrued if the direct costs of violence had been avoided. Refer to Box 2.1 for more detail on the multiplier.

Mexico's economic impact of violence consists of three categories:

1. **Violence containment expenditure** refers to the direct and indirect costs associated with preventing or dealing with the consequences of violence. This includes government spending on domestic security, justice and military.
2. **Protection Costs** refers to the personal and business expenses from the National Survey of Business Victimization (ENVE) and the National Survey of Victimization and Perception of Public Security (ENVIPE) surveys.
3. **Interpersonal Violence** refers to the direct and indirect costs associated with homicide, violent crimes, organized crimes and the fear of victimization.

This study uses a cost accounting methodology to measure the economic impact of violence. Expenditures on containing violence are totaled and unit costs are applied to the MPI estimates for the number of crimes committed. A unit cost is also applied to the estimated level of fear of insecurity. The unit costs estimate the direct (tangible) and indirect (intangible) costs of each crime. Direct unit costs include losses to the victim and perpetrator and exclude costs incurred by law enforcement

and health care systems, as these are captured elsewhere in the model. The direct costs for violent crime and organized crime are obtained from household and business surveys undertaken by the Mexican statistical office, which assesses economic and health costs to the victim of a crime.

Indirect unit costs include the physical and psychological trauma, and the present value of future costs associated with the violent incident, such as lost lifetime wages for homicide victims.

The cost estimates provided in this report are in constant 2020 pesos, which facilitates the comparison of the estimates over time. The estimate only includes elements of violence in which reliable data could be obtained. As such, the estimate can be considered conservative. The items listed below are included in the cost of violence methodology:

1. Homicide
2. Violent crime, which includes assault, sexual violence and robbery
3. Organized crime, which includes extortion and kidnapping
4. Indirect costs of incarceration
5. Fear of insecurity
6. Protections costs, including private security and firearms
7. Federal spending on violence containment, which includes the military, domestic national security and the justice system
8. Medical and funeral costs.

The economic impact of violence excludes:

- State level and municipal public spending on security
- The cost of drug trade related crimes such as the production, possession, transport and supply of drugs
- Population displacement due to violence.

Although data is available for some of these categories, it is either not fully available for all states or for each year of analysis.

BOX 2.1

## The multiplier effect

The multiplier effect is a commonly used economic concept, which describes the extent to which additional expenditure improves the wider economy. Injections of new income into the economy will lead to more spending, which in turn creates employment, further income and additional spending. This mutually reinforcing economic cycle is known as the "multiplier effect" and is the reason that a peso of expenditure can create more than one peso of economic activity.

Although the exact magnitude of this effect is difficult to measure, it is likely to be particularly high in the case of expenditure related to containing violence. For instance, if a community were to become more peaceful, individuals and corporations would spend less time and resources protecting themselves against violence. Due to this decrease in violence, there would likely be substantial flow-on effects for the wider economy, as money is diverted towards more productive areas such as health, business investment, education and infrastructure.

The potential economic benefits from increased peace can be significant. When a homicide is avoided, the direct

costs, such as the money spent on medical treatment and a funeral, can be spent elsewhere. The economy also benefits from the victim's lifetime income and expenditure.

More generally, there is strong evidence to suggest that violence and the fear of violence can fundamentally alter the incentives for business. For example, Brauer and Tepper-Marlin (2009) argue that violence or the fear of violence may result in some economic activities not occurring at all. Their analysis of 730 business ventures in Colombia from 1997 to 2001 found that amidst higher levels of violence, new ventures were less likely to survive and profit. Consequently, with greater levels of violence, it is likely that employment rates and economic productivity will fall long-term, due to the disincentives around job creation and long-term investments.

This study assumes that the multiplier is one, signifying that for every peso saved on violence containment, there will be an additional peso of economic activity. This is a relatively conservative multiplier and broadly in line with similar studies.<sup>22</sup>

“

A dollar of expenditure can create more than a dollar of economic activity



# 3

## POSITIVE PEACE

### KEY FINDINGS

- Globally, Mexico ranks 71<sup>st</sup> out of 163 countries in the 2020 Positive Peace Index and ranks sixth in Central America and the Caribbean. This is much higher than its ranking on the Global Peace Index, highlighting its potential for improvement.
- Mexico's score in the global Positive Peace Index improved by 2.9 percent over the past decade, which is lower than the average global improvement of 3.3 percent.
- The Pillars showing the greatest improvements in the past ten years were *Sound Business Environment*, at 15.5 percent, and *Free Flow of Information*, at 13.5 percent.
- The largest deteriorations were recorded for the *Well-Functioning Government* and *Low Levels of Corruption* Pillars. Deteriorations in these are statistically linked to increases in violence and homicides.
- *Low Levels of Corruption* is the weakest Pillar in Mexico.
- In 2020, insecurity ranked as the highest concern for Mexican citizens, followed by unemployment and health.
- The sub-national Mexico Positive Peace Index (MPPI) showed substantial variation across Mexico's states. Nuevo León, Colima and Baja California Sur have the strongest levels of Positive Peace, while Guerrero, Chiapas and Puebla have the weakest.
- Some states have high levels of Positive Peace while also recording high levels of violence. This is in part associated with a strong presence of organized crime, which can distort the relationship between levels of violence and Positive Peace.
- Organized crime tends to flourish where the *Well-Functioning Government* and *Low Levels of Corruption* Pillars are weak.



## WHAT IS POSITIVE PEACE?

Positive Peace is defined as the *attitudes, institutions and structures* that create and sustain peaceful societies (Figure 3.1). The same factors also lead to many other desirable socio-economic outcomes. Higher levels of Positive Peace are statistically linked to greater income growth, better environmental outcomes, higher levels of wellbeing, better developmental outcomes and stronger resilience.

IEP has empirically derived the Positive Peace Index (PPI) through the analysis of almost 25,000 economic and social progress indicators to determine which ones have statistically significant relationships with peace as measured by the Global Peace Index (GPI).

FIGURE 3.1

### What is Positive Peace?

Positive Peace is a complementary concept to negative peace.



### THE PILLARS OF POSITIVE PEACE

Positive Peace is predicated on eight key factors, or Pillars, that describe the workings of the socio-economic system:

**Well-Functioning Government** – A well-functioning government delivers high-quality public and civil services, engenders trust and participation, demonstrates political stability and upholds the rule of law.

**Sound Business Environment** – The strength of economic conditions as well as the formal institutions that support the operation of the private sector. Business competitiveness and economic productivity are both associated with the most peaceful countries.

**Equitable Distribution of Resources** – Peaceful countries tend to ensure equity in access to resources such as education, health, and to a lesser extent, equity in income distribution.

**Acceptance of the Rights of Others** – Peaceful countries often have formal laws that guarantee basic human rights and freedoms, and the informal social and cultural norms that relate to behaviors of citizens.

**Good Relations with Neighbors** – Peaceful relations with other countries are as important as good relations between groups within a country. Countries with positive external relations are more peaceful and tend to be more politically stable, have better functioning governments, are regionally integrated and have lower levels of organized internal conflict.

**Free Flow of Information** – Free and independent media disseminates information in a way that leads to greater knowledge and helps individuals, businesses and civil society make better decisions. This leads to better outcomes and more rational responses in times of crisis.


**High Levels of Human Capital** – A skilled human capital base reflects the extent to which societies educate citizens and promote the development of knowledge, thereby improving economic productivity, care for the young, political participation and social capital.

**Low Levels of Corruption** – In societies with high levels of corruption, resources are inefficiently allocated, often leading to a lack of funding for essential services and civil unrest. Low corruption can enhance confidence and trust in institutions.

FIGURE 3.2

### The Pillars of Positive Peace

All eight factors are highly interconnected and interact in complex ways.



The Pillars of Positive Peace interact systemically to support a society’s *attitudes, institutions* and *structures* that underpin development and peacebuilding. High levels of Positive Peace occur where attitudes make violence less tolerated, institutions are resilient and more responsive to society’s needs and structures create the environment for the nonviolent resolution of grievances.

The Pillars also offer a practical framework for the implementation of small-scale Positive Peace projects. In cooperation with its global partners, IEP implements and supports a number of projects in local communities around the world using the Pillars of Positive Peace as the main framework to plan action and design measurement.

#### BOX 3.1

### Measuring Positive Peace in Mexico

This report assesses the state of Positive Peace in Mexico in two different and complementary ways. The first – presented in the ‘Positive Peace in Mexico’ section below – is an assessment of where Mexico as a country stands in the global Positive Peace framework. This approach uses data and insight derived from the latest Positive Peace Report.<sup>1</sup> This approach investigates Positive Peace in Mexico against a global context and allows comparisons with neighbors or countries at equivalent stages of development. The objective of comparing and ranking countries is to give policymakers insight into which socio-economic trends, developments and initiatives have been effective in creating and supporting peaceful societies around the world.

The second approach is the development of a sub-national Positive Peace Index for Mexico and is discussed in the section ‘Positive Peace by State.’ The sub-national Mexico Positive Peace Index uses Mexico-specific data, produced by the national statistical agencies and third party sources, to assess the level of Positive Peace in each of Mexico’s 32 states.

Currently, it is not possible to replicate the 24 indicators of the global Positive Peace Index at the sub-national level in Mexico. For the sub-national analysis section, data has been obtained from various statistical sources and selected based on their ability to, as closely as possible, capture elements of the eight Pillars of Peace. Section 5 contains detail on the two methodologies.



## POSITIVE PEACE IN MEXICO: RESULTS FROM THE GLOBAL POSITIVE PEACE INDEX

Globally, Mexico ranked 71<sup>st</sup> out of 163 countries in the 2020 Positive Peace Index (PPI). Mexico was the sixth strongest Positive Peace country in the Central America and the Caribbean region, as shown in Table 3.1. This is much higher than its Global Peace Index ranking, where it sits at 137. This differential highlights that Mexico has Positive Peace surplus and the potential for improvement. The country's weakest Pillar is *Low Levels of Corruption*, which is among the worst in the region.

Positive Peace in Mexico improved by 2.9 percent from 2009 to 2019. This is below the global average improvement of 3.3 percent. As a result, the country fell eight places in the global Positive Peace rankings over the past decade.

Mexico's PPI score improved rapidly between 2009 and 2012. However, between 2012 and 2015 this trend was interrupted and the country's score recorded a mild deterioration (Figure 3.3). This corresponds with the increased violence in Mexico during this time.

TABLE 3.1

### Positive Peace Index – Central America and Caribbean rankings, 2019

Mexico displayed a high level of Positive Peace in 2019, ranking sixth in Central America and the Caribbean.

COUNTRY	REGIONAL RANK/12	GLOBAL RANK/163	SCORE	POSITIVE PEACE CATEGORY
Costa Rica	1	37	2.13	Very High
Jamaica	2	47	2.42	High
Panama	3	54	2.6	High
Trinidad and Tobago	4	59	2.69	High
Cuba	5	69	2.92	High
Mexico	6	71	2.93	High
Dominican Republic	7	78	3	High
El Salvador	8	89	3.12	High
Nicaragua	9	106	3.33	Medium
Honduras	10	110	3.38	Medium
Guatemala	11	111	3.41	Medium
Haiti	12	149	3.91	Low

Source: IEP



Positive Peace in Mexico improved by 2.9 percent from 2009 to 2019. This is below the global average improvement of 3.3 percent.

Since 2009, Mexico's largest improvement was in *Sound Business Environment* (Figure 3.4). This reflects economic progress, with the country experiencing an increase in income per capita, a decline in unemployment, a reduction in economic inequality and increases in access to technology and information.

In contrast, between 2009 and 2019, Mexico has substantially deteriorated in the pillars of *Low Levels of Corruption* and *Well-Functioning Government*. The deterioration in *Low Levels of Corruption* over the past decade has been driven by weaker *control of corruption*. As a result, Mexico ranks 117<sup>th</sup> out of 163 countries in the *control of corruption* indicator. It has fallen 46 places in the last decade, indicating an area where Mexico needs to improve. *Irregular payments and bribes*, calculated by the World Economic Forum and conveys the perception by business leaders about corruption in a country, have also been on the rise.<sup>2</sup>


*Well-Functioning Government* experienced the largest deterioration of any Pillar between 2009 and 2019. This was a result of a deterioration in the *rule of law*, as shown in Figure 3.5, which captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the judicial system, and the likelihood of crime and violence.

At an aggregate level, *Free Flow of Information* recorded the second largest improvement over the past decade driven by the 48.4 percent increase in *individuals using the internet* indicator. However, the trend has been offset by deteriorations in *freedom of*

*the press*. Mexico has one of the world's highest rate of attacks on journalists and in 2020 was ranked one of the deadliest countries for journalists.<sup>3</sup> The *quality of information* indicator has also deteriorated which measures how often governments disseminate false or misleading information.<sup>4</sup>

FIGURE 3.3  
**Mexico Positive Peace score, 2009–2019**


Over the past decade, Mexico's national Positive Peace score improved by 1.6 percent overall, despite some deterioration from 2012 to 2015.



Source: IEP

FIGURE 3.4  
**Change by Pillar of Positive Peace, Mexico, 2009–2019**

There were substantial improvements in the *Free Flow of Information* and *Sound Business Environment* Pillars at the national level. *Low Levels of Corruption* recorded a large deterioration.




Source: IEP global Positive Peace Index

FIGURE 3.5

### Changes in Positive Peace indicators, Mexico, 2009–2019

Positive Peace in Mexico has benefitted from improvements in *individuals using the internet* and *maintaining a business*. It has been hindered by deteriorations in the *rule of law* and *quality of information* indicators.



Source: IEP global Positive Peace Index

### PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNMENT: TRENDS IN WELL-FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT AND LOW LEVELS OF CORRUPTION

The *Well-Functioning Government* and *Low Levels of Corruption* Pillars are critical to building peace in Mexico. This section reviews trends in how Mexicans have perceived corruption in government and how they have rated government performance in key areas over the last six years. It uses annual survey data collected by the National Survey of Victimization and Perception of Public Security (ENVIPE).


Figure 3.6 shows the six-year trend for citizens perceptions of corruption among Mexico’s main security and justice institutions. From 2015 to 2018, the municipal police were perceived as the most corrupt. However, the perception of corruption amongst judges increased sharply in 2016 and overtook the municipal police as the institution perceived as most corrupt in 2019. Perceived corruption in judges has increased by 4.5 percentage points since 2015, the greatest overall increase amongst public security institutions.

Improving trust in public systems is critical to improving the reporting of crimes in Mexico. In 2020, 92.4 percent of crimes in Mexico were not recorded in the official statistics because they were either not reported to the authorities or because no investigation was opened. This figure, also known as the *"cifra negra"* (dark figure of crime), has remained above 92 percent since 2012. The 2020 ENVIPE results show that 64.1 percent of citizens did not report a crime due to lack of confidence in authorities. Over half of respondents who did report a crime claimed that treatment by the authorities was “bad” or “very bad”.

Fear of insecurity remains the highest concern for the majority of Mexicans, as shown in Figure 3.7. In addition, between 2015 and 2020, concern about health rose significantly, more than any other issue, primarily owing to an 8.6 percent increase in 2020 coinciding with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Concern about impunity in the legal system also rose in the past six years, from 17.7 to 24.9 percent.

FIGURE 3.6  
Perceptions of corruption, police forces and justice agencies, 2015–2020

The percentage of Mexicans that perceive judges as corrupt has steadily increased, while perceptions of corruption in the attorney general’s office have improved over the last three years.




Source: ENVIPE

## CORRUPTION IN MEXICO: FINDINGS IN 2020

Corruption is arguably the most critical obstacle to improving peacefulness in Mexico. *Low Levels of Corruption* is Mexico's least developed Pillar and one of the few Pillars in which the country underperforms in comparison to its neighbors. Figure 3.8 shows both the police and judicial system are seen as corrupt by Mexican citizens. This results in lack of trust in the ability of the authorities to reduce crime and insecurity in the country.

FIGURE 3.7  
**Highest concerns among Mexicans, 2015–2020**

For the past six years, insecurity has been the highest concern among Mexicans.




Source: ENVIPE

Figure 3.8 shows that the municipal police are perceived as the most corrupt of Mexico's police forces, while the federal police are perceived as the least corrupt.

Perceived corruption is strongly linked to lack of faith that local police forces can keep citizens safe as shown in Figure 3.9. In 2020, while 71 percent of Mexicans believed the federal police had the ability to keep them safe, only 59.2 percent believed that the municipal police could do the same.

FIGURE 3.9  
**Civilian perceptions of ability of police to assist in a situation of insecurity, March 2020**


More people believe the federal police possess the ability to keep them safe than the municipal police.



Source: ENVIPE

FIGURE 3.8  
**Perceptions of corruption in police forces and justice agencies, March 2020**

About seven out of ten people perceive municipal police and judges as corrupt.



Source: ENVIPE

When surveyed, 42 percent of Mexicans were aware of increased patrolling and police surveillance, as shown in Figure 3.10. However, awareness of government action to reduce corruption is low. In fact, the number of Mexicans who are aware of government action towards maintaining parks and sports facilities are more than triple those that are aware of efforts to reduce juvenile delinquency, corruption or drug trafficking.

Figure 3.11 shows trends on public awareness over time. This shows that while knowledge of government action to reduce drug trafficking and corruption increased in 2020, they have still decreased by around four and seven percentage points respectively

since 2015. Similarly, awareness of government actions to improve the community is below 50 percent and falling.

### DYNAMICS THAT LEAD TO INCREASES IN CRIME


IEP has developed systems analytic tools to better understand the dynamics that lead to changes in violence. Figure 3.12 shows the statistically significant changes that preceded other movements. The analysis period was from 2008 to 2019.

Over the 12-year period a number of indicators have tracked together, however with the time lagged. Statistical analysis conducted by IEP finds that Positive Peace deteriorations have

FIGURE 3.10

### Civilian awareness of government actions, March 2020

More than three times as many people knew about government efforts to maintain parks than knew about efforts to reduce corruption.




Source: ENVIPE

FIGURE 3.11

### Civilian awareness of government actions, 2015–2020

Civilian awareness of government actions to reduce drug trafficking and corruption has declined in the past six years.



Source: ENVIPE


been leading indicators in violence. In particular, the indicators of the *Well-Functioning Government* and *Low Levels of Corruption* pillars have deteriorated together, forming vicious cycles. As these pillars have eroded, the indicators of *Perceptions of Criminality*, *Violent Demonstrations*, *Violent Crime*, *Homicide* and *Impact of Terrorism* have all increased together since 2008. Subsequent deteriorations in *Freedom of the Press* and *Socio-Economic Inclusion* have then followed the increase in violence. This has formed a vicious cycle leading to further erosions of Positive Peace.

The empirical analysis of the changes in data that have occurred in Mexico further highlight the importance of thinking systemically. Deteriorations in both Positive Peace and violence have a statistically significant relationship over time, meaning the data suggest these two systems are inextricably linked. If the data matches reality, tackling violence alone will not yield effective outcomes unless governance and corruption issues are also addressed.

FIGURE 3.12

### Changes in Positive and Negative Peace in Mexico, 2008–2019

Since 2008, indicators of government effectiveness and corruption have deteriorated together, leading to subsequent increases in violence.



Source: IEP



## POSITIVE PEACE BY STATE: THE MEXICO POSITIVE PEACE INDEX

The MPPI is calculated using an adapted version of the global PPI methodology. It uses state-level economic, governance, social and attitudinal data sourced primarily from INEGI, including ENVIPE and other surveys. It also uses data from the United Nations, the World Bank, the OECD and Article 19.



### POSITIVE PEACE IN MEXICO



This section of the report gives an overview of the sub-national Mexico Positive Peace Index (MPPI), which provides a Positive Peace score for each state. The MPPI uses 24 indicators grouped along the eight Pillars of Positive Peace, which is illustrated in Table 3.2. These sub-national indicators map to the global Positive

Peace Index as closely as possible. However, specific issues in the Mexican sub-national context, as well as some data limitations, require a different choice of indicators.<sup>5</sup> The full methodology for both indices is detailed in Section 4.

TABLE 3.2

### Indicators in the sub-national Mexico Positive Peace Index, 2018

Mexico's sub-national Positive Peace Index was calculated from 24 indicators produced by local and international agencies.

Pillar	Indicator name	Source
Equitable Distribution of Resources	Socially vulnerable population	CONEVAL
	People living in poverty	CONEVAL
	Average number of people per household	INEGI
High Levels of Human Capital	Human Development Index - Education	UNDP
	Human Development Index - Health	UNDP
	Scientific or technological companies/institutes	RENECYT
Well-Functioning Government	How would you rate the performance of the municipal police?	ENVIPE
	Are you aware of any actions taken by local authorities to construct or improve schooling?	ENVIPE
	Homicide sentencing rate	INEGI CNG
Good Relations with Neighbors	Have most of your neighbors organized themselves to resolve or address theft?	ENVIPE
	Trust in neighbors	ENVIPE
	Proportion of gross state product produced by tourism	INEGI
Low Levels of Corruption	Do you perceive the state police as being corrupt?	ENVIPE
	Do you perceive the municipal police as being corrupt?	ENVIPE
	Do you perceive the public ministry and state attorneys as being corrupt?	ENVIPE
Sound Business Environment	Doing Business	World Bank
	GDP per capita, USD constant prices, PPP	OECD
	Unemployment rate	INEGI
Acceptance of the Rights of Others	Proportion of population affirming ISSSTE health services are provided in respectful manner	INEGI ENCIG
	Proportion of municipal administration staff that is female	INEGI CNGMD
	Reported cases of discrimination per 100K population	INEGI, IEP calculations
Free Flow of Information	Attacks on journalists	Article 19
	Proportion of households with access to the Internet	INEGI
	Proportion of public institutions that have a website	INEGI CNGSPSPE

Nuevo León was the highest ranking Positive Peace state in 2018, followed by Colima, Baja California Sur and Sonora. Querétaro and Yucatán were tied in fifth place. Guerrero recorded the

weakest level of Positive Peace, followed by Tabasco, Oaxaca, Puebla and Chiapas.

TABLE 3.3

### Mexico Positive Peace by state

Nuevo León, Colima and Baja California Sur had the highest state levels of Positive Peace in 2018.

RANK IN 2018*	STATE	SCORE IN 2018	CHANGE IN SCORE, 2014-2018**	RANK IN 2014
1	Nuevo León	2.37	-0.12	1
2	Colima	2.53	-0.06	2
3	Baja California Sur	2.64	-0.03	3
4	Sonora	2.67	-0.08	5
=5	Querétaro	2.69	-0.23	8
=5	Yucatán	2.69	-0.10	6
7	Coahuila	2.75	-0.17	9
=8	Jalisco	2.77	-0.2	11
=8	Sinaloa	2.77	-0.15	9
10	Aguascalientes	2.82	0.09	4
11	Chihuahua	2.88	-0.01	7
12	Tamaulipas	2.89	-0.16	15
13	Durango	2.9	-0.10	12
14	Nayarit	2.91	-0.16	16
15	Quintana Roo	2.95	-0.29	23
16	Zacatecas	2.96	-0.07	13
17	Hidalgo	2.99	-0.24	22
18	Mexico City	3.03	-0.19	21
19	Campeche	3.05	0.02	13
=20	Baja California	3.06	-0.06	18
=20	Guanajuato	3.06	-0.03	17
22	Morelos	3.1	-0.08	20
23	Michoacán	3.17	-0.24	26
24	Tlaxcala	3.21	-0.16	25
25	México	3.24	-0.27	27
26	San Luis Potosí	3.25	0.10	19
27	Veracruz	3.27	-0.03	24
28	Tabasco	3.37	-0.14	27
29	Oaxaca	3.39	-0.15	29
30	Puebla	3.44	-0.19	31
31	Chiapas	3.48	-0.1	30
32	Guerrero	3.69	0.00	32
	<b>Average</b>	<b>3.00</b>	<b>-0.11</b>	

\* An equal (=) sign means multiple states share the same ranking.

\*\* In index points. A decline in score indicates an improvement in Positive Peace.

Source: IEP

### SUB-NATIONAL POSITIVE PEACE AND THE MPI

Organized crime in Mexico has distorted the relationship between levels of violence and Positive Peace. The established finding in the analysis of global patterns of Positive Peace is that high levels of socio-economic and institutional development are usually associated with greater levels of peacefulness. This translates into a direct correlation between measurements in the MPI and Positive Peace. However, within Mexico, this correspondence is not found. State-level Positive Peace as measured by the MPPI and actual peace gauged by the MPI are not correlated. This means that states with higher levels of socio-economic development are not necessarily the most peaceful. Of the four crime subcomponents of the MPI – *homicide, violent crime, firearms crime* and *organized crime* – only *organized crime* is correlated with Positive Peace. However, as shown in Figure 3.13, this correlation is inverted, in that states with higher levels of Positive Peace also tend to be the most affected by organized crime activity.

It is known from IEP’s global statistical research that Positive Peace is positively linked to better economic performance. Strong economic performance relies on well-developed infrastructure, such as ports, roads, border crossings, to provide easy access to markets. Large-scale drug trafficking and money laundering also requires the same ease of access to market to operate. In Mexico, this leads to the inverse relationship shown in Figure 3.13. Indeed, high Positive Peace states in Mexico tend to be situated close to the northern border where substantial trade with the United States takes place, in the high-tourism Yucatán Peninsula, and in the industrialized western states where large logistical assets such as the Manzanillo Port are located.<sup>6,7,8</sup>


This does not mean that Positive Peace is any less important to reducing violence in Mexico. Rather, it shows how weaknesses in the *Low Levels of Corruption* and *Well-Functioning Government* Pillars create a framework where criminal organizations have an outsized influence in society.

Previous research by IEP demonstrated that pursuing socio-economic development without first improving administrative

efficiency and transparency is an ineffective way to build peace. Analysis published in the Mexico Peace Index 2018 showed that developing the *Sound Business Environment* or *High Levels of Human Capital* without improving the *Well-Functioning Government* and *Low Levels of Corruption* Pillars may in effect lead to increases – not reductions – in violence.<sup>9</sup> This result helps explain the dynamics of peace in Mexico, where economic development in certain states was not accompanied by the strengthening of robust institutions.

FIGURE 3.13  
**Positive Peace and organized crime in Mexico**

Positive Peace and organized crime are inversely related in Mexico. States with stronger levels of Positive Peace tend to record higher levels of organized crime activity.



Source: IEP



# 4

## IMPLEMENTING POSITIVE PEACE IN MEXICO

This section describes some of the successful applications of Positive Peace that IEP has been involved in Mexico and implemented at the national, sub-national and local level.

Nationally, IEP has conducted numerous conferences and training workshops with members of the military, the police, local civil society organizations and citizens. These workshops have developed the capacity of these organizations and citizens to implement Positive Peace within their communities. In particular, this section describes work carried out in Culiacán, Sinaloa, where IEP has worked alongside various civil society organizations to promote agendas for peace. These collective efforts have seen significant results in one of the states most affected by violence.



# BUILDING CAPACITIES FOR POSITIVE PEACE

## POSITIVE PEACE WORKSHOPS

IEP’s work contributes to a deeper, more comprehensive and objective understanding of peace. IEP developed the Positive Peace framework using empirical research techniques to understand what factors create and sustain peaceful societies. The Positive Peace workshops are designed to assist local communities to understand Positive Peace and create systemic change.

Figure 4.1 shows IEP’s process of change for Positive Peace workshops. The workshops provide training, build networks and inform project proposals. In the short term, participants gain knowledge and skills useful in building peace. In the medium term, participants will use these skills to build their own projects, which are intended to directly improve Positive Peace. The long-term goal is for local communities to develop new ways of further improving Positive Peace in their countries. This will lead to better economic development outcomes, higher resilience and more peaceful societies.

Specifically, Positive Peace workshops create change by:

- **Teaching participants that Positive Peace is systemic** and that sustainable peace is achieved through ensuring all eight Pillars are strong and developing in tandem. Many


development projects focus on only some of the Pillars. On their own, these are useful projects but systemic change only happens when the focus is on the whole system. The eight Pillars of Positive Peace provide a good framework to describe systems of peace.

- **Following this process broadens the participant’s awareness** that many aspects interact to create positive development and peace. Strengthening only one of the Pillars can sometimes increase the likelihood of conflict. Thinking systemically allows participants to better describe the issues they face and identify broader solutions. The Positive Peace workshops are consistent with the ‘do no harm’ approach.
- **Fostering bottom-up approaches that assist in building better societies.** Participants are given time to develop projects and apply the theory and language of Positive Peace to real world projects. Participants are instilled with ownership of the project throughout the workshop. Participants are first asked to describe the issue they wish to address and then how it could be addressed through the eight Pillars. The skills and knowledge gained in the workshops assist participants in gaining community support for future Positive Peace endeavors.

FIGURE 4.1

## Positive Peace workshop process of change

Workshops help improve Positive Peace directly by educating participants and implementing projects, and indirectly through building human capital, expanding networks and follow-on projects



Source: IEP

- **Reducing the likelihood of future conflicts.** The causes of conflicts are complex and intertwined. Describing the full scope of any conflict situation is challenging. Because IEP's Positive Peace framework is easily understood, it is easier for participants to see the importance of each of the Pillars. The simple language of the Pillars also presents a neutral baseline language acceptable in all cultural contexts of the workshops to date.
- **Offering the opportunity for participants** to meet, discuss and collaborate with people from other parts of the country that they ordinarily may not have contact with. In some workshops, participants have come from groups with different backgrounds and perspectives. As the workshops are designed to be forward looking, participants imagine the future collectively from a more inclusive approach.

## WORKSHOP FORMATS

The format of Positive Peace workshops is customizable for different contexts, profiles and cultures. The workshops carried out globally thus far have had considerable variety. Three examples of participant groups are set out below:

1. **Members of Government and Civil Society.** Brings together relevant leaders in government, business and academia. IEP conducted this type of workshop in Zimbabwe, Northern Ireland in 2019 and Mexico in 2019 and 2020.
2. **Rival Groups in a Conflict Setting.** Brings together different conflicting groups, such as from rival ethnicities. The structure of the Positive Peace workshops allows participants to see common problems and issues without creating blame. This tends to pull the participants together, thereby fostering

understanding. IEP conducted this type of workshop in Tunisia with participants from seven Libyan cities in 2018 and in Zimbabwe in 2016.

3. **Local Community Leaders and Youth.** Brings together local community leaders and motivated youth who want to improve development and enhance peace in their communities. IEP has conducted many of these types of workshops, including Cambodia, Uganda, Thailand, Mexico, Colombia and more.

## OUTCOMES OF THE WORKSHOPS

The workshops have been designed to achieve the following outcomes:

1. Equip individuals with foundational knowledge about the mechanisms that create societal development and peace.
2. Provide practical examples and motivation that positively influence individual behaviors towards achieving Positive Peace.
3. Participants identify additional stakeholders to be involved and a process for doing so, including through future workshops, online training and the provision of relevant additional research and resources.
4. Identify practical, concrete steps that participants can take to build Positive Peace in their local communities and activities.
5. Positively reinforce and build other important behaviors and skills linked to Positive Peace, including communication, conflict resolution, inclusivity, cooperation, empathy and civic engagement.
6. Strengthen each of the Eight Pillars of Peace.



## MEXICO CASE STUDIES

### **POSITIVE PEACE TRAINING FOR YOUTH, THE MILITARY AND POLICE**

Starting in 2019, IEP Mexico has provided a series of conferences and training workshops for some of the main institutions responsible for training military personnel in the country, such as the National School of Sergeants, the War College, the Military School of Nursing and the Military School of Music. Over the last three years, IEP has trained more than 3,000 members of the armed forces and more than 2,500 local public servants in Mexico.

Some of the activities IEP has been involved in include:

- Training sessions for the Military School of Sergeants in Puebla, during which a new approach to security was presented centered on understanding of the factors that build peace. Two sessions were held in July 2019, training 830 soon-to-be first sergeants in total. The long-term intention is to incorporate Positive Peace content into the six-month training program for first sergeants and second sergeants.
- A presentation at the 2019 annual session on Military Education and Innovation to an audience of 250 directors from most of the military education institutions in Mexico. IEP also conducted a one-day workshop for 110 members of the National Guard at the Military School of Sergeants. The conversations generated around Positive Peace revealed the need to reflect on the ethical challenges and problems that people responsible for public security face every day.
- An August 2019 Positive Peace workshop for 400 state police officers belonging to five different divisions in Hidalgo. To date, IEP has provided workshops to more than 1,000 state police officers and approximately 300 women who work in the Secretary of Public Security of Hidalgo. It is expected that in the near future, these trainings will be part of the curriculum taught by the State Vocational Training Institute.
- Sixteen workshops, held between September and December 2019, in the 12 regions that make up the state of Jalisco, training more than 500 public servants, including mayors, councilors, public officials, and municipal police. In 2020, this training program continued online, reaching a similar number of participants in areas of the state that rarely have access to training programs of this type. Currently, IEP accompanies and trains the Network of Young Peacebuilders in Jalisco, with which it is expected to consolidate a large community of public servants, young people and members of civil society interested in building positive peace in their state.
- A March 2020 training session, held on International Women's Day, for 500 women belonging to various units of the Mexican

Army. During this session, participants discussed the challenges faced by women in security services.

While the COVID-19 pandemic has reduced face-to-face delivery of these workshops, IEP has adapted the curricula to an online format providing the ability to reach audiences that ordinarily would not have participated. Both in-person and online formats were effective at communicating the transformative nature of Positive Peace.

### **IEP AMBASSADORS PROGRAM**

In 2015, IEP globally launched its Ambassadors program, initially called the Global Peace Index Ambassador Program, that educates people around the world on the work of IEP and Positive Peace. This program provides tools for participants to apply Positive Peace in their own spaces through community projects, conferences, trainings and other public events.

In 2017, Rotary International and IEP leaders partnered to develop, organize and run the first national 'A Stronger Mexico' meeting. The event spanned three days in the state of Puebla and convened 300 leaders interested in building peace in their surroundings. Based on the success of this meeting, a second group of 150 young people was trained in Hidalgo and Mexico City in 2019.

These events led to the formation of a National Pro Peace Network. This network develops a large number of Positive Peace initiatives in schools, universities, local governments, companies, civil society organizations and the media throughout the country.

To further build on this momentum, Rotaract Mexico formed the National Committee for Positive Peace. With a presence in all regions of the country, this committee allows young Rotarians to disseminate Positive Peace content among the nearly ten thousand Rotarians in Mexico.

These Positive Peace communities have had both a local and international impact. In 2019, several members participated and facilitated activities in the XVII World Summit of Nobel Peace Laureates in Mérida, Yucatán. During the same year, others attended the Rotary International Convention in Hamburg, Germany. Six of these participants now form part of a group of 30 Positive Peace Activators in Latin America. Initiated by Rotary, the Positive Peace Activators Program connect high-level professionals for the promotion of peace in the region.

### **BUILDING PEACE FROM CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CULIACÁN CASE**

In the first edition of the MPI published in 2013, Sinaloa was

ranked 30th out of 32 states, making it one of the least peaceful states in the country. The state suffered from a high rate of homicides and gun violence. Sixty percent of the crimes committed in the state were concentrated in its capital, Culiacán.

Eight years later, Sinaloa has substantially improved compared to the other states in Mexico, rising by 14 places in the national rankings. It currently ranks 16<sup>th</sup> out of 32 states in the MPI 2021. While many problems related to violence persist, the evolution of the results measured by the MPI reflects the ability of the state to address its issues.

To support local efforts, in 2017 IEP began advising organizations in Culiacán. In public events, press conferences and discussion forums, IEP highlighted the differences between Positive Peace and negative peace and why this is important to Mexico.

Towards the end of 2017, one of the participants of the workshop given in Puebla, promoted an initiative to replicate the Positive Peace trainings for young people in Culiacán. More than 300 young students from all regions of Sinaloa have been trained. Other institutions such as the University of San Diego and Fundación Slim have contributed to this capacity building process in the state capital.

The adoption of the Eight Pillars of Positive Peace opened a wide range of advocacy opportunities in which various actors have been able to strategically contribute to the construction of peace in their community from their own capabilities, resources and interests.

In 2019, the GC1 Foundation, which launches and supports social programs focused on having a real and positive impact while promoting more peaceful and progressive societies, aligned their objectives and activities towards the Eight Pillars of Positive Peace. In doing so, they are seeking a comprehensive, systemic and strategic approach to peace in Culiacán.

According to the members of these organizations, working with IEP has been of strategic significance. They have used the Pillars of Positive Peace as a guide to plan strategies and achieve the results that today have improved the levels of peace in Sinaloa.

This holistic view of peace has facilitated the identification of "blind spots", networking opportunities, and the creation of new projects such as *Tus Buenas Noticias* ("Your Good News"), a local media platform that only transmits the positive aspects and dynamics of the community, promoting the communication for peace and collective resilience. Monthly conferences are held exclusively to monitor safety indicators. Additionally, the GC1 Foundation participates in the different councils related to peace and public security in the state. The GC1 Foundation consistently engages with the public security and development authorities, with the municipal government, the state government, and with representatives of the Army and Navy. Table 4.2 illustrates how the eight Pillars of Positive Peace are implemented in a variety of programs in which the CG1 Foundation is engaged.

TABLE 4.2

## Agenda for Positive Peace, GC1 Foundation

Drawing on IEP's work, the foundation targets different Positive Peace Pillars in its projects.

POSITIVE PEACE PILARS	CULIACAN PARTICIPA	PARQUES ALEGRES	PROEDUCA	SUMA	TUS BUENAS NOTICIAS	MAPASIN	CONSTRUYENDO PAZ
Well-Functioning Government	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Equitable Distribution of Resources	✓					✓	✓
Free Flow of Information	✓				✓		✓
Sound Business Environment	✓						✓
High Levels of Human Capital	✓		✓			✓	✓
Acceptance of the Rights of Others	✓						✓
Low Levels of Corruption	✓			✓			✓
Good Relations with Neighbors	✓	✓					✓

Source: GC1 Foundation

# 5

## 2021 MEXICO PEACE INDEX METHODOLOGY

The Mexico Peace Index (MPI) is based on the work of the Global Peace Index (GPI), the leading global measure of peacefulness, produced annually by IEP since 2007. The MPI follows a similar methodology to other national indices such as the United Kingdom Peace Index (UKPI) and the United States Peace Index (USPI), also produced by IEP, and measures negative peace, defined as "the absence of violence or fear of violence."

This 2021 edition is the eighth iteration of the MPI and uses data published by *the Executive Secretary of the National System for Public Security / Secretariado Ejecutivo de Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública (SESNSP)*.

The MPI measures peacefulness at the state level in Mexico. A key reason for choosing this unit of analysis is that, similar to the United States, Mexico's state governments have wide-ranging autonomous powers, allowing them to have a significant impact on the level of violence. The response to violence may therefore differ significantly from state to state.

The MPI is composed of five indicators. The *homicide* and *violent crime* indicators are based on those used in the USPI and UKPI, using the US Federal Bureau of Investigation's standard definition of violent crime. The *detention without a sentence* indicator in the MPI captures the excessive use of incarceration in some states. The *firearms crime* indicator represents gun use and availability, using the best available data. This is similar to the approach used

in the USPI as well. Lastly, the *organized crime* indicator is specific to Mexico, because of the problems the country faces with organized criminal activity.

All data used to calculate the MPI comes from government bodies in Mexico. IEP then uses survey data collected by the national statistics office to adjust the crime figures for underreporting.

## 2021 MPI INDICATORS

### DATA SOURCES

The MPI is composed of the following five indicators, scored between 1 and 5, where 1 represents the most peaceful score and 5 the least peaceful. Population data is used for estimating rates per 100,000 people. The data runs from 2015 to 2020.

#### Homicide

The number of victims of intentional homicide per 100,000 people.

Source: SESNSP

#### Violent Crime

The number of robbery, sexual assault, and family violence cases and the number of violent assault victims per 100,000 people, adjusted for underreporting. Robbery cases must meet one of two criteria to be included:

- types of robbery that rely on the threat of violence, such as a mugging, or
- robbery incidents where the database indicates violence was used.

Source: SESNSP

#### Organized Crime

The number of extortions, drug trade related crimes, and kidnapping or human trafficking investigations per 100,000 people. Extortion, kidnapping and human trafficking rates are adjusted for underreporting. Drug trade and major organized crime offenses include:

- the federal crimes of production, transport, trafficking, trade, supply, or possession of drugs or other crimes under the *Crimes Against Public Health* law
- retail drug crimes, as a proxy indicator of the size of the market fueled by illegal drug production and distribution
- and crimes classed under the *Law Against Organized Crime*, which includes all of the above crimes when three or more people conspire to commit them.

Source: SESNSP

#### Firearms Crime

The number of victims of an intentional or negligent homicide or assault committed with a firearm per 100,000 people.

Source: SESNSP

#### Detention without a Sentence

The ratio of persons in prison without a sentence to the number of homicides and violent crimes.

Source: CNG

#### Population data

The estimated population of each state in each year.

Population data is used to calculate the rate per 100,000 people for homicide, violent crime, organized crime and weapons crime.

Source: National Population Council / *Consejo Nacional de Población* (CONAPO)

### UNDERREPORTING

Only about ten percent of crimes in Mexico are reported to the authorities.<sup>1</sup>

Two of the MPI indicators – *violent crime* and *organized crime* – are adjusted for underreporting. IEP uses ENVIPE<sup>2</sup> data to calculate underreporting rates for each state and adjusts the official statistics for robbery, assault, family violence, sexual violence, extortion and kidnapping and human trafficking to better reflect actual rates of violence. This approach helps to counterbalance the high rates of underreporting in Mexico.

IEP calculated the underreporting rates for each state and crime based on the information from ENVIPE. The survey asks each

respondent if they were a victim of a particular type of crime and whether or not they reported it to the authorities. IEP sources this data from each victimization survey for the years 2015 to 2019 and takes the total number of each crime in each state for the five years. IEP then divided the total numbers of crimes reported by survey respondents by the number of crimes that survey respondents said they reported to the authorities. This produces a multiplier for adjusting the official statistics. The adjustments are made for the crimes of robbery, assault, family violence, sexual violence, extortion and kidnapping and human trafficking.

The underreporting rates use five years of data because, in some states, there were crimes where none of the victims reported the crime to the authorities. If none of the crimes were reported, the reporting rate of zero percent cannot be used to adjust the police-recorded numbers. Additionally, combining the data over time smooths out any large fluctuations in underreporting rates that may be the result of complex and imperfect surveying

methodologies, rather than a true change in reporting. Reporting rates have not changed significantly in Mexico over the last five years.

### Underreporting rate

**Definition:** Number of crimes reported by victims on the victimization survey divided by the number of those crimes that victims stated they reported to the authorities.

Source: ENVIPE, 2015-2019

## INDICATOR SCORE & OVERALL CALCULATIONS

The MPI indicators are scored between 1 and 5, with 5 being the least peaceful score and 1 being the most peaceful score. Banded indicator scores are calculated by normalizing the range of raw values based on each state's average value over the period 2015 to 2020. First, the average value for each state over the six years of the study is calculated. Then the outliers are removed from the range of average state values in order to identify the min and max of normally distributed average values. Outliers in this case are defined as data points that are more than three standard deviations greater than the mean. Next, the values for each year are normalized using the min and max of the normal range and are banded between 1 and 5. The calculation for banded scores is:

$$Banded\ score_x = \left( \frac{raw\ value_x - min_{sample}}{max_{sample} - min_{sample}} \times 4 \right) + 1$$

Finally, if any of the banded values are above 5, the state is assigned a score of 5 and if any values are below 1, the state is assigned a score of 1.

There is one additional step used to calculate the *organized crime* score: in the case of the *organized crime* indicator, raw values are multiplied by the indicator sub-weights listed in Table 5.1. The

sub-weights are used so that the indicator score reflects the more serious societal impact of particular crimes and to correct for the uneven distribution of offenses. In 2018, extortion and retail drug crimes made up 88.6 percent of crimes, which means that the trend in these offenses would overshadow any changes in kidnapping, human trafficking or major drug crime rates.

Major organized crime offenses, such as drug trafficking and kidnapping and human trafficking have the highest weights in the *organized crime* score. These crimes reflect more severe acts of violence and provide an indication of the strength and presence of major criminal organizations. Retail drug crimes serve as a proxy indication of the size of the drug market. However, some portion of the retail drug market will represent small individual sellers or reflect personal drug use, both of which are of less concern. Human trafficking and major drug trafficking offenses are more destabilizing to Mexican society because these crimes:

- reflect large revenue sources for criminal organizations
- absorb more human and physical resources into violent, illicit economic activity
- depend upon a greater level of corruption
- indicate the presence of organizations that pose a greater threat to the Mexican state.

After the score for each indicator has been calculated, weights are applied to each of the five indicators in order to calculate the overall MPI score. The overall score is calculated by multiplying each indicator score by its index weight and then summing the weighted indicator scores.

There are many methods for choosing the weights to be applied to a composite index. In order to maintain consistency across IEP's various peace indices, the weights in the MPI mirror those used in the GPI, USPI and UKPI as closely as possible.

The weights for the GPI indicators were agreed upon by an international panel of independent peace and conflict experts and are based on a consensus view of their relative importance. To complement this approach and reflect the local context of Mexico, a second expert panel was formed consisting of leading Mexican academics and researchers to determine the final weights for the five indicators in the MPI. With direction from the expert panel at the time of the design of the index, a number of different methods, such as equal weighting, principal component analysis and

analytical hierarchical processing, were used to test the robustness of the results. The final weights as determined by the IEP research team and the expert panel are shown in Table 5.1.

TABLE 5.1  
**Indicator Weights in the MPI**

INDICATOR	WEIGHT	% OF INDEX
Homicide	4	30%
Violent Crime	3	21%
Weapons Crime	3	20%
Detention without a Sentence	1	8%
Organized Crime	3	21%

TABLE 5.2  
**Composition of the MPI organized crime score**

MPI INDICATOR	DESCRIPTION	WEIGHT AS % OF OVERALL MPI SCORE	INDICATOR SUB-TYPE	VARIABLES INCLUDED	SUB-WEIGHT RELATIVE TO OTHER CRIMES IN THE INDICATOR
Organized crime	Extortions, kidnappings and cases of human trafficking, and narcotics crimes per 100,000 people	21%	Extortion (adjusted for underreporting)	Extortion	3
			Kidnapping & human trafficking (adjusted for underreporting)	Kidnapping	5
				Human trafficking	
			Trafficking of minors	1	
			Retail drug crimes		Possession, commerce and supply in small amounts
Major organized crime offenses	Violations of the law prohibiting crimes against public health, which criminalizes drug trafficking	20			
	Violations of the organized crime law, which criminalizes organized crime related offenses committed by three or more people				

Source: IEP

#### 2021 MPI EXPERT PANEL

- **Alejandra Ríos Cázares**  
INEGI. Directora General Adjunta de Desarrollo de Información Gubernamental, Índices e Indicadores.
- **Leslie Solís Saravia**  
World Justice Project
- **Leonel Fernández Novelo**  
Observatorio Nacional Ciudadano
- **Paola Jiménez Rodríguez.**  
Jurimetría. Iniciativas para el Estado de Derecho, AC
- **Alberto Díaz-Cayeros**  
Center for Democracy Development and Rule of Law, Freeman Spogli Institute of International Affairs. Stanford University
- **David Ramírez De Garay**  
Coordinador del Programa de Seguridad. México Evalúa



# METHODOLOGY FOR CALCULATING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

The economic impact of violence is defined as the expenditure and economic activity related to "*containing, preventing and dealing with the consequences of violence*." The **economic impact of violence** refers to the total cost (direct and indirect) of violence plus an economic peace multiplier. The **economic cost of violence** refers to the direct and indirect costs of violence.

IEP's estimate of the economic impact of violence includes three components:

1. **Direct costs** are the costs of crime or violence to the victim, the perpetrator and the government, including those associated with policing, medical expenses, funerals or incarceration.
2. **Indirect costs** accrue after the fact. These include physical and psychological trauma and the present value of future costs associated with the violent incident, such as the consequential lost future income. There is also a measure of the impact of fear on the economy, as people who fear that they may become a victim of violent crime alter their behavior.
3. The **multiplier effect** is a commonly used economic concept that describes the extent to which additional expenditure has flow-on impacts in the wider economy. Injections of new income into the economy will lead to more spending, which will in turn create employment, further income and encourage additional spending, thereby increasing GDP. This mutually reinforcing economic cycle explains the "multiplier effect," and why a dollar of expenditure can create more than a dollar of economic activity. The multiplier effect calculates the additional economic activity that would have accrued if the direct costs of violence had been avoided. Refer to box 5.1 for more detail on the multiplier.

Refer to Box 5.1 for more detail on the multiplier.

## CATEGORIES AND INDICATORS INCLUDED IN THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

1. **Violence containment expenditure** refers to the direct and indirect costs associated with preventing or dealing with the consequences of violence. This includes government spending on domestic security, justice and military.
2. **Protection Costs** refers to the personal and business expenses from the National Survey of Business Victimization (ENVE) and the National Survey of Victimization and Perception of Public Security (ENVIPE) surveys.
3. **Interpersonal Violence** refers to the direct and indirect costs associated with homicide, violent crimes, organized crimes and the fear of victimization.

This study uses a cost accounting methodology to measure the economic impact of violence. Expenditures on containing violence are totalled and unit costs are applied to the MPI estimates for the number of crimes committed. A unit cost is also applied to the estimated level of fear of insecurity. The unit costs estimate the direct (tangible) and indirect (intangible) costs of each crime. Direct unit costs include losses to the victim and perpetrator and exclude costs incurred by law enforcement and health care systems, as these are captured elsewhere in the model. The direct costs for violent crime and organized crime are obtained from household and business surveys undertaken by the Mexican statistical office, which assesses economic and health costs to the victim of a crime.

Indirect unit costs include the physical and psychological trauma and the present value of future costs associated with the violent incident, such as lost lifetime wages for homicide victims.

The cost estimates provided in this report are in constant 2020 pesos, which facilitates the comparison of the estimates over time. The estimate only includes elements of violence in which reliable data could be obtained. As such, the estimate can be considered conservative. The items listed below are included in the cost of violence methodology:

1. **Homicide**
2. **Violent crime, which includes assault, violence within the family, sexual violence and robbery**
3. **Organized crime, which includes extortion, kidnapping and human trafficking**
4. **Indirect costs of incarceration**
5. **Fear of insecurity**
6. **Protections costs, including private security and firearms**
7. **Federal spending on violence containment, which includes the military, domestic security and the justice system**
8. **Medical and funeral costs**

The economic impact of violence excludes:

- State level and municipal public spending on security.
- The cost of drug trade related crimes such as the production, possession, transport and supply of drugs.
- Population displacement due to violence.

Although data is available for some of these categories, it is either not fully available for all states or for each year of analysis.

## BOX 5.1

### The multiplier effect

The multiplier effect is a commonly used economic concept, which describes the extent to which additional expenditure improves the wider economy. Injections of new income into the economy will lead to more spending, which in turn creates employment, further income and additional spending. This mutually reinforcing economic cycle is known as the “multiplier effect” and is the reason that a peso of expenditure can create more than one peso of economic activity.

Although the exact magnitude of this effect is difficult to measure, it is likely to be particularly high in the case of expenditure related to containing violence. For instance, if a community were to become more peaceful, individuals and corporations would spend less time and resources

protecting themselves against violence. Due to this decrease in violence, there would likely be substantial flow-on effects for the wider economy, as money is diverted towards more productive areas such as health, business investment, education and infrastructure.

The potential economic benefits from increased peace can be significant. When a homicide is avoided, the direct costs, such as the money spent on medical treatment and a funeral, can be spent elsewhere. The economy also benefits from the victim’s lifetime income and expenditure. More generally, there is strong evidence to suggest that violence and the fear of violence can fundamentally alter the incentives for business. For example, Brauer and Tepper-Marlin (2009) argue that

violence or the fear of violence may result in some economic activities not occurring at all. Their analysis of 730 business ventures in Colombia from 1997 to 2001 found that amidst higher levels of violence, new ventures were less likely to survive and profit. Consequently, with greater levels of violence, it is likely that employment rates and economic productivity will fall long-term, due to the disincentives around job creation and long-term investments.

This study assumes that the multiplier is one, signifying that for every peso saved on violence containment, there will be an additional peso of economic activity. This is a relatively conservative multiplier and broadly in line with similar studies.<sup>4</sup>

## ESTIMATION METHODS

A combination of approaches are used to estimate the economic cost of violence to Mexico’s economy. The analysis involved two components:

1. Financial information detailing the level of expenditure on items associated with violence was used wherever possible.
2. Unit costs were used to estimate the cost of violent activities. Specifically, an estimate of the economic cost of a violent act was sourced from the literature and applied to the total number of times such an event occurred to provide an estimate of the total cost of categories of violence. The MPI data is used for the number of homicides, sexual assaults, violent assaults, robberies, kidnappings and extortions.

IEP uses federal government expenditure data for military, domestic security and the justice system as federal government violence containment costs. Data is sourced from Secretariat of Public Finance and Credit (SHCP). State and municipal level spending are excluded from the study due to data unavailability.

The federal government expenditure data does not provide details of the spending at the state level. Therefore, a combination of state population size and the state funding allocation from the Public Security Contribution Fund/ *Fondo de Aportaciones para la Seguridad Pública* (FASP) is used to estimate the likely distribution between states.

A unit cost approach is used to estimate the economic cost of homicide, violent crime, organized crime, fear of insecurity. Unit

costs for the homicide, violent crimes and organized crimes are based on a study by McCollister (2010) that estimated the tangible and intangible cost of violent crimes in the United States. The McCollister (2010) direct and indirect costs are applied to the number of homicides to calculate the total cost of homicide. Only the McCollister (2010) intangible (indirect) costs are applied to violent crime and organized crime. The direct costs of violent crime are taken from the nationally representative victimization surveys (ENVIPE and ENVE) administered by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). Both surveys collect data on economic and health-related direct costs due to violent crime.

1. Direct costs or tangible costs of crime include medical expenses, cash losses, property theft or damage, and productivity losses.
2. Indirect costs include physical and psychological trauma as well as long-term costs due to a violent incident.

In addition to the breakdown by tangible and intangible costs, McCollister (2010) offers further details of the costs by victim, perpetrator and justice system. Such itemization enables IEP to exclude the justice system costs to avoid double counting with expenditure data used for the justice system and domestic security.

IEP also uses Dolan & Peasgood’s (2006) estimate of the unit cost of fear of crime to calculate the cost of perceptions of insecurity in Mexico.

To ensure that cost estimates appropriately represent relative income levels in Mexico, they were scaled according to Mexico’s

GDP per capita relative to the US before being converted to 2020 Mexican pesos. This was based on the aforementioned US study suggesting that the indirect cost of a homicide approximates US\$8.4 million. The equivalent cost in Mexico was then calculated based on purchasing power adjusted GDP per capita of \$20,944 for Mexico as compared to \$65,298 for the US in 2020. This is called the adjusted unit cost.

All the costs are adjusted to constant 2020 pesos using GDP deflator data from the World Bank. The base year of 2019 was chosen because it is the most recent year for which GDP deflator data was available. Estimating the economic impact in constant prices facilitates comparisons over time.

Any GDP-related analysis uses the most recently available GDP data from INEGI.

### **CALCULATING THE COST OF HOMICIDE, VIOLENT CRIME AND ORGANIZED CRIME**

To calculate the cost for the categories of crime used in this study, IEP uses the data from the MPI.

Data on the incidence of homicide is sourced from the SESNSP. Homicides are multiplied by adjusted unit costs to calculate the total cost of homicide in Mexico.

Violent crime, which includes incidents of sexual violence, robbery and assault are also sourced from SESNSP and are adjusted for underreporting. For more details on the data and underreporting adjustment refer to page 80. The economic costs of each category of violent crime are calculated using the respective adjusted unit costs.

The cost of organized crime is based on the number of incidents of extortion and kidnapping or human trafficking. To estimate the total cost of extortions and kidnapping in Mexico, IEP assumes that extortions and robbery - as well as kidnapping and assault - are equivalent in terms of their economic impact on the victim.

Therefore, unit costs for the indirect costs are sourced from McCollister (2010) and applied to extortion and kidnapping. The direct cost for violent and organized crime are sourced from ENVIPE, a national household survey of victimization and perception of public safety and ENVE, a national survey of business victimization. These surveys collect data on the economic and health-related losses to the victim of violent and organized crime.

### **COST OF FEAR OF INSECURITY**

ENVIPE data is used to estimate the perception of insecurity at the state level in Mexico. IEP uses the proportion of respondents who felt insecure, multiplied by the state's population to arrive at the number of people who reported a fear of insecurity.

Victimization survey estimates are conducted yearly and are available from 2011 to 2020. Therefore, IEP estimates the fear of insecurity for the years for which data is not available. The unit cost of fear is taken from Dolan and Peasgood (2006), from which the adjusted unit cost is derived.

### **PROTECTION COSTS**

Protection costs represent spending by households and businesses on measures that reduces victimization from violent and organized crime. Both households and businesses take measures such as hiring private security, purchasing firearms or insurance, installing alarms, locks and changing place of residence or business to protect themselves in the face of high levels of crime and violence. This category replaces private security expenditure

and the cost of firearms.

Data for protection costs are sourced from INEGI, both for households and businesses. INEGI provides state level summaries of protection costs developed from the ENVIPE (household survey) and ENVE (business survey).

### **CALCULATING THE INDIRECT COST OF INCARCERATION**

The direct cost of incarceration is included in the government expenditure on domestic security and the justice system. Therefore, IEP only includes the indirect cost of incarceration, which is the lost income due to imprisonment. This is calculated using the Mexican minimum wage and the number of inmates that would have been in full-time employment. Data on the minimum wage for Mexico is sourced from the Department of Labor and Social Welfare (*Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social, STPS*). For 2020, the minimum wage of 123.22 pesos is used. This is calculated for a yearly wage of 32530.08 pesos. Literature suggests that 60 percent of people who were sentenced to prison had full-time employment prior to being in prison and 20 percent of them have some employment inside prison. Therefore, IEP considers that 60 percent of the inmates would have been in full time employment. The minimum wage lost is calculated for 60 percent of the prison population in Mexico.

### **ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT**

To estimate the total economic impact of violence, IEP uses a peace multiplier to estimate the additional economic activity that would have resulted if violence was avoided. The conceptual underpinning of the multiplier is the opportunity cost of the resources lost by the victim, perpetrator, and the law enforcement agencies due to the crime. Therefore, the peace multiplier represents the flow-on effects of redirected expenditure from violence containment to more economically enabling activities, such as business investment or education.



# POSITIVE PEACE METHODOLOGY

Positive Peace is defined as the *attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies*. IEP has measured Positive Peace at both the state and national levels in Mexico. The MPPI is based on the methodology for the global PPI, described in full in the 2020 Positive Peace Report, available at [www.visionofhumanity.org](http://www.visionofhumanity.org).

## MEXICO PEACE INDEX

The methodology for measuring Positive Peace at the state level is the same as that for the global index, but the indicators in the subnational MPPI differ slightly for two reasons:

- Subnational data on Positive Peace is limited
- Considerations specific to the Mexican context require some changes in indicators.

The sub-national index was derived from a different set of indicators using information sourced from reputable Mexican and international sources (Table 5.3). Due to the frequency of data

releases for some sources, the sub-national index is updated every two years.

Correlations between sub-national Positive Peace indicators and negative peace are relatively low (Table 5.3). For this reason, all indicators were weighted equally in building the Pillars and the overall score. Correlations are low presumably because most policies influencing socio-economic outcomes are set up at the national rather than state level. Thus, sub-national data may be more prone to statistical noise, that is, variations in the measurement statistic that reflect mostly methodological issues and data-gathering limitations rather than actual differences in the underlying social phenomenon being measured.

Further, in some countries – and this appears to be the case in Mexico – the states or regions with the highest standards of living are sometimes those with greater urbanization and interpersonal violence. In Mexico there is an added issue in that the most socio-economically developed states are also those where criminal organizations are more active.

TABLE 5.3

### Indicators in the sub-national Mexico Positive Peace Index, 2018

Pillar	Indicator name	Source	Correlation coefficient (to the MPI)
Equitable Distribution of Resources	Socially vulnerable population	CONEVAL	-0.16
	People living in poverty	CONEVAL	-0.24
	Average number of people per household	INEGI	-0.42
High Levels of Human Capital	Human Development Index - Education	UNDP	0.18
	Human Development Index - Health	UNDP	-0.02
	Scientific or technological companies/institutes	RENECYT	-0.23
Well-Functioning Government	How would you rate the performance of the municipal police?	ENVIPE	-0.17
	Are you aware of any actions taken by local authorities to construct or improve schooling	ENVIPE	-0.24
	Homicide sentencing rate	INEGI CNG	-0.53

Good Relations with Neighbors	Have most of your neighbors organized themselves to resolve or address theft?	ENVIPE	-0.54
	Trust in neighbors	ENVIPE	0.13
	Proportion of gross state product produced by tourism	INEGI compiled and normalized by IMCO	0.32
Low Levels of Corruption	Do you perceive the state police as being corrupt?	ENVIPE	-0.23
	Do you perceive the municipal police as being corrupt?	ENVIPE	0.08
	Do you perceive the public ministry and state attorneys as being corrupt?	ENVIPE	-0.24
Sound Business Environment	Doing Business	World Bank	-0.32
	GDP per capita, USD constant prices, PPP	OECD	-0.09
	Unemployment rate	INEGI	-0.09
Acceptance of the Rights of Others	Proportion of state population that affirm ISSSTE health services are provided in respectful manner	INEGI ENCIG	-0.14
	Proportion of municipal administration staff that is female	INEGI CNGMD	0.13
	Reported cases of discrimination per 100K population	INEGI, IEP calculations	0.06
Free Flow of Information	Attacks on journalists	Article 19	0.01
	Proportion of households with access to the Internet	INEGI	0.36
	Proportion of public institutions that have a website	INEGI CNGSPSPE	-0.04

Source: IEP

## CALCULATING STATE SCORES

The process for calculating state Positive Peace scores is similar to that described for calculating the MPI, but all indicators in the MPPI are evenly weighted. Thus, the indicators are normalized and banded, and then the arithmetic mean of indicator score is calculated as the score for each Pillar. The arithmetic mean of the Pillar scores is used for each state's overall score.

**APPENDICES**

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RESULTS TABLES

## APPENDIX A

# MPI RESULTS

Table A.1

### Overall Scores, 2015–2020

A lower score indicates a better level of peacefulness.

STATE	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
AGUASCALIENTES	1.815	1.710	2.026	2.176	2.272	2.197
BAJA CALIFORNIA	3.189	3.203	4.120	4.331	4.466	4.411
BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR	2.764	3.441	4.392	3.051	2.708	2.607
CAMPECHE	1.694	1.683	1.656	1.560	1.959	1.691
CHIAPAS	1.785	1.693	1.689	1.741	1.677	1.613
CHIHUAHUA	2.643	2.943	3.475	3.592	3.843	3.867
COAHUILA	2.366	1.799	1.813	1.951	2.043	2.003
COLIMA	2.529	3.815	3.807	3.996	4.230	4.203
DURANGO	2.215	2.159	2.252	2.158	2.171	2.088
GUANAJUATO	2.192	2.258	2.562	3.500	3.689	3.856
GUERRERO	3.551	3.900	3.838	3.886	3.650	3.150
HIDALGO	1.475	1.545	1.746	1.862	2.036	1.911
JALISCO	2.319	2.303	2.517	2.856	2.826	2.691
MÉXICO	2.683	2.433	2.624	2.726	2.909	2.943
MEXICO CITY	2.343	2.342	2.540	2.940	3.022	2.517
MICHOACÁN	2.249	2.464	2.593	2.730	3.014	3.142
MORELOS	2.714	2.814	2.669	2.823	3.367	3.143
NAYARIT	1.820	1.564	2.302	2.504	1.953	1.872
NUEVO LEÓN	2.281	2.505	2.585	2.535	2.591	2.496
OAXACA	1.629	2.104	2.211	2.485	2.466	2.266
PUEBLA	1.878	1.729	1.937	2.139	2.253	2.005
QUERÉTARO	1.633	1.668	1.847	2.039	2.347	2.390
QUINTANA ROO	2.354	2.014	2.576	3.504	4.012	3.304
SAN LUIS POTOSÍ	1.871	2.073	2.346	2.420	2.589	2.956
SINALOA	3.109	2.915	3.326	2.877	2.651	2.493
SONORA	2.766	2.794	2.613	2.436	3.013	3.312
TABASCO	2.261	2.313	2.572	3.084	2.929	2.448
TAMAULIPAS	2.860	2.756	2.968	2.822	2.415	2.216
TLAXCALA	1.400	1.415	1.471	1.504	1.554	1.587
VERACRUZ	1.539	1.839	2.271	2.169	2.398	2.150
YUCATÁN	1.443	1.406	1.311	1.236	1.252	1.318
ZACATECAS	2.183	2.596	3.188	3.321	3.421	4.170
<b>NATIONAL</b>	<b>2.268</b>	<b>2.294</b>	<b>2.543</b>	<b>2.710</b>	<b>2.792</b>	<b>2.694</b>

Source: IEP

Table A.2

**Indicator Scores, 2020**

A lower score indicates a better level of peacefulness.

STATE	HOMICIDE	VIOLENT CRIME	FIREARMS CRIME	ORGANIZED CRIME	DETENTION WITHOUT A SENTENCE
AGUASCALIENTES	1.368	3.167	1.49	3.425	1.307
BAJA CALIFORNIA	5	3.296	5	5	2.11
BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR	1.554	3.411	1.274	5	1.496
CAMPECHE	1.533	1.223	1.345	1.723	4.297
CHIAPAS	1.544	1.444	1.372	1.629	2.874
CHIHUAHUA	5	2.641	4.894	3.29	1.785
COAHUILA	1.495	2.274	1.312	3.204	1.766
COLIMA	5	3.344	5	4.224	1.418
DURANGO	1.649	2.463	1.455	2.904	2.196
GUANAJUATO	5	3.313	5	2.657	1.28
GUERRERO	3.485	2.308	3.337	3.962	1.499
HIDALGO	1.72	2.732	1.756	1.672	1.488
JALISCO	3.008	2.916	2.433	2.589	1.822
MÉXICO	2.06	4.783	2.38	3.536	1.271
MEXICO CITY	1.933	4.107	2.285	2.378	1.479
MICHOACÁN	4.195	2.225	4.41	1.856	1.798
MORELOS	3.942	3.429	3.094	2.42	1.414
NAYARIT	1.891	1.266	1.499	1.614	5
NUEVO LEÓN	2.023	2.727	2.421	3.393	1.503
OAXACA	2.487	2.55	2.573	1.628	1.606
PUEBLA	1.984	2.654	1.936	1.561	1.716
QUERÉTARO	1.584	3.013	1.608	4.084	1.29
QUINTANA ROO	3.419	3.944	2.755	3.689	1.551
SAN LUIS POTOSÍ	2.662	2.963	2.724	4.167	1.437
SINALOA	2.601	2.595	2.401	2.747	1.387
SONORA	4.3	2.28	3.412	3.234	2.268
TABASCO	2.501	3.36	2.335	1.942	1.464
TAMAULIPAS	2.237	2.783	1.747	2.396	1.35
TLAXCALA	1.583	1.305	1.289	1.581	3.098
VERACRUZ	2.135	2.178	2.199	2.316	1.569
YUCATÁN	1.167	1.133	1.042	1.454	2.697
ZACATECAS	5	2.754	4.647	5	1.404
<b>NATIONAL</b>	<b>2.743</b>	<b>2.991</b>	<b>2.65</b>	<b>2.812</b>	<b>1.529</b>

Source: IEP

## APPENDIX B

# ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

Table B.1

### The economic impact of violence 2020, constant 2020 pesos

STATE	ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE (BILLIONS)	PER CAPITA ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE	ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE % GDP
AGUASCALIENTES	51.9	36,158	14.5%
BAJA CALIFORNIA	259.6	71,413	31.5%
BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR	28.8	35,761	13.4%
CAMPECHE	21.6	21,543	2.2%
CHIAPAS	78.7	13,742	17.8%
CHIHUAHUA	233.9	61,538	29.0%
COAHUILA	59.0	18,344	6.2%
COLIMA	61.2	77,957	38.4%
DURANGO	38.6	20,650	11.5%
GUANAJUATO	420.6	67,536	41.9%
GUERRERO	138.7	37,922	41.6%
HIDALGO	78.1	25,302	19.8%
JALISCO	323.5	38,466	17.7%
MÉXICO	589.7	33,836	25.3%
MEXICO CITY	400.0	44,355	7.3%
MICHOACÁN	242.8	50,321	40.0%
MORELOS	106.5	52,101	38.7%
NAYARIT	28.6	22,219	14.2%
NUEVO LEÓN	155.3	27,681	7.4%
OAXACA	130.8	31,565	35.8%
PUEBLA	206.2	31,227	21.9%
QUERÉTARO	99.3	43,574	14.4%
QUINTANA ROO	80.8	46,871	23.0%
SAN LUIS POTOSÍ	91.9	32,053	17.0%
SINALOA	101.3	32,089	17.3%
SONORA	147.9	48,117	17.0%
TABASCO	85.2	33,133	11.2%
TAMAULIPAS	107.3	29,404	13.9%
TLAXCALA	28.0	20,310	15.4%
VERACRUZ	196.9	23,060	16.1%
YUCATÁN	25.2	11,146	4.8%
ZACATECAS	96.6	57,953	44.1%
<b>NATIONAL</b>	<b>4714.7</b>		

Source: IEP

Table B.2

**The economic impact of violence 2015–2020, constant 2020 pesos, billions**

STATE	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
AGUASCALIENTES	32.4	33.1	39.3	43.6	47.7	51.9
BAJA CALIFORNIA	153.1	160.5	237.5	287.8	267.8	259.6
BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR	32.6	40.4	76.0	34.8	33.3	28.8
CAMPECHE	17.4	21.4	19.8	21.1	22.3	21.6
CHIAPAS	93.6	90.4	93.0	99.9	92.5	78.7
CHIHUAHUA	133.2	156.3	195.0	221.9	237.5	233.9
COAHUILA	69.2	67.8	68.5	74.7	72.3	59.0
COLIMA	23.7	53.5	72.1	65.5	68.8	61.2
DURANGO	47.3	47.6	45.5	43.4	42.6	38.6
GUANAJUATO	167.4	179.0	207.0	336.7	358.4	420.6
GUERRERO	196.4	207.4	226.0	221.7	185.2	138.7
HIDALGO	53.0	59.7	69.4	77.6	88.1	78.1
JALISCO	199.5	236.3	266.7	314.5	325.7	323.5
MÉXICO	601.8	552.5	601.3	638.3	628.7	589.7
MEXICO CITY	276.2	273.6	289.3	371.9	356.8	400.0
MICHOACÁN	138.2	166.5	180.7	197.8	226.7	242.8
MORELOS	85.1	93.9	91.0	107.3	118.2	106.5
NAYARIT	20.4	15.8	36.3	40.8	28.8	28.6
NUEVO LEÓN	121.4	142.4	143.6	171.7	155.9	155.3
OAXACA	55.2	130.0	131.2	157.0	157.5	130.8
PUEBLA	133.9	148.6	161.1	201.2	209.4	206.2
QUERÉTARO	53.8	51.6	55.6	65.7	65.1	99.3
QUINTANA ROO	48.6	40.3	55.7	88.4	93.5	80.8
SAN LUIS POTOSÍ	57.0	63.7	79.3	93.7	80.2	91.9
SINALOA	114.9	126.4	159.6	123.3	109.8	101.3
SONORA	91.0	99.6	103.4	108.0	138.0	147.9
TABASCO	64.3	70.9	83.5	96.9	101.7	85.2
TAMAULIPAS	127.0	136.9	151.0	145.8	125.9	107.3
TLAXCALA	24.3	24.1	26.5	29.2	31.8	28.0
VERACRUZ	141.0	188.0	231.7	225.0	231.0	196.9
YUCATÁN	37.9	41.1	35.9	38.1	27.1	25.2
ZACATECAS	43.3	62.2	73.5	73.3	74.0	96.6
<b>NATIONAL</b>	<b>3,453.8</b>	<b>3,781.6</b>	<b>4,306.3</b>	<b>4,816.7</b>	<b>4,802.7</b>	<b>4,714.7</b>

Source: IEP

Table B.3

**The economic impact of violence by category, 2020, constant 2020 pesos, billions**

STATE	GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE (MILITARY, DOMESTIC SECURITY AND JUSTICE SYSTEM)	INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE	PROTECTION COSTS
AGUASCALIENTES	10.5	39.7	1.7
BAJA CALIFORNIA	20.0	234.9	4.7
BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR	10.0	17.5	1.3
CAMPECHE	9.1	11.7	0.7
CHIAPAS	21.4	55.1	2.3
CHIHUAHUA	19.6	211.4	2.9
COAHUILA	15.3	41.3	2.4
COLIMA	9.2	50.7	1.3
DURANGO	12.0	25.6	1.0
GUANAJUATO	24.9	386.5	9.3
GUERRERO	17.1	119.2	2.4
HIDALGO	14.5	61.6	1.9
JALISCO	31.9	282.8	8.7
MÉXICO	60.7	515.3	13.7
MEXICO CITY	40.3	211.4	148.3
MICHOACÁN	19.7	219.0	4.2
MORELOS	12.6	91.7	2.2
NAYARIT	9.8	17.4	1.4
NUEVO LEÓN	24.2	117.0	14.1
OAXACA	17.5	110.6	2.7
PUEBLA	24.5	171.9	9.8
QUERÉTARO	12.5	84.5	2.4
QUINTANA ROO	11.5	67.4	1.9
SAN LUIS POTOSÍ	13.9	75.5	2.5
SINALOA	15.8	83.1	2.4
SONORA	17.2	126.1	4.6
TABASCO	13.9	69.4	1.9
TAMAULIPAS	16.9	88.0	2.4
TLAXCALA	9.5	17.1	1.4
VERACRUZ	29.4	161.8	5.7
YUCATÁN	11.8	11.6	1.8
ZACATECAS	11.1	83.8	1.8
<b>NATIONAL</b>	<b>588.3</b>	<b>3,860.7</b>	<b>265.6</b>

Source: IEP

## ENDNOTES

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## SECTION 2: ECONOMIC VALUE OF PEACE IN MEXICO

- The average conversion rate equal to one Mexican Peso to 0.046895 United States Dollar is used.
- Sourced from Unidad de Planeación Económica de la Hacienda Pública and includes general economic, commercial, and labor affairs, agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, fuel and energy, mining, manufacturing and construction, transport, communications, tourism, science, technology and innovation and other industries and other economic affairs. "Desarrollo económico"
- Calculated using the 2021 EVP economic impact of violence and includes the indicators military expenditure, internal security expenditure and private security expenditure.
- Calculated using the 2021 EVP economic impact of violence homicide indicator.

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
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